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Golan v. Holder
10-545
Ruling Below: Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (lOth Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600
(2011).
In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, restoring copyright protection to
a number of foreign works previously in the public domain. Lawrence Golan, a music conductor,
director, and professor, along with a number of educators, performers, publishers, film archivists,
and motion picture distributors brought suit, arguing URAA §514 is unconstitutional because it
. violates their First Amendment rights by removing works from the public domain. The district
court first granted summary judgment to the government, holding that private censorship via
copyright does not implicate the First Amendment. On appeal, the 10th Circuit remanded,
directing the lower court to apply an appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny. The parties
agreed to a characterization of the URAA as a content-neutral restriction on speech subject to
intermediate scrutiny. The district court then granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding
that the URAA violated their First Amendment rights. In 2010, the 10th Circuit reversed the
ruling, holding that URAA §514 satisfies intermediate scrutiny and that enacting §514 lay within
Congress's Article I powers.
Questions Presented: (l) Does the Progress Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I,
§ 8, cl. 8, prohibit Congress from taking works out of the public domain? (2) Does Section 514
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act violate the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution?
Lawrence GOLAN; Estate of Richard Kapp; S.A. Publishing Co., Inc., doing business as
ESS.A.Y. Recordings; Symphony of the Canyons; Ron Hall, doing business as Festival
Films; John McDonough, doing business as Timeless Video Alternatives International,
Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants,

v.
Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States;
Marybeth Peters, in her official capacity as Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office of the
United States, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees. ·Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc.; International Coalition for Copyright Protection; The AmericanSociety Of
Composers, Authors and Publishers; The American Society of Media Photographers; The
Association ofAmerican Publishers; Broadcast Music, Inc.; The Music Publishers .
Association of the United States; The Software and Information Industry Association; The
Recording Industry Association of America; Reed Elservier, Inc.; Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt Publishing Co.; Professor Daniel Gervais, Amici Curiae.
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Filed June 21,2010
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[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
BRISCOE, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs brought this action challenging the
constitutionality of Section 514 of the
Uruguay. Round
Agreements
Act
("URAA"), which granted copyright
protection to various foreign works that
were previously in the public domain in the
United States. The district cOUli granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
concluding that Section 514 violates
plaintiffs' freedom of expression under the
First Amendment. In Case No. 09-1234, the
government appeals the district cOUli's order
granting plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and denying the government's
motion, arguing that Section 514 is a valid,
content-neutral regulation of speech. In Case
No.
09-1261, plaintiffs cross-appeal,
contending that the statute is facially invalid
and that they are entitled to injunctive relief.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and conclude that Section 514
of the URAA is not violative of the First
Amendment.
I. Statutory Background

In 1989, the United States joined the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Atiistic Works ("Berne Convention").
The Berne Convention requires each
signatory to provide the same copyright
protections to authors in other member
countries that it provides to its own authors.
Pursuant to Article 18, when a country joins
the Convention, it must provide copyright
protection to preexisting foreign works even
when those works were previously in the
public domain in that country. However,
when the United States joined the Berne
Convention, the implementing legislation
did not extend copyrights to any foreign

works that were already m the public
domain in the United States.
In April .1994, the United States signed
various trade agreements in the Uruguay
Round General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Included in this round of agreements
was the Agreement on Trade Related·
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs). The TRIPs agreement required, in
part,that its signatories comply with Article
18 of the Berne Convention, and thus,
extend copyright protection to all works of
foreign origin whose term of protection had
not expired. Unlike the Berne Convention,.
the TRIPs agreement provided for dispute
resolution before the World Trade
Organization.
In order to comply with these international
agreements, Congress enacted the URAA. In .
particular, Section 514 of the URAA
implements Article 18 of the Berne
"restores"
Convention.
Section
514
copyrights in foreign works that were
formerly in the public domain in the United
States for one of three specified reasons:
.failure to comply with formalities, lack of
subject matter protection, or lack of national
eligibility. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a),
(h)(6)(C). Section 514 does not restore
copyrights in foreign works that entered the
public domain through the expiration of the
term of protection.
In addition to restoring copyrights in
preexisting foreign works, Section 514
provides some· protections for reliance
parties such as plaintiffs who had exploited
these works prior to their restoration. In
order to enforce a restored copyright against
a reliance party, a foreign copyright owner
must either file notice with the Copyright
Office within twenty-four months of
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restoration, or serve actual notice on the
reliance patiy. A reliance party is liable for
infringing acts that occur after the end of a
twelve month grace period, starting from
notice of restoration. Reliance parties may
sell or otherwise dispose of restored works
during this grace period, but they cannot
make additional copies during this time.
Section 514 provides further protections for
reliance parties Who, prior to restoration,
created a derivative work that was based on
a restored work. Under Section 514, "a
reliance patiy may continue to exploit that
derivative work for the duration of the
restored copyright if the reliance party pays
to the owner of the restored copyright
reasonable compensation. . . ." If the parties
are unable to agree on· reasonable
compensation, a federal court will determine
the amount of compensation.
II. Factual and Procedural Background

The factual background is not in dispute.
Plaintiffs
are
orchestra
conductors,
educators, performers, publishers, film
archivists, and motion picture distributors
who have relied on artistic works in the
public domain for their livelihoods. They
perform, distribute, and sell public domain
works. The late plaintiff Kapp created a
derivative work-a sound recording based
on several compositions by Dmitri
Shostakovich. Section 514 of the URAA
provided copyright protection to these
foreign works, removing them from the
public domain in the United States. As a
result, plaintiffs are either prevented from
using these works or are required to pay
licensing fees to the copyright holders-fees
that are often cost-prohibitive for plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs filed this action, challenging the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, and Section 514 of the
URAA, seeking declaratory and injunctive

relief. Initially, the district court granted
summary judgment to the government. On
appeal, we concluded that plaintiffs'
challenge to the Copyright Term Extension
Act was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
123 S.Ct. 769, 154 L.Ed.2d 683 (2003). We
also held that "[Section] 514 of the URAA
ha[d] not exceeded the limitations inherent
in the Copyright Clause" of the United
States Constitution. We recognized that
"legislation promulgated pursuant to the
Copyright Clause must still comport with
of. the
other
express
limitations
Constitution," and concluded that plaintiff~
had "shown sufficient free expression
interests in works removed from the public
domain to require First Amendment scrutiny
of [Section] 514," We then remanded the
case to the district court to "assess whether
[Section] 514 is content-based or contentneutral," and to apply the appropriate level
of constitutional scrutiny.
On remand, the parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. The government and
plaintiffs agreed that Section 514 is a
content-neutral regulation of speech, and
thus should be subject to intermediate
scrutiny. The district court concluded that
"to the extent Section 514 suppresses the
right of reliance parties to use works they
exploited while the works were in the public
domain," Section 514 was unconstitutional.
Consequently, the district cOUli granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
and denied the government's motion.
The government timely appealed the district
court's order, arguing that Section 514 of the
URAA does not violate the First
Amendment.
Plaintiffs cross-appealed,
arguing that the district court failed to
provide all of the relief that they requested.
Specifically, plaintiffs request that we
adjudicate their facial challenge to Section
514, direct the district court to enjoin
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Attorney General Holder from enforcing the
statute, and order the Register of Copyrights
Marybeth Peters to cancel the copyright
registrations of restored works.
III. Government's Appeal
"We review de novo challenges to, the
constitutionality of a statute." Because this
case implicates the First Amendment, "we
have 'an obligatiOIi to make an independent
examination of the whole record in order to
make sure that the judgment does not
cons,titute a forbidden intrusion on the field
of free expression.'"
The parties agree that Section 514 of the
DRAA is a content-neutral regulation of
speech, and thus, is subject to intermediate
scrutiny. Although their position is "not
controlling given Our special standard of de
novo review," we agree that Section 514 is a
content-neutral regulation of speech.
In determining whether a regulation is
content-neutral or content-based, "'the
government's purpose in enacting the
regulation is the controlling consideration.'"
The primary inquiry "is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys." "If the regulation
serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression it is considered neutral, even if it
has an incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others." On its face,
Section 514 is content-neutral. Moreover,
there is no indication that the government
adopted Section 514 "'because of agreement
or disagreement with the message [that the
regulated speech] conveys.'" Congress
primarily enacted Section 514 to comply
with the United States' international
obligations and to protect American authors'
rights abroad. Therefore, we agree that it is a
content-neutral regulation.

In reviewing the constitutionality of a
content-neutral regulation of speech, we
apply "an intern1ediate level of scrutiny,
because in most cases [such regulations]
pose a less substantial risk of excising ,
certain ideas or viewpoints from the public
dialogue." Applying intermediate scrutiny, a
content-neutral statute "will be sustained ,
under the First Amendment if 'it advances
important governmental interests unrelated
to the suppression of free speech and does
not burden substantially more speech than
necessary to further those interests."
The government argues on appeal that
Section 514 is narrowly tailored to
advancing three impOliant governmental
interests:
(1)
attaining
indisputable
compliance with international treaties and
multilateral agreements, (2) obtaining legal
protections for American copyright holders'
interests abroad, and (3) remedying past
inequities of foreign authors who lost or
never obtained copyrights in the United
States. 'We hold that. the government has
demonstrated a substantial interest in
protecting American copyright holders'
interests abroad, and Section 514 is
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
Consequently, the district court erred in
concluding that Section 514 violates
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.

A. Governmental Interest
1. Section 514 addres($es a substantial or
important governmental interest.
In order for a statute to survive intermediate
scrutiny, the statute must be directed at an
important or substantial governmental
interest unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. See Turner L 512 U.S. at 662,
114 S.Ct. 2445. We have no difficulty in
concluding that the government's interest in
securing protections abroad for American
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copyright holders satisfies this standard.
Copyright serves to advance both the
economic. and expressive interests of
. American authors. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at
211-13, 123 S.Ct. 769. In addition to
creating economic incentives that further
expression, copyright also serves authors'
First Amendment interests. "[F]reedom of
thought and expression 'includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all. '" "Courts and
commentators have
recognized that
copyright . . . servers] this countervailing
First Amendment value" of the freedom not
to speak.
Plaintiffs c.ontend that the government does .
not have an important interest in a
"reallocation of speech interests" between
American reliance parties and American
copyright holders. However, the Supreme
Court has recognized that not all First
Amendment interests are equal. "The First
Amendment securely protects the freedom
to make-or decline to make-one's own
speech; it bears less heavily when speakers
assert the right to make other people's
speeches." Although plaintiffs have First
Amendment interests, so too do American
authors.
Securing foreign copyrights for American
works preserves the authors' economic and
expressive interests. These interests are at
least as important or substantial as other
interests that the Supreme Court has found
to be sufficiently important or substantial to
satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Accordingly,
Section 514 advances an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of free expression.
2. Section 514 addresses a real harm.

The government's asserted interest cannot

be merely important in the abstract-the
sti:ltute must be directed at a real, and not
merely conjectural, harm. Thus, we must .
examine whether Section 514 was "designed
to address a real harm, and whether [it] will
alleviate [that harm] in a material way." In
undertaldng this review, we "must accord
substantial deference to the predictive
judgments of Congress. Our sole obligation
is to assure that, in formulating its
judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence."
"[S]ubstantiality is to be measured in this
context by a standard more deferential than
we accord to judgments of an administrative
agency." This deferential standard is
warranted for two important reasons. First,
Congress is "far better equipped" as an
institution "to amass and evaluate the vast
amounts of data bearing upon the legislative
questions." Second, we OWIe Congress "an
additional measure of deference out of
respect for its authority to exercise the
legislative power."
. Even in the . realm of First
Amendment
questions
where
Congress must base. its conclusions
upon substantial evidence, deference
must be accorded to its findings as to
the harm to be avoided and to the
remedial measures adopted for that
end, lest we infringe on traditional
legislative authority to make
predictive judgments....
Additionally, the other branches' judgments
tegarding foreign affairs walTant special
deference from the courts. The Supreme
Court has "consistently acknowledged that
the nuances of the foreign policy of the
United States are much more the province of
the Executive Branch and Congress than of
[the courts]." As such, we apply
considerable deference to Congress and the
276

. Executive in making decisions that require
predictive judgments in the areas of foreign
affairs.

3. Substantial evidence supported the
conclusion that Section 514 would alleviate
these harms.

To be clear, we do not suggest that
Congress's decisions regarding foreign
affairs are entirely immune from the
requirements of the First Amendment.
Rather, we merely acknowledge that in
undertaking our constitutional review of a
content-neutral
statute,
Congress's
predictive judgments are entitled· to
"substantial deference," and in this
particular context, our review of Congress's
predictive judgments is fmiher informed by
the special deference that Congress and the
Executive Branch deserve in matters of
foreign affairs.

Next, we must determine whether there was
. substantial evidence from which Congress
could conclude that Section 514 would
alleviate these harms to American copyright
holders. At the Joint Hearings, Congress
heard testimony that by refusing to restore
copyrights in foreign works in the public
domain, the. United States was not in
compliance with its obligations under the
Berne Convention. In addition, the United
States' refusal to restore foreign copyrigh~s
was harming American authors' interests
abroad: foreign countries were following the
United States' example of refusing to restore
copyrights in works in the public domain.

Turning to the issue at hand, pnor to·
enacting Section 514 of the URAA,
Congress heard testimony addressing the
interests of American copyright holders. In
particular,
American
works
were
unprotected in several foreign countries, to·
the detriment.of the United States' interests.
By some estimates, billions of dollars were
being lost each year because foreign
countries were not providing copyright
protections to American works that were in
the public domain abroad.
Congress had substantial evidence from
which it could reasonably conclude that the
ongoing harms to American authors were
real and not merely conjectural. Around the
globe, American works were being exploited
without the copyright owners' consent and
without providing compensation. Thus, there
was a "substantial basis to support
Congress' conclusion that a real threat
justified enactment of' Section 514 of the
URAA.

Further, the United States' trading partners
had represented that they would restore
American copyrights only if the United
States restored foreign copyrights. Foreign
countries were willing to provide, at most,
reciprocal copyright protections to American
works. Moreover, the United States had an
opportunity to set an example for copyright
restoration for other countries. Thus, if the
United States wanted certain protections for
American authors, it had to provide those
. protections for foreign authors.
Plaintiffs aver that Congress was presepted
with evidence regarding the need to restore
copyrights generally, but that there was no
evidence that Congryss needed to provide
. limited protections for reliance parties.
According to plaintiffs, there is "no support
for the conclusion that enacting more
stringent measures against reliance parties ..
. would have any impact whatsoever on the
behavior of foreign countries." To the
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contrary, Congress heard testimony that the
United States' chosen method and scope of
copyright restoration would impact other
hations that were similarly deciding how to
restore copyrights.
In particular, Congress heard testimony that
the United States could set an example
regarding copyright restoration, and other
countries might mirror the United States'
approach. For example, Ira Shapiro, General
Counsel of the Office of the United States '
Trade Representative, testified that "the
choices made in our implementation of the
TRIPs agreement will set an example for
other countries as governments decide on
their own implementing legislation as well
as influence future disputes over the
obligations of the Agreement." Additionally,
Eric Smith, spealdng on behalf of a
consortium of trade associations whose
members represented both American
copyright industries and reliance parties,
testified as follows:
The fact is that what the United
States does' in this area will carry
. great weight in the international
community. If we. interpret Article
18 and the TRIPS provisions to deny
protection or significantly limit its
scope, our trading partners-just
now
considering
their.
own
implementing legislation-will feel
free to simply mirror our views. If
the largest exporter of copyrighted
material in the world takes the
position that we have no, or only
limited, obligations, the United
States will have little credibility ih
convincing particularly the new
nations with whom we are just
starting copyright relations to give us
the expansive protection that we
need.

Joint Hearings at 247 (emphasis added).

Thus~ Congress heard testimony from a

number of witnesses that the United States'
position on the scope of copyright
restoration-which necessarily includes the
enforcement against reliance parties-was
critical to the United States' ability to obtain
similar protections for American copyright
holders.
Further, Congress squarely faced the need to
balance the interests of American copyright
holders and American reliance parties. In his
opening remarks, Senator DeConcini stated:
The conventional wisdom within the
U.S. copyright community is that
through the restoration of copyright
protection to foreign authors we will
get more than we give because U.S.
authors will be able to retrieve far
more works in foreign countries than
foreign authors will retrieve here in
the United States.

. [I]f we set out t,o restore
copyright protection to foreign
works, we must provide protection
that is complete and meaningful. By
the same token, we must ensure that
copyright
restoration
provides
reliance
users
a
sufficient
opportunity
to
recoup
their
investment.

fd. at 81-82 (Statement of Sen. DeConcini).
Congress also heard from Eric Smith, who
testified that the' bills under consideration
would
provide' a careful balance between
the need, on the one hand, to
establish a "model" provision which
other countries could follow in order
to secure effective restoration of our
copyrights abroad and the need, on
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the other hand, to balance the rights
of foreign authors whose works are
restored in the u.s. with the
domestic users that may have relied
on the public domain status of the
work in making investments.
Id. at 252.

In spite of this testimony, plaintiffs contend
that the government's interest is too
speculative to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.
Although we require "substantial evidence"
in order to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, the
evidentiary requirement is not as onerous as
plaintiffs would have us impose. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that imposing
too strict of an evidentiary requirement on
Congress is "an improper burden for courts
to impose on the Legislative Branch." An
overly demanding "amount of detail is as
unreasonable in the legislative context as it
is constitutionally unwarranted. Congress is
not' obligated, when enacting its statutes, to
make a record of the type that an
administrative agency or court does to
accommodate judicial review."
"Sound policymaking often requires
legislators to forecast future events and to
anticipate the likely impact of these events
based on deductions and inferences for
which complete empirical support may be
unavailable." Past conduct may be, the
best-and
sometimes
only-evidence
available to Congress in making predictive
judgments. We think that this is especially
'true in areas that involve predictions of
foreign relations and diplomacy, where
empirical data will rarely be available, and
to which considerable deference is owed to
Congress and the Executive.
Plaintiffs direct our attention to evidence in
the Congressional record that contradicted
the, view that other ,countries would follow

the United States' approach to copyright
restoration. More specifically, Irwin Karp
stated:
When
these
countries
grant
retroactivity, the theory goes, they'
will deny their reliance interests real
protection-if we do so now. But this
is only a theory, and an unlikely one.
Most foreign countries, including the
Commonwealth countries, already
grant us retroactivity. They will not
change their laws to restrict
protection of their reliance patiies.
Nor will the few important countries
who presently. do not retroactively
protect U.S. works [.J When they do
grant retroactivity they can decide
what protection they will grant to
their reliance interests. There is
nothing to stop them from adopting
the British et al buy-out provision.
Joint Hearings at 231.
However, as detailed above, this was not the
only evidence, in the record regarding the
potential effect of the United States' position
on copyright restoration. Congress also
heard testimony that if it wanted foreign
countries to provide strong protections for
American authors, Congress needed to
provide like protections for foreign authors.
Although Congress was presented with
evidence that its position on copyright
restoration
might
not
guarantee
reciprocation, it does not follow that Section
514 is unconstitutional. "The Constitution
gives to Congress the role of weighing
conflicting evidence in the legislative
process." Thus, we must determine
"whether, given conflicting views . . . ,
Congress had substantial evidence for
making the judgment that it did." In other
words, "[tJhe question is not whether
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Congress, as an objective matter, was
correct to determine" that limited
protections for reliance parties were
"necessary" to gamer similar protections
from foreign countries. "Rather, the question
is whether the legislative conclusion was
reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence in the record before Congress."
In making that determination, we are
not to reweigh the evidence de novo,
. or to replace Congress' factual
predictions with our own. Rather, we
are simply to determine if the
standard is satisfied. If it is, summary
judgment for [the govelnment] is
appropriate regardless of whether the
evidence is in Qonfiict.
(internal
omitted).

Id.

quotations

and

citations

Considering the deference that Congress is
owed, particularly in areas of foreign
relations, we conclude that Congress's
judgments were supported .by substantial
evidence. The testimony before Congress
indicated that the United States' historically
lax position on copyright restoration had
been an obstacle to the protection that the
United States was seeking for its own
copyright owners. Witnesses further testified
that many countries would. provide no
greater protections to American authors than
the United States gave to their foreign
counterparts. There was also testimony that
the chosen method of restoring foreign
copyrights would have great weight in the
international community and could induce
other countries to follow the United States'
lead, although Congress heard some
testimony that other countries would not
necessarily follow the United States'
approach. Consequently, Congress was
presented with substantial evidence that
514
would
advance
the
Section

government's
interest
in
protecting
American copyright holders "in a direct and
effective way." The United States' ability to
protect American works abroad would be
achieved less effectively absent Section 514,
and therefore, the government's interest is
genuinely advanced by restoring foreign
copyrights with limited protections for
reliance parties such as plaintiffs.
B. Section 514 does not burden substantially
more speech than necessary.

Under intermediate scrutiny, we must also
determine whether Section 514 is narrowly
tailored to further the governinent's
interests. "Content-neutral regulations do
not pose the same inherent dangers to free
expression that content-based regulations
do," and therefore, the government has a
degree of latitude in choosing how to further
its . asselied interest. Accordingly, "the
[g]overnment may employ the means of its
choosing so long as the regulation promotes
a substantial governmental interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation and does not burden
substantially more speech than is necessary
to further that interest. " Further, the
regulation need not be the least-restrictive
alternative of advancing the government's
interest.
1. Section 514 is narrowly tailored.

The "[g]overnment may not regulate
expression in such a manner that a
substantial portion of the burden on speech
does not serve to advance its goals." "[T]he
essence of narrow tailoring" is when a
regulation "focuses on the source of the
evils the [government] seeks to eliminate ...
without at the same time banning or
significantly restricting a substantial
quantity of speech that does not create the
same evils." That is, when "the burden
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imposed by [a regulation] is congruent to the
benefits it affords," that regulation is
narrowly tailored.
In the case at bar, the burdens imposed on
the reliance parties are congruent with the
benefits . Section 514 affords American
copyright holders. As discussed above, the
govemment has a substantial interest in
securing protections for American works in
foreign countries. Further, Congress heard
testimony that the United States could
expect foreign countries to provide only as
much protection to. American copyright
holders as the United States would provide
to· foreign copyright holders, and other
countries might follow the United States'
example. In other words, the United States
needed to impose the same burden on
American reliance parties that it sought to
impose on foreign reliance parties. Thus, the
benefit that the govemment sought to
provide to American authors is congruent
with the burden that Section 514 imposes on
, reliance parties. The burdens on speech are
therefore directly focused to the harms that
the govemment sought to alleviate: "This is
the essence 6fnarrow tailoring."
2. Alternatives do not undermine the narrow
tailoring ofSection 514.

Plaintiffs contend that "the Govemment
could have complied with the Beme
Convention while providing· significantly
stronger protection for the First Amendment
interests of reliance parties like the Plaintiffs
here." According to plaintiffs, Article 18 of
the Beme Convention provides considerable.
discretion that allows the govemment to
provide greater protections for reliance
parties. The government responds that the
Beme Convention requires only transitional
protections for reliance parties.
The parties' arguments about what the Beme
Convention requires and permits are beside

the point. As discussed above, the
govemment's interest is not limited to
.compliance with the Beme Convention.
Rather, its interest includes securing
protections for American copyright owners
in foreign countries, which includes
providing copyright protection against
. foreign reliance parties. Thus, it is
immaterial whether, as plaintiffs contend,
the govemment could have complied with
the minimal obligations of the Berne.
Convention and granted stronger protections
for American reliance parties. If Congress
had provided stronger protections to
American reliance parties such as plaintiffs,
many foreign countries may have provided
similar· protections for. their own reliance
parties, thereby providing less protection for
American authors. Thus, even assuming for
purposes of this appeal that the United
States could have provided stronger
protections for American reliance parties
while complying with the mInImum
requirements of the Beme Convention,
Section 514 does not burden substantially
more speech than necessary to further the
govemment's interest.
Moreover, in concluding that Section 514 is
not narrowly tailored, the district court and
plaintiffs relied on other countries'
approaches to implementing the Beme
Convention, specifically, the United
Kingdom model. However, we are not
persuaded that the constitutionality of
Section 514 is undermined by the
availability of the United Kingdom model.
First, the "less restrictive-altemative
analysis has never been a part of the inquiry
into the validity of content-neutral
regulations on speech." A statute must be
"narrowly tailored to serve the govemment's
legitimate, content-neutral interests," but it
"need not be the least restrictive or least
intrusive means of doing so." As long as the
govemment does not burden substantially
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more speech than necessary to advance an
important interest, we will not invalidate a
statute simply because "the government's
interest could be adequately served by some
less-speech-restrictive altemative."
Second, to the extent that the United
Kingdom model is relevant to our .inquiry, it
is not such an obvious and substantially lessspeech-restrictive
altemative
that
it
undermines the validity of Section 514.
Although not necessary to the intermediate
scrutiny analysis, the existence of lessspeech-restrictive altematives may be
relevant to determining whether Section 514
is nan-owly tailored. '''The availability of
less burdensome' altematives to reach the
stated goal signals that the fit between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to
accomplish those ends may be too imprecise
to withstand First Amendment scrutiny.'
This is particularly true when such
altematives are obvious and restrict
substantially less speech." We do not
suggest that the existence of a less restrictive
altemative is dispositive. "We merely
recognize the reality that the existence of an
obvious and substantially less restrictive
means for advancing the desired government
objective [may] indicate[ ] a lack of nan-ow
tailoring."
With this in mind, we turn to plaintiffs'
suggestion that there were less restrictive
means of restoring foreign copyrights.
Although no country has provided full,
permanent exemptions for reliance parties,
other countries have provided limited
protections for reliance' parties. The chief
altemative discussed by plaintiffs and the
district court is the United Kingdom model.
See Golan, 611 F.Supp.2d at 1174 However,
the United Kingdom model is not an
obvious and substantially less restrictive
altemative.

***
The United Kingdom model is not
substantially less restrictive of speech. than
Section 514 of the URAA. In the United
Kingdom, a copyright owner cannot enforce
the copyright against a reliance party unless
the owner "buys out" the reliance party.
Under Section 514, a copyright owner
cannot enforce the copyright against a
reliance party unless the owner files notice
with the Copyright Office or serves notice
on a reliance party. Moreover, under Section
514, reliance parties have twelve months to
continue exploiting the works, although they
cannot continue to' make copies .of the
restored work. Under the United Kingdom
model, however, the reliance party's
interests are immediately terminated upon
buy-out. Thus, under both systems, reliance
parties receive qualified protection insofar
as a reliance party can continue to exploit a
work until the copyright owner does
something: either buyout the reliance party
(United Kingdom model) or file notice
(Section 514). Ultimately, both approaches
provide the copyright owner with the ability
to terminate the reliance party's interests.
The only significant difference is that under
the United Kingdom model, the reliance
party . receives compensation from the
owner, while under Section 514, the reliance
party has a twelve month grace period to
continue exploiting the work.
Further, the United Kingdom model is not
far more protective of speech interests of
reliance parties who have created derivative
works, . such as' the late plaintiff Kapp.
Section 514 allows these reliance parties to
continue to use a derivative work as long as
they pay "reasonable compensation" to the
copyright owner. The United Kingdom
model, on the other hand, apparently
provides no such protection for creators of
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derivative works. In a sense, the two models
are mirror images of each other. Under
Section 514, a reliance party can continue to
exploit a derivative work as long as he pays
compensation to the owner of the original
copyright. In the United Kingdom, an author
of a derivative work can continue to exploit
the new work until the owner pays
compensation to the reliance party.
We cannot say that one approach is clearly
more protective. of speech interests than the
other. Although the United Kingdom model
is arguably more protective of reliance
parties' economic interests, we cannot say
that it is substantially more protective of
reliance parties' expressive interests.
Moreover, even if the United Kingdom
model is marginally more protective of
speech interests,
when . evaluating a content-neutral
regulation
which
incidentally
burdens speech, we will not
invalidate the preferred remedial
scheme because some alternative
solution is marginally less intrusive
on a speaker's First Amendment
interests. So long as the means
chosen are not substantially broader
than necessary to achieve the
government's interest, the regulation
will not be invalid simply because a
court
concludes
that
the
government's interest could be
adequately served by some lessspeech-restrictive alternative.
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 217-18, 117 S.Ct.

1174. (internal citations, quotations, and
ellipses omitted).
At its core, plaintiffs' challenge to Section
514 "reflect[s] little more than disagreement
over the level of protection" that reliance
parties should receive .. Congress sought to

balance the interests between American
copyright holders and American reliance
parties. In so doing, Congress crafted a
nuanced statute that offered some
protections for both of these competing
interests. It is not our role to opine on the
best method of striking this balance. A
statute's "validity does not tum on a
[court's] agreement with the responsible
decisionmaker
concerning the most
appropriate
method
for
promoting
significant government interests." Plaintiffs
may have preferred a different method of
restoring copyrights in foreign works, but
that is not what the Constitution requires; as
long as the government has not burdened
substantially more speech than necessary to
further an important interest, the First
Amendment does not permit us to second
guess Congress's legislative choice. "We
cannot displace Congress' jUdgment
respecting content-neutral regulations with
our own, so long as its policy is grounded on
reasonable factual findings supported by
evidence that is substantial for a legislative
determination. "
We . conclude that because Section 514
advances a substantial government interest,
and it does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to advance that
interest, it is consistent with the First
Amendment. Accordingly, the district court
erred in ruling that Section 514 violates
plaintiffs' freedom of expression.
IV. Plaintiffs' Cross-Appeal

Plaintiffs have cross-appealed, arguing that
Section 514 is unconstitutional on its face.
More specifically, "[p]laintiffs contend that
removing works from the public domain of
copyright (as distinct from patents) is an
illegitimate means regardless of the end or
the importance of the interest." Facial
challenges to statutes are generally
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disfavored as "[fJacial invalidation is,
manifestly, strong medicine that has been
employed by the [Supreme] Court sparingly
and only as a last resort." As such, plaintiffs
bear a "heavy burden" in raising a facial
constitutional challenge. They have not met
this burden, as their arguments on appeal are
largely foreclosed by our conclusion that
Section 514 does not violate their freedom
.of expression, as well as by our previous
decision in Golan L which we are not free to
revisit, as law of the case.
Plaintiffs assert that "there must be a 'bright
line' drawn around the public domain.... "
But in Golan L we rejected plaintiffs'
argument "that, in the context of copyright,
the public domain is a threshold that
Congress may not traverse in both
directions." Golan L 501 F.3d at 1187
(quotation omitted). We stated that
[t]he clear import of Eldred is that
Congress has expansive powers
when it . legislates under the
Copyright Clause, and this court may
not interfere so long as Congress has
rationally exercised its authority.
Here, we do. not believe that the
decision to comply with the Berne
Convention, which secures copyright
protections for American works
abroad, is so inational or so
unrelated to the aims of the
Copyright Clause that it exceeds the
. reach of congressional power.

Id. (internal citation omitted).·
We held that Section 514 was within
Congress's Article I powers, and therefore,
Congress had the authority to extend
copyright to works that were in the public
domain.
.Of course, while Congress may have the
authority under Article I to enact Section

514, it "must still comport with other
express limitations of the Constitution."
Plaintiffs have cast their facial challenge to
Section 514 in terms of "the First
Amendment, the contours of which may be
informed by the Progress [or Copyright]
Clause." However, plaintiffs have provided
no legal support for their claim that the First
Amendment--either by itself or informed by
any· other provision of the Constitutiondraws such absolute, bright lines around the
public domain, and we are aware of no such
authority ..
Plaintiffs' only legal authority is Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98
L.Ed. 884 (1954), but their reliance on
Bolling is without merit. In Bolling, the
Supreme
Court
announced
that
"[s]egregation in public education [wa]s not
reasonably
related
to
any
proper
governmental objective" arid held "that
racial segregation in the public schools of
the District of Columbia [wa]s a denial of
the due process of law guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." The
Due Process analysis in Bolling does not
inform plaintiffs' argument that the First
Amendment makes the public domain of
copyright absolutely inviolable. Instead, the
First Amendment places the same
restrictions on copyright restoration under
Section 514 that it imposes on all other
content-neutral regulations of speech.
In sum, Congress acted within its authority
under the Copyright Clause in enacting
Section 514. Further, Section 514 does not
violate plaintiffs'· freedom of speech under
the First Amendment because it advances an
important governmental interest, and it is
not substantially broader than necessary to
advance that interest. Accordingly, we
REVERSE the judgment of the district court
. and REMAND with instructions to grant
summary judgment in favor of the
government.
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"Can Congress Restore Foreign Public Domain
Copyright Protections"
The National Law Journal
May 11,2011
COlynne McSherry
Does Congress have the power to "restore"
copyright protection to public domain
works? The U.S. Supreme COUli will shortly
consider the question in Golanv. Holder,
the first case since Eldred v. Ashcroft to
address the constitutional limits on
Congress' power to expand copyright
protection.
At issue is § 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, which granted copyright
protection to certain works by foreign
authors that, for a variety of reasons, had
entered the public domain. As a result,
. public domain works potentially numbering
in the millions-including Prokofiev's Peter
and the Wolf, literature by Maxim Gorky,
paintings by Picasso and music by
Stravinsky, for example-were newly
eligible for copyright protection. If the
copyright owner decides to enforce its
rights, those using or planning to use the
works must either pay hefty license fees or
cease use of the works. The law includes
some protections for existing users, such as
providing immunity for prerestoration uses
and a one-year grace period.
The appellants are Lawrence Golan, a
symphony conductor whose orchestra
performs a wide variety of public domain
works, and S.A. Publishing and Ron Hall,
who publish and distribute public domain
compositions and feature films. They argue
that removing works from the public domain
inserts potentially paralyzing uncertainty to
. the system and harms the public's First
Amendment rights to receive and share

information. For its part, the govemment
defends the law as a reasonable means of
complying with U.S. treaty obligations.
The case has had a somewhat tortured
history: In April 2005, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Colorado rejected
Golan's speech arguments as misplaced
because "private censorship via copyright
enforcement does not implicate First
Amendment concerns." On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals held that, while Congress
had not exceeded its authority under the
copyright clause, § 514 did implicate First
Amendment interests. Specifically, the court
found that, after Eldred, copyright
legislation is subject to First Amendment
review if it alters the "traditional contours"
of copyright protection and that the
"bedrock principle of copyright law that
works in' the public domain remain there"
means that removing works from the public
domain calls for First Amendment scrutiny.
On remand, the District of Colorado
invalidated the statute, holding that it was
not sufficiently related to a significant
govemment interest. This time, the
government appealed, and won: Also
applying intermediate scrutiny, the 10th
Circuit found the law narrowly tailored to
the govemment's "substantial interest in
protecting American copyright holders'
abroad"
because
restoring
interests
protections for foreign works might induce
other nations to provide reciprocal
protections for American authors.
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The Supreme Court has certified two
questions for consideration: (1) Does the
Constitution's progress clause prohibit
Congress from taking works out of the
public domain? And (2) does § 514 violate
the First Amendment?
For the appellants, the answer is yes on both
counts. In their petition for certiorari, the
appellants argued that the progress clause, in
particular the. requirement that copyright
protection be time-limited, embodies the
central purpose of copyright: to encourage
the public release, dissemination and use of
creative works. During oral arguments in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, the government's own
lawyer suggested there was a "bright line"
around works. that had already entered the
public domain. Section 514, the appellants
contend, impermissibly transforms a "bright
line" into a slippery slope:

Thus, any interference with its contents must
impinge on free speech interests. That
interference cannot be justified by mere
speCUlation that it might lead to greater
protections for American authors abroad.
Indeed, the appellants note that even if
American authors do receive reciprocal
rights, the usual public-benefit theory for
protection-that
granting
copyright
economic benefits to authors encourages the
creation of new works-does not apply
because the "windfall" in question would
apply only to the authors of works created
decades ago. Thus, § 514 cannot, by
definition, benefit the public by encouniging
the creation of new works.

Appellants' petition at 11.

The government, of course, has another
view. With respect to the copyright clause's
reference to "limited times," the government
argues that § 514 is perfectly consistent:
Protection ends when it would have anyway
if the author had complied with appropriate
formalities. Moreover, removal of works
from
the
public
domain
is
not
unprecedented; in fact, it has occurred
several times, beginning with the first U.S.
Copyright Act in 1790. And, following
Eldred, .the Court should accept Congress'
determination that § 514 would ultimately
help American authors obtain rewards for
their creative efforts, in keeping with the
economic philosophy behind the copyright
clause.

Moreover, the appellants argue, Congress
impermissibly sacrificed public speech
rights~the vested interest in public domain
works-to create private economic windfalls
for foreign authors. The appellants can no
longer freely express themselves, e.g.,
perform various works formerly in the·
public domain, or distribute celiain films.
More broadly, they argue, the public domain
is a kind of cultural commons that provides
the building blocks for all kinds of speech.

As for the alleged effects on speech, the
government argues that the number of works
affected is relatively small, and that nothing
forbids secondary users from using the
works subject to reasonable compensation
or, when appropriate, making fair use of
them. At the same time, § 514 was intended
to accomplish not one, but three important
"ensure
government
interests:
to
indisputable compliance" with the United
States' obligations under the Berne

"The Tenth Circuit's decision
invit[es]
Congress
to
restore
copyright in Public Domain works
any time there is an important
interest in doing so. Yet reducing the
federal deficit, demonstrating good
will to a foreign nation or helping an
aging museum would all appear to be
reasons,· by
the
sufficient
Government's account, to give away
pieces of the Public Domain."
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Convention; to encourage other countries to
restore the rights of American authors
abroad; and to remedy what it views as the
inequitable treatment of foreign authors who .
lost U.S. copyright protection based on prior
laws.
Again, the government stresses, the courts
should
not
second-guess
Congress'
judgment as to the best way for the. United
States to comply with its international
commitments.
In its opposition to the petition for certiorari,
the government also contended that the law
should never have been subjected to First
Amendment scrutiny because it did not alter
.copyright law's traditional First Amendment
safeguards: the idea/expression dichotomy
and the doctrine of fair use.
The Comi's ruling may have profound
consequences, both legally and practically.
First, the Court is likely to provide
additional guidance as to when and how
Congress may tinker with copyright law.
Second, if the Court approves § 514, it may
send a chilling message to the myriad
individuals and institutions that reproduce
and distribute public domain works, from
orchestras and publishers to libraries and
other archives.

For example, libraries seeking to provide
online access to their collections need
reliable conclusions as to whether those
collections are in the public domain.
Libraries follow a statutory e4ception that
allows them to lend out material that may be
covered by valid copyright. 17 U.S.C. 108.
However, it is not always clear that this
exception applies to digitally preserving and
providing access to some materials, leaving
libraries and archives at potential risk when
they provide access to digital materials for
which they do not have explicit rights or
about which they are not certain as to the
materials' public domain status.
Amicus filers in support of the appellants
argue that a stable public domain helps
librarians to do the crucial work of
preserving and promoting access to the
cultural commons. They point out that new
technologies are sputTing that progress by
allowing libraries and other archivists to
make more works more accessible to more
people than ever before, and they warn that
newly unstable public domain would inhibit
such development.
For copyright lawyers, librarians or the
many musicians, artists, writers, publishers
andlor readers who use public domain
works, this case will be one to watch.
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"Once in the Public's Hands,
Now Back in Picasso's"
New York Times
March 22,2011
Adam Liptak
Supreme Court arguments often concern not
just the narrow issue in the case but also the
implications of a ruling. You sometimes
catch the justices squinting, trying to see
over the legal horizon.
Nine years ago, for instance, the court heard
. arguments in a case about whether Congress
was free to add 20 years of copyright
protection for works that had not yet entered
the public domain.
Several justices asked about a different and
even tougher question: Was Congress also
free to restore copyright protection to works
that had entered the public domain and
become public property?
"If Congress tomorrow wants to give a
copyright to a publisher solely for the
purpose of publishing and disseminating
Ben Jonson, Shakespeare, it can db it?"
Justice Stephen G. Breyer asked a lawyer for
the government.
"It may," said the lawyer, Theodore B.
Olson, who was United States solicitor
general at the time. But he did not sound too
sure.

A little later, Justice David H. Souter
pressed Mr. Olson on the same point and
elicited the concession that restoring a
copyright presented a much harder case.
"There is a bright line there" for "something
that has already gone into the public
domain," Mr. Olson said.

Justice Souter seemed satisfied. "If· you
don't throw out a line there," he said, "then
Ben Jonson certainly gets recopyrighted."
The court ended up ruling, by a 7-to-2 vote
in 2003 in Eldred v. Ashcroft, that
extensions for works still under copyright
are allowed.
This month, the court agreed to hear a case
on the question Justices Breyer and Souter
anticipated, one that will test whether there
is indeed a constitutional line Congress may
not cross when it comes to the public
domain.
The new case asks whether Congress acted
constitutionally in 1994 by restoring
copyrights in foreign works that had
belonged to the public, including films by
Alfred Hitchcock and Federico Fellini,
books by C. S. Lewis and Virginia Woolf,
symphonies by Prokofiev and Stravinsky
and paintings by Picasso, including
"Guernica."
"The works that qualify for copyright
restoration probably number in the
millions," Marybeth Peters, the United
States register of copyrights, said in 1996.
The plaintiffs in the new case, Golan v.
Holder, are orchestra conductors, teachers
and film archivists who say they had relied
for years on the free availability of works in
the public domain that they had performed,
adapted and distributed.
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The 1994 law,they told the justices, "did
something unprecedented in the history of
American intellectual property law and
constitutionally profound."
Lawrence Golan, the lead plaintiff, teaches
conducting at the University of Denver and
is the music director .and conductor of the
Yakima Symphony Orchestra in Washington
State. He said the 1994 law made it very
difficult for smaller orchestras to play some
seminal 20th-century works that had once
been a standard part of their repertories.
"Once you own a Beethoven symphony, you
own it till it falls apart," he said. "That used
to be the case with Stravinsky, Shostakovich
and Prokofiev. Now an orchestra that wants
to play, say, Shostakovich's Fifth has to rent
it for $800 for one performance."
He said he had no quarrel with providing
financial incentives to people who create art.
"Obviously, current composers need to be
encouraged to create their works, and they
should be getting royalties," Mr. Golan said.
But he said withdrawing works from the
.public domain did great harm to the cultural
life of small communities for no good
reason.
That analysis, Mr. Golan's lawyers say, is
consistent with the constitutional .balance
between property and speech. The
Constitution authorizes Congress "to
promote the progress of science and llseful
mis, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their

respective writings and discoveries."
In other words, said Anthony T. Falzone of
the Stanford Law School Center for Internet
and Society, which represents the plaintiffs,
the Constitution meant to create incentives,
not monopolies. "The whole point wasn't to
protect stuff," he said. "It was to encourage
people to make stuff, and ev~rybody' s lost
sight of that."
The government counters that nothing in the
1994 law did damage to the constitutional
structure or to free speech rights.
The government adds that the 1994 law
applies to foreign works "previously
ineligible for protection or whose authors
were unfamiliar with the technicalities of
United States law." Every work brought
back· into. copyright protection, the
government says, "expires on the same day
as if the work had been protected since its
creation. "
The federal appeals court in Denver, in
upholding the law, said there were important
First Amendment interests at stake on both
sides. It concluded that there was reason to
think that American authors and artists
would be better off abroad if foreign authors
and artists received expanded copyright
protection here.
That economic calculation rankled Mr.
Falzone. "You're selling public property,"
he said. "Congress literally took the public's
property and handed it over to foreign
copyright owners."
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"Supreme Court Takes Up Scholars' Rights"
The Chronicle ofHigher Education
May29,2011
Marc Parry

When Lawrence Golan picks up his baton
here at the University of Denver, the
musicians in his student orchestra see a
genial conductor who corrects their mistakes
without raising his voice in frustration.
Yet Mr. Golan is frustrated, not with the
musicians, but with a copyright law that
does them harm. For 10 years, the music
professor has been quietly waging a legal
campaign to overturn the statute, which
makes it impossibly expensive for smaller
orchestras to play certain pieces of music.
Now the case is heading to the u.s.
Supreme Court. The high-stakes copyright
showdown affects far more than sheet
music. The outcome will touch a broad
swath of academe for years to come,
dictating what materials scholars can use in
books and courses without jumping through
legal hoops. The law Mr. Golan is trying to
overturn has also hobbled libraries' efforts
. to digitize and share books, films, and
music.
The conductor's fight centers on the concept
of the public domain, which scholars depend
on for teaching and research. When a work
enters the public domain, anyone can quote
from it, copy it, share it, or republish it
without . seeking permission or paying
royalties.
The dispute that led to Golan v. Holder
dates to 1994, when Congress passed a law
that moved vast amounts of material from
the public domain back behind the firewall
of copyright protection. For conductors like
. Mr. Golan, that step limited access to

canonical 20th-century Russian pieces that'
had been freely played for years.
"It was a shocking change," Mr. Golan says
over dinner at a tacos-and-margaritas dive
near the University of Denver's mountainframed campus. "You used to be able to buy
Prokofiev, Shostakovich, Stravinsky. All of
a sudden, on one day, you couldn't
anymore."

Other works once available but now
restricted include books by H.G. Wells,
Virginia Woolf, and C.S. Lewis; films by
Alfred Hitchcock, Federico Fellini, and Jean
Renoir; and artwork byM.C. Escher and
Pablo Picasso. The U.S. Copyright Office
estimated that the works qualifying for
copyright restoration "probably number in
the millions."
Congress approved the recopyrighting,
limited to foreign works, to align U. S. policy
with an international copyright treaty. But
the Golan plaintiffs-.a group that includes
educators, performers, and film archivistsargue that bigger principles are at stake.
Does Congress have the constitutional right
to' remove works from the public domain?
And if it does, what's stopping it from
plucking out even more freely available
works?
"If you can't rely on the status of something
in the public domain today-that is, if you
never know whether Congress is going to
act again and yank it out-you're going to
be a lot more cautious about doing anything
with these materials," says Mr. Golan's
lawyer, Anthony Falzone, executive director
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of the Fair Use Project and a lecturer in law
at Stanford Law School. "You really destroy
the value and the usefulness of the public
domain in a profound way if the rug can be
pulled out from under you at any time."
The Radicalization of Golan

Before the rug was yanked out from under
hUn, Mr. Golan had no experience as an
activist. He still doesn't seem like one.
Outside the orchestra pit, the conductor
could pass for an off-duty businessman: trim
build, clean-cut dark hair, slacks,waistlength tan jacket. The tenured professor has
taught conducting and led the 80-student
Lamont Symphony Orchestra at this private
university since 2001. Yet he has done little
to publicize his cause on campus, at least
jUdging from the reactions of others in the
music school one recent evening as the halls
buzzed with costumed nuns· rehearsing
Pucci!}i's Suor Angelica.
"No!" said one professor after hearing that
Mr. Golan's case was going to Washington.
"Are you making it up?" asked another.
Mr. Golan keeps a low profile as.a plaintiff
because his life is about music, not
litigation. "1 would love to have my name go
down in history like Arturo Toscanini, for
being the greatest conductor of all time," he
says.
But because his quest for that glory
coincides with a broad shift in the reach of
copyright law, he has a better shot at going
down in history as the capitalized name atop
a Supreme Court opinion studied by future
generations of law students.
The· son of a violinist in the Chicago
Symphony Orchestra, Mi. Golan was just
starting his own professional career when

Congress passed the copyright restoration.
The change was surprising from a
philosophical point of view: Under
copyright law, the Constitution grants
authors a limited monopoly over their works
as an incentive to promote creativity. Over
the years, Congress has often delayed the
passage of works into the public domain by
lengthening the duration of copyright terms.
But removing pieces· already there was
different, Mr. Golan's lawyers argue, a
radical change in what one scholar describes
as the basic "physics" of the public domain.
That may sound abstract, but the impact on
Mr. Golan was direct. When a work is in the
public domain-that Puccini opera, say-an
orchestra can buy the sheet music.
Symphonies typically costabout $150. And
the orchestra can keep those pages forever,
preserving the instructions that librarians
laboriously pencil into scores. But works
under copyright are typically available only
for rent. And the cost is significantly higher:
about $600 for one performance. With the
flip of a switch, the new law restored
copyright to thousands of pieces.
For big-city orchestras like the New York
Philharmonic, that change is like a
"mosquito bite," Mr. Golan says. But Mr.
Golan's university ensemble gets only about
$4,000 to rent and buy music each year.
That means it can perform some copyrighted
works but must rely on the public domain
for about 80 percent of its repertoire. And
$4,000 is relatively generous. Other colleges
might have only $500 to spend on music.
When the Conductors Guild surveyed its
1,600 members, 70 percent of respondents
said they were now priced out of performing
pieces previously in the public domain.
Teaching suffers, too. Every year, for
example, University of Denver students
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compete for the honor of playing a concerto,
a piece in which the orchestra accompanies
a solo instrument. But when a pianist wanted
to audition with a piano concerto by
Prokofiev, a Russian composer who died in
1953, Mr. Golan was forced to tell her no.

Think of the Golan case as "Eldred, the
Sequel." Only this time the question isn't
whether Congress can delay works' from
entering the public domain. It's whether'
removing works already there is a "bright
line" Congress can't cross.

"It's one that any aspiring pianist needs to
learn, and to have the experience of actually
playing it with orchestra is phenomenal,"
Mr. Golan says. But "we just didn't have the
money in the orchestra budget to pay the
rental price."

'Fairly Horrible'

The problem soon got worse. In 1998, after
lobbying by entertainment groups like the
Walt Disney Company, Congress passed
another law, extending copyrights by 20
years. This Copyright Term Extension
Act-mocked by. critics as the Mickey
Mouse Protection Act-meant that a work
would not enter the public domain until up
to 70 years after its cn;ator's death.

If .that bright line dims, scholars and
librarians will have problems. To understand
why, consider the copyright confusion faced
by Elizabeth Townsend-Gard.

That legal one-two punch made it hard for
Mr. Golan to' play both foreign and
American works, like Gershwin's Rhapsody
in Blue.

Ms. Townsend-Gard is an associate
professor at Tulane University Law School.
As' a graduate student in the 1990s, she
studied history at the University .of
California at Los Angeles. Her dissertation
. was a biography of Vera Brittain, a British
author known for her WorId War I
autobiography, Testament of Youth. Ms.
Townsend-Gard mined letters, diaries,
photos, and other texts for her research. But
she worried about getting permission to
publish' materials she needed, because Ms.
Brittain's literary executor, too, was writing
a biography of the author.

In response to those changes, reform-minded
academics at top law schools fought back
with multiple lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of the statutes. The
conductor's tale made him an ideal poster
child for their war to protect the public
domain.

In 1996 the ground shifted under Ms.
Townsend-Gard's feet. At the outset of her
research, almost all the works she needed
had been in the public domain. When she
finished, because of the restoration now
under attack by Mr. Golan, almost all those
works were under copyright.

Reformers suffered a defeat in 2003, when
the Supreme Court rejected an online book
publisher'S challenge of the 20-year
extension. In that case, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
the court found the change acceptable in part
because it had not "altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection."

She ultimately diversified her project so that
it became a comparative biography of many
subjects rather than just one. But she also
grew fascinated with the copyright
complexities surrounding the daily work of
historians. Ms. Townsend-Gard ended up
going to law school after finishing her
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Ph.D., and invented a software tool, called
the Durationator, designed to tell users the
copyright status of any work.
The market of scholars who might need that
tool is large. The law at stake in Golan alone
potentially affects anyone studying works
created or published by non-U.S. authors or
publishers from 1923 to 1989. Most of those
materials were in the public domain before.
Now they are covered by a complicated
copyright statute, says Ms. Townsend-Gard.
"For people who work on the 20th century,
it's fairly horrible," she says.
Now pull back from the view of an
individual scholar, and imagine you are
working on one of the numerous projects to
make millions of digital books available
online.
Libraries,
archives,
Google:
Copyright restoration has big consequences
for their digitization efforts. Most of those
ventures will· not publish the full texts of
works online unless they are clearly in the
public domain in the United States.
But when it comes to a foreign book,
figuring out its copyright status can require a
mammoth investigation. That's because a.
work must have been under copyright in its .
home country to qualify for restoration in
the United States, says Kenneth D. Crews,
director of the copyright advisory office at
Columbia University Libraries. So, for
example, when Columbia considers
digitizing a rare trove of Chinese books,
including many from the 1920s and 1930s of
great interest to scholars, its staff must grasp
the legal nuances of a country that has gone
through a revolution-and a transformation
of copyright law-since the books were
published. Or must try to, anyway.
And if the law is unclear, the university
must decide whether digitization is worth

risking a potentially expensive lawsuit
should a rights-holder turn up later.
"It's deterring digitization on anything
foreign,"
Ms.
Townsend-Gard . says,
"because people can't figure it out."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit took a different view. In a 2010
ruling backing the government, it stressed
the argument that recopyrighting foreign
works that had fallen into our public domain
was crucial to protecting American authors '
interests abroad. Our restoration of those
copyrights could drive other countries to
grant retroactive copyrights to contemporary
American works that had fallen into their
public domains.
And big money is at stake. The court quoted
Congressional testimony from the mid1990s in which a group representing
publishers, record companies, and other
copyright-based industries estimated that
billions were being lost each year because
foreign countries were failing to provide
copyright· protections to u.S.-originated
works. The recording industry told
lawmakers that there were "vastly more U.S.
works currently unprotected in foreign
markets than foreign ones here."
The government, in its Supreme Court brief,
. pointed out that the copyright restorations
were limited in scope. They applied to
foreign works whose creators weren't
familiar with U:S. copyright procedures, for
example. Other works restored were
previously ineligible for protection.
The Supreme Court is· expected to decide the
case during the term that begins in October.
Mr. Golan hopes to be in Washington to
watch. Unless, that is, he has a concert to.
conduct.
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"Tenth Circuit Victory for
Copyright Owners"
LexisNexis Communities Copyright & Trademark Law Blog
June 22, 2010
Henry Z. Horbaczewski
A maj or victory for copyright owners was
rendered today by the Tenth Circuit u.s.
Court of Appeals in Golan v. Holder, in
which Reed Elsevier participated in a friendus
of-court
brief supporting
the
Government.
The case involved the constitutionality of
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act ("URAA") (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A, 109) a
federal statute restoring copyright to works
of other treaty partners that were still in
copyright in their c'ountries of origin but had
fallen into the public domain in the United
States. The plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the law as a restriction
on free speech, asserting that the law should
be subjected to a "strict standard" or review,
that compliance with the Berne Convention
was an insufficiently important public
purpose to justify the restraints on their use
of the foreign works at issue, and, most
importantly, that the public domain was a
form of Constitutional sanctuary from which
works could not be removed once they had
entered it.
Originally the District COUli rejected the
Constitutional challenge, but on appeal the
Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded to the
District Court to consider the free speech
(First Amendment) issue. The District COUli
then
dutifully
ruled
the
statute
unconstitutional as violative of the First
Amendment. This time, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the second ruling and upheld the
statute.

For US copyright owners, the
significant points of the decision are:

most

Compliance with the Berne Convention is a
"substantial" government interest.
In balancing the free speech equities,
"Copyright also serves authors' First'
Amendment interests." The free speech
argument is not a one-way street.
The "inviolable" public domain argument
was squarely rejected: "[P]laintiffs have
provided no legal support for their claim that
the First Amendment-either by itself or
informed by any other provision of the
Constitution-draws such absolute, bright
lines around the public domain, and we are
aware of no such authority."
The Tenth Circuit did not confront the
Supreme Court's language in Eldred v.
Ashcroft that copyright law does not conflict
with the First Amendment so long as the
"traditional contours of copyright," are
preserved, language with the some
academics have interpreted as prohibiting an
material change, from the structure of
copyright in the 1790's including, for
example, the elimination of formalities
under the Berne, Convention, but finessed
the issue as follows: "We note that copyright
includes several "built-in" First Amendment
protections. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20. The
idea/expression dichotomy ensures that only
particular expressions, and not ideas
themselves, are subject to copyright
protection. Id Additionally, the fair use
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defense allows individuals to use
expressions contained in a copyrighted work
under certain circumstances, including
"criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching ... scholarship, or research ... and

even for· parody." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted). Section 514 does not
traditional,
built-in
disturb
these,
protections[empahis supplied], and thus,
such protected speech remains unburdened."
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC
10-553
Ruling Below: E.E.o.c. v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, 597 F.3d
769 (6th Cif. 2010), cert granted, 131 S. Ct. 1783 (2011).

Plaintiff Cheryl Perich was a 'called' teacher at defendant Hosanna-Tabor, a religiously affiliated
school, until academic year 2004-2005 when she went on disability and was diagnosed with
narcolepsy. Her duties as a teacher included teaching secular subjects using secular materials and
approximately forty-five minutes of teligious activities each· day. Halfway through academic
year 2004-2005, Perich was medically cleared to return to work. Perich attempted to do so but
was informed her position had been filled by a substitute the school had contracted with through
the end of the year. Perich refused to leave the building until she was given a letter indicating she
had appeared for work. The school offered her a deal whereby she would resign her call and they
would pay a portion of her insurance premiums through December of 2005. Perich refused this
deal and was eventually terminated. The school cited disruptive behavior and characterized
Perich's conduct as regrettable. Perich filed a complaint with the EEOC under the ADA and the
EEOC filed suit against Hosanna-Tabor· on her behalf, alleging discrimination and retaliation.
The District Court awarded summary jUdgment to Hosanna-Tabor, holding that Perich's duties
placed her under the ministerial exception of the ADA. On appeal, the 6th Circuit vacated and
remanded, applying a primary duties test and finding that Perich's duties were primarily secular
and thus the ministerial exception did not apply.
Question Presented: Whether the ministerial exception, which prohibits most employmentrelated lawsuits against religious organizations by employees performing religious· functions,
applies to a teacher at a religious elementary school who teaches the full secular curriculum, but
also teaches daily religion classes, is a commissioned minister, and regularly leads students in
prayer and worship.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cheryl
Perich, Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SCHOOL,
Defendant-Appellee.

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed March 09,2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
CLAY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and Cheryl Perich,
.appeal from the district court's order

granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendant Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School ("Hosannain
this
action
alleging
Tabor")
discrimination in violation of the Americans
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with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §
12117(a) (the "ADA"). For the reasons set
forth below, we VACATE the district
court's order and REMAND the case for
further proceedings consistent with this
OpInIOn.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Perich's employment
relationship with Hosanna-Tabor, which
terminated Perich from her teaching position
on April 11, 2005. Hosanna-Tabor, an
ecclesiastical corporation affiliated with the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (the
"LCMS"), operates a church and school in
Redford, Michigan. The school teaches
kindergarten through eighth grades. The
faculty consists of two types of teachers: (1)
"lay" or "contract" teachers, and (2) "called"
teachers. Contract teachers are hired by the
Board of Education for one-year renewable
terms of employment. Called teachers are
hired by the voting members of the
Hosanna-Tabor church congregation upon
the recommendation of the Board of
Education, Board of Elders, and Board of
Directors. Called teachers are hired on an
open-ended basis and cannot be summarily
dismissed without cause. They can also
apply for a housing allowance on their
income taxes provided that they are
conducting activities "in the exercise of the
ministry."
To be eligible for a "call," a teacher must
complete the colloquy classes required by
the LCMS, which focus on various aspects
of the Christian faith. After completing the
colloquy, a teacher receives a certificate of
admission into the teaching ministry, and the
Michigan District of the LCMS places the
teacher's name on a list that can be accessed
by schools that need teachers. Once selected
by a congregation, a called teacher receives
the title of "commissioned minister."

In July 1999, Hosanna-Tabor hired Perich as
a contract teacher to teach kindergarten on a
one year contract from August 15, 1999 to
June 15, 2000. After Perich completed the
required colloquy classes at Concordia
College in February 2000, Hosanna-Tabor
hired Perich as a called teacher on March
29, 2000.. Perich continued teaching
kindergarten until the end of the 2002-2003
year. She taught fourth grade during the
2003-2004 school year, and she was
assigned to teach third and fourth grades for
the 2004-2005 school year. From the time
she was hired as a called teacher until her
termination, Perich was listed as a
commissioned minister in the LCMS. At
least once during her tenure, Perich claimed
the housing allowance on her income taxes.
After Perich was hired as a called teacher,
her employment duties remained identical to
the duties she performed as a contract
teacher. Perich taught math, language arts;
social studies, science, gym, art, and music.
Language arts instruction included reading,
English, spelling, and handwriting. Music
instruction included secular music theory
and playing the recorder, using the same
music book as the local public school.
During the 2003-2004 school year, Perich
taught computer training as well.
Perich also taught a religion class four days
per week for thirty minutes, and she
attended a chapel service with her class once
a week for thirty minutes. Approximately
twice a year, Perich led the chapel service in
rotation with other teachers. Perich also led
each class in prayer three times a day for a
total of approximately five or six minutes.
During her final year at Hosanna-Tabor,
Perich's fourth grade class engaged in a
devotional for five to ten minutes each
morning. In all, activities devoted to religion
consumed approximately forty-five minutes
of the seven hour school day.
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Hosanna-Tabor's website indicates that the
"Christ-centered
school
provides
a
education" that helps parents by "reinforcing
bible principals [sic] and standards."
Hosanna-Tabor describes its staff members
as '·'fine Christian role models who integrate
faith into all subjects." Perich valued the
freedom a sectarian school afforded to
"bring God into every subject taught in the
classroom." However, Perich taught secular
subjects using secular textbooks commonly
used in public schools,and she can only
recall two instances in her career when she
introduced religion into secular subjects.
. Furthermore, Hosanna-Tabor does not
require teachers to be called or even
. Lutheran. Non-Lutheran teachers have
identical responsibilities as Lutheran
teachers, including teaching religion classes
and leading chapel service. Members of the
custodial staff and at least one teacher who
worked at Hosanna-Tabor were not
Lutheran.
At a church golf outing in June 2004, Perich
suddenly became ill and was taken to the
hospital. She underwent a series of medical
tests to determine the cause. Perich's doctors
had not reached a definitive diagnosis by
August, and Hosanna-Tabor administrators
suggested that Perich apply for a disability
leave of absence for the 2004-2005 school
year. The principal of Hosanna-Tabor, Stacy
Hoeft, informed Perich that she would "still
have ajob with [Hosanna-Tabor]" when she
regained her health. Perich agreed to take a
disability leave and did not return to work at
the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year.
Throughout her leave, Perich regularly
provided Hoeft with updates about her
condition and progress.
On December 16, 2004, Perich informed
Hoeft by email that her doctor had
confirmed a diagnosis of narcolepsy and that
she would be able to return to work in two to

three months once she was. stabilized on
medication. On January 19, 2005, Hoeft
asked Perich to begin considering and
discussing with her doctor what she might
be able to do upon return. Perich responded
the same day that she· had discussed her
work day and teaching responsibilities with
her doctor, and he had assured her that she
would be fully functional with the assistance
of medication. Perich reiterated this
sentiment with additional explanation on
January 21, 2005.
Also on January 21, 2005, Hoeft informed
Perich that the school board intended to
amend the employee handbook to request
that employees on disability for more than
six months resign their calls to allow
Hosanna-Tabor to responsibly fill their
positions. Such resignations would not
necessarily prevent reinstatement of these
employees' calls upon their return to health.
Perich had been on disability for more than
five months when she received this email.
On January27, 2005, Perich wrote to Hoeft
that she would be able to return to work
between February 14 and February 28,2005.
Hoeft· responded with surprise, because
Perich had indicated a few days before that
she .had been unable to complete her
disability forms because of her condition.
Hoeft expressed concern that Perich's
condition would jeopardize the safety of the
students in her care. Hoeft also indicated
that Perich would not be teaching the third
and fourth grades upon return, because the
substitute teacher had a contract that ran
through the end of the school year.!
Furthermore, she indicated that the third and
fourth grade students had already had two
teachers that year and having a third would
not provide a good learning environment for
them.
Three days later,
at the annual
congregational "shareholder" meeting, Hoeft
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and the school board ~xpressed their opinion
that it was unlikely that Perich would be
physically capable of returning to work that
school year or the next. Consequently, the
congregation adopted the Board's proposal
to request that Perich accept a peaceful
release agreement wherein Perich would
resign her call in exchange for the
congregation paying for a portion of her
premiums
through
health .. insurance
December 2005. On February 7, 2005, the
Board selected Chairman Scott Salo to
discuss this proposal with Perich.
On February 8, 2005, Perich's doctor gave
her a written release to return t6 work
without restrictions on February 22, 2005.
The next day Salo contacted Perich to
discuss her employment. Perich instead
requested to meet with the entire school
board. At the meeting on February 13,2005,
the Board presented the peaceful release
proposal, and Perich responded by
presenting her work release note. The Board
continued . to express· concerns about
Perich's ability to supervise students for the
entire day. Perich explained that, as of her
doctor's release on February 22, 2005, she
would no longer be eligible for disability
coverage and would be required to return to
work. The Board, however, continued to
request that Perich resign and asked her to
respond to the peaceful release proposal by
February 21,2005.
Shortly after 9:00 p.m. on February 21,
2005, Perich emailed Hoeft to confirm that
she had decided not to resign from her
position and that she planned to return to
work in the morning. When Perich reported
to work on February 22, 2005, the school
did not have a job for her. Because the
school handbook states that failure to return
to work on the first day following the
expiration of an approved medical leave
may be considered a voluntary termination,
Perich refused to leave school grounds until

she received a letter acknowledging that she
appeared for work. Perich received a letter
signed by Hoeft and Salo, which said that
Perich had provided improper notification of
her return to work and asked that she
continue her leave to allow the congregation
a chance to develop a possible plan for her
return. Perich took the letter and left the
premises.
Later that day, Perich spoke with Hoeft over
the phone. Hoeft told Perich that she would
likely be fired, and Perich told Hoeft that
she would assert her legal rights against
discrimination if they were unable to reach a
compromise. Perich asked Hoeft to transmit
that information to the Board. Perich also
. sent Hoeff an email stating that her doctor
had reaffirmed that she was healthy and
ready to return to work. Following the
~oard's meeting on February 22, 2005, Salo
sent Perich a letter describing Perich's
conduct as "regrettable" and indicating that
the Board would review the process of
rescinding her call based on her disruptive
behavior.
On March 19, 2005, Salo sent Perich a
follow-up letter stating that, based on
Perich's insubordination and disruptive
behavior on February 22, 2005, the Board
would request rescinding Perich's call at the
next voter's meeting on April 10, 2005. The
letter also stated that Perich had "damaged,
beyond repair" her working relationship
with Hosanna-Tabor by "threatening to take
legal action," and it laid out the voting
procedure by which the congregation could
depose a called minister. Finally, the letter
again proposed the peaceful release offer
and gave Perich until April 8, 2005 to accept
the offer.
On March 21, 2005, Perich's lawyer sent a
letter to Hosanna-Tabor' s lawyer stating that
Hosanna-Tabor's actions amounted to
unlawful discrimination. The letter asked
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Hosanna-Tabor to respond seeking an
amicable resolution to the matter, or else
Perich would be forced to bring a lawsuit or
file a complaint with the EEOC. On April
10, 2005; the congregation voted to rescind
Perich's call. The next day, Salo informed
Perich of her termination.
On May 17, 2005, Perich filed a charge of
discrimination and retaliation with the
EEOC alleging that Hosanna-Tabor had
discriminated and retaliated against her in
violation of her rights under the ADA. On
September 28, 2007, the EEOC filed a
complaint against Hosanna-Tabor in the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan alleging one count of
retaliation in violation of the ADA. Perich
and Hosanna-Tabor each filed motions for
summary judgment on July 15, 2008. On
October 23, 2008, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of HosannaTabor, dismissing the claim on the grounds
that the court could not inquire into her
claims of retaliation because they fell within
the "ministerial exception" to the ADA.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo a district court's
order of dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). Although the district
court issued its decision in the context of a
summary judgment motion, the court
dismissed Perich's claim based on a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and did not reach
the merits of the claim. In addition, this
Circuit has treated the "ministerial
exception" as jurisdictional in nature and an
appropriate ground for a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Accordingly, this
Court should review the claim using the
same analysis as it does for an order entered
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

In response to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving
jurisdiction. Furthermore, "unlike Rule
12(b)(6) analysis, under which the existence
of genuine issues of material fact warrants .
denial of the motion to' dismiss, 'the court is
empowered to resolve factual disputes when
subject matter jurisdiction is challenged.'" If
the district court makes its jurisdictional
ruling based on the resolution of both legal
and factual disputes, this Court reviews the
legal findings under a de novo standard and
the factual findings under a clearly
erroneous standard.
Perich argues that no facts relevant to the
determination of subject matter jurisdiction
were in dispute and, thus, this Court should
review de novo all of the district court's
findings .. Hosanna-Tabor argues the district
court made a number of factual findings in
determining that the court had no subject
matter jurisdiction, including HosannaTabor's status as a "religious institution"
and Perich's status as a "minister" and
"ministerial employee." Thus, according to
Hosanna-Tabor, this Court should review
these factual findings under the clearly.
erroneous standard.
The district court made both factual and
legal findings in determining whether the
court had subject matter jurisdiction. The
district court's determinations concerning
Perich's primary duties throughout her work
day were factual. Accordingly, this Court
must accept these factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. However, its
decision as to whether Perich classified as a
ministerial employee remains a legal
conclusion subject to de novo review.
II. The ADA's Application to Religious
Organizations
The ADA generally prohibits an employer
with fifteen or more employees from
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discriminating against a qualified individual
with a disability on the basis of that
disability in regard to all conditions of.
employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5), §
12112(a). The retaliation provision of the
ADA
prohibits
employers
from
"discriminat[ing] against any individual
because such individual has opposed any act
or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or
because such individual made a charge ...
under [the ADA]." Title I of the ADA
includes an exception-known as the
"ministerial
exception"-which
allows
religious entities to give "preference in
employment to individuals of a particular
religion" and to "require that all applicants
and employees conform to the religious
tenants of such organization." 42 U.S.C. §
121 13 (d).
However, the legislative history makes clear
that Congress intended the ADA to broadly
protect employees of religious entities from
retaliation on the job, subject only to a
narrowly drawn religious exemption. The
House Report provides the following
illustrative hypothetical example:
[A]ssume
that
a
Mormon
organization wishes to hire only
Mormons to perform certain jobs. If
a person with a disability applies for
the job, but is not a Mormon, the
organization can refuse to hire him
or her. However, if two Mormons
apply for a job, one with a disability
and one without a disability, the
organization cannot discriminate
against the applicant with the
disability because of that person's
disability.
H.R.Rep. No. 485 part 2, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 76-77 (1990).

III. The Ministerial Exception
The ministerial exception is rooted in the
First Amendment's guarantees of religious
freedom.
A. Interference in Church Governance
As applied by this Circuit, the doctrine
"precludes subject matter jurisdiction over
claims
involving'
the
employment
relationship between a religious institution
and its ministerial employees, based on the
institution's constitutional right to be free
from judicial interference in the selection of
those employees."
As the Fifth Circuit noted in McClure v.
Salvation Army, one of the first cases to
analyze the ministerial exception, "[t]he
relationship between an· organized church
and its ministers is its lifeblood. The
minister is the chief instrument by which the
church seeks to fulfill its purpose." 460 F.2d
at 558-59.
While the ministerial exception was first
applied in the context of suits brought
against religious employers' under Title VII,
the exception has been extended to suits
brought against religious employers under
the ADA.
For the ministerial exception to bar an
employment discrimination claim, two
factors must be present: (1) the employer
must be a religious institution, and (2) the
employee must be a ministerial employee.
To qualify as a' religious institution under
the first prong, the employer need not be a
traditional religious organization, such as a
church, diocese, or synagogue, nor must it
be an entity operated by a traditional
religious organization. Rather, a religiously
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affiliated entity is considered a religious
institution if its "mission is marked by clear
or obvious religious characteristics." This
Circuit has applied the ministerial exception
to a religiously affiliated hospital, and it has
explicitly approved of applying the doctrine
to religiously affiliated schools and
corporations.

By contrast, when courts have found that
teachers classify as ministerial employees
for purposes of the exception, those teachers
have generally taught primarily religious
subjects or had a central role in the spiritual
or pastoral mission of the church.

To determine whether an employee is
ministerial under the second prong, this
Circuit has instructed courts to look at the
function, or "primary duties" of the
employee. As a general rule, an employee is
considered a minister if "the employee's
primary duties consist of teaching, spreading
the faith, church governance, supervision of
a religious . order, or superViSIOn or
participation in religious ritual and
worship." In extending the ministerial
exception beyond ordained ministers, this
Circuit has instructed courts to look at the
function of the plaintiffs employment
position rather than the fact of ordination.
Other circuits have further instructed that
.courts must "determine whether a position is
important to the spiritual and pastoral
mission of the church." The parties in the
instant case do not dispute that "religious
institutions" include religiously affiliated
schools and that Hosanna-Tabor meets this
requirement. Thus, the first requirement
under the ministerial exception is present,
and the primary issue is whether Perich
served as a ministerial employee.

The district court's factual detelminations
concerning
Perich's
primary
duties
throughout her work day were not clearly
erroneous. The record supports the finding
that Perich's employment duties were
identical when she was a contract teacher
and a called teacher and that she taught
math, language arts, social studies, science,
gym, art, and music using secular textbooks.
Furthermore, the record indicates that Perich
taught a religion class four days per week
for thirty minutes and that she attended a
chapel service with her class once a week
for thirty minutes. Perich also led each class
in prayer three times a day for a total of
approximately five or six minutes. The
record also indicates that Perich seldom
introduced
religion
during
secular
discussions. Approximately twice a year,
Perich led the chapel service in rotation with
other teachers. However, teachers leading
chapel or teaching religion were not required
to be called or even Lutheran, and, in fact, at
least one teacher was not. In all, the record
supports the district court's finding that
activities . devoted to religion consumed
approximately forty-five minutes of the
seven hour school day.

The question of whether a teacher at a
sectarian school classifies as a ministerial
employee is one of first impression for this
Court. However, the overwhelming majority
of courts that have considered the issue have
held that parochial school teachers such as
Perich, who teach primarily secular subjects,
do not classify. as ministerial employees for
purposes of the exception.

However, given these factual findings
relating to Perich's primary duties, the
district court erred in its legal conclusion
classifying Perich as a ministerial employee.
Perich spent approximately six hours and
fifteen minutes of her seven hour day
teaching secular subjects, using secular
textbooks, without inco['porating religion
into the secular material. Thus, it is clear
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· that Perich's primary function was teaching
secular subjects, not "spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a
religious order, or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and
worship."
The fact that Perich participated in and led
some religious activities throughout the day
does not make her primary function
religious. This is underscored by the fact
that teachers were not required to be .called
or even Lutheran to conduct these religious
activities, and at least one teacher at
Hosanna-Tabor was not Lutheran.
In addition, that Hosanna-Tabor has a
generally religious character-as do all
d~finition-and
religious
schools
by
characterizes its staff members as "fine
Christian role models" does not transform
Perich's primary responsibilities in the
classroom into religious activities. This is
underscored by the fact that Perich can only
recall twice in her career when she
introduced the topic of religion. during
secular discussions. Similarly, Perich's extra
religious training as a result of completing
her colloquy did not affect the duties she
performed in the classroom on a daily basis. .
In finding that Perich was a ministerial
employee, the district court relied largely on
the fact that Hosanna-Tabor gave Perich the
title of commissioned minister and held her
out to the world as a minister by bestowing
this title upon her. However, the title of
commissioned minister does not transform
the prim.ary duties of these called teachers
from secular in nature to religious in nature.
The governing primary duties analysis
requires a court to objectively examine an
employee's actual job function, not her title,
in detennining whether she is properly
classified as a minister. In this case, it is
clear from the record that Perich's primary

duties were secular, not only because she
spent the overwhelming majority of her day
tea.ching secular subjects using secular
textbooks, but also because nothing in the
record indicates that the Lutheran church
relied on Perich as the primary means to
indoctrinate its faithful into its theology. By
contrast, in Clapper, the defendant schools
envisioned their teachers as having a
primarily religious role. The teachers were
required to be "tithe paying members of the
Seventh-day Adventist Church and' are
expected to participate in church activities,
programs, and finances." See Clapper, 1998
WL 904528, at· *2. The Fourth Circuit
observed that "[t]he purpose of this
requirement is obvious-the Chesapeake
Conference desires to insure that the minds
of its youth are shaped by model members
of the Seventh-day Adventist faith."
Furthermore, the district court in the instant
case found that the primary duties of called
teachers are identical to those of contract
teachers, who do· not have the title of
minister, and at least one contract teacher
who taught at the school was not Lutheran.
Given the undisputed evidence that all
teachers at Hosanna-Tabor were assigned
the same duties, a finding that Perich is a
"ministerial" employee would compel the
conclusion that all teachers at the schoolcalled, contract, Lutheran, and nonLutheran-are similarly excluded from
coverage under the ADA and other federal
fair employment laws. However, the intent
of the ministerial exception is to allow
religious organizations to prefer members of
their own religion and adhere to their own
religious interpretations.· Thus, applying the
exception to non-members of the religion
and those whose primary function is not
religious in nature would be both illogical
and contrary to the intention behind the
exception.
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B. Interpretation of Church Doctrine

In addition to being motivated by the
concern of government interference in
church governance, the ministerial exception
is also motivated by the concern "that
secular authorities would be involved in
evaluating
or
interpreting
religious
doctrine. "
In the instant case, Hosanna-Tabor has
attempted to reframe the underlying dispute
from the question of whether HosannaTabor fired Perich in violation of the ADA
to the question of whether Perich violated
church doctrine by not engaging in internal
dispute resolution. However, contrary to
Hosanna-Tabor's assertions, Perich's claim
would not require the court to analyze any
church doctrine; rather a trial would focus
on issues such as whether Perich was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA,
whether Perich opposed a practice that was
·unlawful under the ADA, and whether
Hosanna-Tabor violated the ADA in its
treatment of Perich. As Plaintiff notes, the
LCMS personnel manual, which includ()s
EEOC policy, and the Governing Manual
for Lutheran Schools clearly contemplate
that teachers are protected by employment
discrimination and contract laws. In
addition, none of the letters that HosannaTabor sent to Perich throughout her
termination process reference church
doctrine or the LCMS dispute resolution
procedures.
Furthermore, this Court would not be
precluded from inquiring into whether a
doctrinal basis actually motivated HosannaTabor's actions.
CONCLUSION
Because the ministerial exception does not,
bar Perich's claims against Hosanna-Tabor,
we VACATE the district court's order

entering summary judgment on behalf of
Defendant and REMAND with instructions
that the district court make a finding on the
merits of Perich's retaliation claim under the
ADA.
HELENE N..
concurring.

WHITE,

Circuit

Judge,

I agree that the ministerial exception does
not bar this ADA action. I write separately
because I read the relevant cases as more
evenly split than does the majority.
As the majority notes, whether a teacher at a
sectarian school is properly characterized as
a ministerial employee is an issue of first
impression for this Court. A number of
courts have concluded that parochial school
teachers are not ministerial employees for
pui'Poses of the exception. In contrast, courts
have found teachers to be ministerial
employees where the teachers have taught
religious subjects and/or had a key role in
the religious mission of the church.
Of these cases, four present situations
similar to that here-plaintiff teachers who
taught primarily secular subjects at a
religious school and court decisions turning
on a primary-duties analysis. Two plaintiffs
were not found to be ministerial employees ..
Two plaintiffs were found to be ministerial
employees.
Perich's daily duties resemble to some
extent those of the plaintiffs in each of these
cases, including those in which the courts
found the plaintiffs' "primary duties" to be
ministerial in nature. Tipping the scale
against the ministerial exception in this case
is that, as the majority points out, there is
evidence here that the school itself did not
envision its teachers as religious leaders, or
as occupying "ministerial" roles. HosannaTabor's teachers are not required to be
called or even Lutheran to teach or to lead
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daily religious activities. The fact that the
. duties of the contract teachers are the same
as the duties of the called teachers is telling.
This presence (or lack) of a predominantly
religious yardstick for qualification as a
teacher is a key factor in decisions finding
the ministerial exception applicable and
those finding it inapplicable alike.

By this measure, even courts that have found
ministerial plaintiffs who have daily
schedules that have roughly the same ratio
of religious to non-religious activities as
Perich would find that the ministerial
exception should not apply here.
For the reasons above, I concur.
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"High Court to Weigh Bias Exemption
for Religious Teachers"
Education Week
March 28, 2011
Mark Walsh

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to decide whether a private school teacher
involved in secular and religious instruction
falls under a widely recognized exception to
employment-discrimination
laws
for
ministers and other church leaders.
The appeal by a Lutheran church and
elementary school in Redford, Mich., was
joined by a number of religious
organizations and .$cho1ars, who argued that
there are widely disparate rulings in the
lower courts about whether religious-school
teachers are subject to the "ministerial
exception" to job-bias laws.
The exception, recognized by virtually every
federal circuit court of appeals, bars lawsuits
that interfere in the relationship between a
religious organization and employees who
perfOlID religious functions. It is separate
from the specific religious exemption in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which applies to any employee of a religious
organization, but only with respect to claims
of religious discrimination.
The federal appeals courts are split on the
legal standard to be applied and the scope of
the employees covered by the ministerial
exception.
The case accepted by the Supreme Court,
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (No. 10-553),
involves Cheryl Perich, a 4th grade teacher
at the school who got into a dispute over her

return from a medical leave for narcolepsy
in the 2004-05 school year.
Perich was a "called teacher" under the
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, which
meant she was trained in the church's
theology and selected for her job by voting
members of the church. She taught a secular
4th grade curriculum, but also taught
religion classes on some days and led
devotional exercises, among other religious
duties, according to court papers.
Amid the dispute over her medica11eave, the
church rescinded her "call," effectively
terminating her. She filed a charge of
discrimination and retaliation with the
federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which took her side and filed a
retaliation suit against the church and school
under the. Americans with Disabilities Act.
A federal district court ruled for the church,
but in March 2010, a panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, in Cincinnati,
ruled 2-1 for the teacher. The court applied a
"primary duties" test, and held that Perich
was not subject to the ministerial exception
because she "spent the overwhelming
majority of her day teaching secular subjects
using secular textbooks." The court also said
that "called" and "lay" teachers at the school
had primarily the same duties.
The church and school appealed to the
~upreme Court with the support of the
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.
"The decision below conflicts with this
court's cases forbidding secular courts from
306

interfering in religious disputes," says the
brief on the church's behalf, co-written by
Douglas Laycock, a prominent law and
religion scholar and a professor at the
University of Virginia. "The courts here·
have no business reinstating a commissioned
minister and called teacher who teaches
religion and leads children in worship."
Among the groups filing friend-of-the-court
briefs on the church's side were the
of
Christian
Schools
Association
International, the Council of Hindu Temples
of North America, and the Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations of North
America.

review of Perich's duties at the school.
"The fact that Perich led chapel twice a year
in rotation with other teachers did not make
her a minister for·purposes of the ministerial
exception, the [6th Circuit] court noted," the
EEOC brief said.
In a brief filed on. behalf of Perich, her
lawyer also urged the high court not to take
the case, saying that religious organizations
are seeking "wide leeway to avoid the
federal
statutory
prohibitions
on
discrimination. "
The court will hear arguments in the case
during its term that begins next October.

The EEOC filed a brief urging the court not
to review the case, noting that the 6th
Circuit had conducted a "fact-intensive"
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"Perich vs. The Parish: 6th Circuit Says Teacher
Not Ministerial Employee"
Michigan Lawyers Weekly
March 22, 2010
Brian Frasier
A parochial school teacher is not a
ministerial employee and can sue her parish
employer for violating the Americans with
Disabilities Act, said the 6th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The facts are similar to the recent Michigan
Court of Appeals' decision in Weishuhn v.
Catholic Diocese of Lansing (see "You're
fired!," Michigan Lawyers Weekly, Feb. 8,
2010). In that case, the court said the teacher
couldn't sue for wrongful termination
because she was a ministerial employee.
But the facts of that case are distinguishable
·because of comments Weishuhn made about
her personal teaching philosophy in a
newspaper interview, said Thomas A.
Cooley Law School professor John Taylor.
Determining whether a teacher is a
ministerial employee is not as simple as
counting the religious classes.
"It [is] a factor, but not the only factor," he
said.

Weishuhn's attorney, Julie A. Gafkay, said
Weishuhn's personal beliefs are beyond the
proper analysis.

Perich not a minister
In general, the ministerial exception
prevents courts from interfering in the
employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministerial employees. A
ministerial employee is determined by a
primary duties test-the totality of the

employee's duties and
position and function.

responsibilities,

In the 6th Circuit case, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission et al. v. HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
School, parochial teacher Cheryl Perich
began suffering from narcolepsy during the
summer of 2004. School administrators told
her that she should take a disability leave of
absence for the school year, and the
principal told her she'd still have ajob when
she was ready to return.
In January 2005, the school changed its
policy to "request that employees on
disability for more than six months [to]
resign" so the school could fill their
positions. When Perich tried to return before
the end of her six months, she was not
allowed to do so.
The court noted that "the overwhelming
majority of courts" have held that parochial
school teachers that teach primarily secular
subjects aren't ministerial employees.
But, "when courts have found that teachers
classify as ministerial employees for
purposes of the exception, those teachers
have generally taught primarily religious
subjects or had a central role in the spiritual
or pastoral mission of the ChU1:ch.," wrote
Judge Eric L. Clay.
Using the primary duties test analysis, the
court detennined Perich was not a
ministerial employee because she spent six
hours and 15 minutes of her seven-hour day
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teaching secular subjects.
"The fact that Perich participated in and led
some religious activities throughout the day
does not make her primary function
religious," Clay wrote.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Helene N.
White wrote that, while she agreed with the
majority, her analysis of whether Perich was
a ministerial employee was much closer,
tipped by the fact that the school did not
envision its teachers as religious leaders.
Should personal beliefs matter?

Taylor said the two rulings are consistent
because the court didn't base its decision in
Weishuhn solely on teaching time.
"I don't think that the Michigan Court of
Appeals applied a different rule," he said. "I
just think that there was a different set of
facts."
Taylor said that by his count, Perich spent
about 10 percent of her week teaching
religious classes, while Weishuhn spent
about a third of her time teaching religion.
But the fact that Taylor thought swung
Weishuhn in favor of the church was an
interview she gave to The Catholic Times, in
which she talked about weaving religion into
any class that she taught.
"That was the single most crucial difference
between the two cases and the single most
crucial factor working against her," Taylor
said.

year. She attended chapel with her class. She
taught religion four days per week. And,
she's considered a commissioned minister."
Gafkay said it wouldn't be fair to hold
statements made in the newspaper interview
regarding her personal religious beliefs
against her because it had nothing to de:> with
her job duties.
"Nowhere does [the primary duties] test call
for looking at the individual beliefs of that
employee," she said.
Weishuhn recently appealed the case to the
Michigan Supreme Court.
Another impOliant distinction was HosannaTabor didn't require its teachers to be·
Lutheran, and all teachers, whether "called"
or contract teachers, did the same job, said
Wayne State University School of Law
professor Kingsley R. Browne.
He said the rulings were consistent because
the courts applied the same basic law to each
set of facts. But Browne agreed that
consideration of Weishuhn's choice to
infuse religion to secular classes could tip
the analysis between similarly situated
teachers with different philosophies.
"If you had a case in which you had two
employees that are suing for the same thing,
joint plaintiffs, and they testify differently in
depositions about whether they had·
incorporated religion into their secular
classes, that would be a tough call," he said.

Gafkay disagreed, saying the primary duties
of both teachers were similar.

"What's controlling? The way the employee
does their job, or the way the employer
contemplated that the job would be
performed?"

"[Perich] led the class in prayer three times a
day," she said. "She led chapel two times a

Attorneys for both Perich and HosannaTabor did not respond to Michigan Lawyers
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Weekly's requests for comment.
Decision in a Nutshell
The Case: Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, et al., v. Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Church & School.
The Facts: A parochial teacher was fired
after becoming ill, even though her doctors
said she could fully return to work. She sued
under the Americans With Disabilities Act.
The Decision: She was not a ministerial
employee, and her ADA lawsuit is allowed
to proceed.
From the Decision: "A religious entity may
give a preference in employment to
individuals of the particular religion, and
may require that . . . employees conform to
the religious tenets of the organization.

However, a religious organization may not
discriminate against an individual who
satisfies the permitted religious criteria
because that individual is disabled .... "
"The governing primary duties analysis
requires a court to objectively examine an
employee's actual job function, not her title,
in determining whether she is properly
classified as a minister."
Froin the Concurrence: "Perich's daily
duties resemble to some extent those of the
plaintiffs in each of these cases, including
those in which the courts found the
plaintiffs' 'primary duties' to be ministerial
in nature. Tipping the scales against the
ministerial exception in this case is that, as
the majority points out, there is evidence
here that the school itself did not envision its
teachers as religious leaders."
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"Hosanna-Tabor Case to Test Our
Church-State Divide"
USA Today
April 25, 2011
Richard W. Garnett

The Supreme Court's religious-freedom
decisions are usually about symbols, speech
and spending: war memorial crosses in the
desert and Ten Commandments monuments
near public buildings, scholarships that
allow poor kids to attend parochial schools
. and funding for "faith-based" social
services, Pledge of Allegiance, and so on..
In late March, the justices agreed to review a
Michigan job-discrimination case with none
of these familiar eye-catching and attentiongrabbing features. It does involve, however,
fundamental questions about church-state
relations and the limits of government
authority-questions at the core of the First
Amendment's concerns-and it could prove
to be among the court's most important
religious-liberty cases in many years.
Critics sometimes complain that the court's
religion-related decisions bog down in
trivi~-How close are the reindeer and
snowmen to the Baby Jesus in the holiday
display?-but this case, Hosanna-Tabor
Church v. EEOC, is about a big idea, the
"separation of church and state," that really
matters.
The case
In a nutshell, Hosanna-Tabor is ·a lawsuit
brought by Cheryl Perich, a former teacher
at a church-run Lutheran grade school who
argues that the church violated a federal law
against disability-based discrimination when
it rescinded her "call" as a "commissioned
minister"-and fired her as a third- and

fourth-grade teacher, after a disabilityrelated leave of absence.
A federal trial court in Michigan dismissed
the teacher's claim, insisting that the
"ministerial" nature of her position and the
religious dimensions of the church's
decision made it inappropriate to apply the
anti-discrimination law. But the court of
appeals disagreed and concluded that her
"primary duties"-as a "commissioned
minister" at a school that aims to provide a
"Christ-centered education" from teachers
who "integrate faith into all subjects"-were
secular, and not religious. .
The court gave little weight to the facts that
the teacher led her students in prayer several
times a day and taught religion classes four
days a week, and instead simply compared
the minutes she spent on religious formation
with those she spent teaching "secular
subjects."
The Supreme Court should reverse this
decision, and it is important to understand
why.
For stmiers, it is well established that a
"ministerial exception" to job-discrimination
laws prevents secular courts from jumping
into religious disputes. that they lack the
authority to address or the competence to
solve. The question in the Hosanna-Tabor
case is not so much whether the exception
exist~-it does, and it should-as how it
should be understood and applied.
As the court of appeals recognized, this
exception is "rooted in the First
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Amendment's guarantees of religious
freedom." Indeed, a religious-liberty
promise that allowed governments to
second-guess
religious
communities'
'decisions about what should be their
teachings or who should be their teachers
would be a hollow one.
To be clear, the ministerial exception is
constitutionally required and valuable, but it
does not rest on assumption that religious
institutions and employers never behave
badly. Celiainly, they do. Its premise is not
that churches are. somehow "above the law."
They are not, and should not be. Its point is
not "discrimination is fine, if churches do
it." It is, instead, that there are some
questions secular courts should not claim the
power to answer, some wrongs that a
constitutional commitment to church-state
separation puts beyond the law's corrective
reach, and some relationships-such as the
one petween a religious congregation and
the ministers to whom it entrusts not only
the "secular" education but also the religious
formation of its members-that government
should not presume to supervise too closely.

interpreting and applying the First
Amendment's religious-freedom guarantees,
it cannot be the role of secular government
to second-guess the decisions of religious
communities and institutions about who
should be their ministers, leaders and
teachers, any more than they should review
their decisions about the content of religious
doctrines.

Out of government's league

Last October, many enjoyed a laugh at the
expense of Christine O'Donnell, then a
candidate for one of Delaware's U.S. Senate
seats, when she questioned the constitutional
pedigree of the "separation of church and
state." Her critics were a bit too quick to
poke fun. In fact, "separation of church and
state" does not appear in the Constitution.
Still, and even though it is often distorted
and misused, the idea is a crucial dimension
of religious freedom. We wisely distinguish,
or "separate," the institutions and authorities
of religion from those of government. We do
this, though, not so much by building a
"wall," but by respecting the genuine
autonomy of these different spheres. We do
this not to confine religious belief and
practice but to curb the ambitions and reach
of governments.

To be sure, not every employee of a
religious institution IS a "ministerial
employee," and religious institutions-·like
all employers-have many legal obligations
to their employees. Although there are
difficult questions to be asked, and many
fine lines to be drawn, when it comes to

The Gospel repOlis that Jesus told the
Pharisees to "render therefore to Caesar the
things that are Caesar's, and to God ~he
things that are God's." In a similar vein, our .
Constitution tells Caesar that he is only
Caesar, and insists that he not demand what
is God's.
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"Should Religions Be Allowed to Discriminate?"
Washington Post

April 5, 2011
Marci A. Hamilton
Congress and the state legislatures owe it to
potential employees of religious institutions
to warn them of their lack of protection from
invidious discrimination.
The Supreme Court this week granted
review on the issue of whether religious
organizations have a constitutional right to
discriminate against their employees. That is
right-there is a legal argument that
religious organizations should have a
constitutional right to treat their employees
in ways no secular organization could.
Although the lower courts have been
entertaining arguments in this sphere for
decades, this is the first time the· Supreme
Court has waded into what is called the
"ministerial exception." Don't be misled by
the name of the doctrine, though. These
cases do not involve simply ministers,
priests, or rabbis. Religious organizations
obviously should have a right to choose their
clergy according to their own lights.
The doctrine, though, was extended to
include others who are not clergy per se,
e.g., teachers whose role is more secular
than religious, as in this particular case.
The case is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,
and involves teacher Cheryl Perich. She
developed narcolepsy and, therefore, took a
medical leave. The head of the school
promised to hold her job for her. When her
health improved, she retumed to the school,
but was told she could not come back yet.
She had to wait until the beginning of the
next school year.

She argued that .the school violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
- by excluding her on the basis of her illness.
The church school has responded that it had
the power to remove her for disobedience to
its leaders' order to wait until the next year,
regardless of the ADA.
- Then, in the courts, the school raised the flag
of the First Amendment, arguing that she
was a religious employee and the courts
should not interfere. She taught secular
subjects but also some religion classes and
led the students in prayer.
In most employment contexts, an employer
who behaved like the church school in this
case would be accountable to state and
federal- anti-discrimination laws protecting
the sick and disabled. -The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found
that the First Amendment was not a bar to
her claims, and, therefore, concluded that
the church could be liable under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
This case reminds me of Lynette Petruska's
struggles. She was chosen by a Catholic
university to be its chaplain. There was no
requirement that the position be held by a
priest and, therefore, it was open to a
woman. The school, however, eventually
shoved Petruska out of her position· to
replace. her with a man. It was gender
discrimination. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that she
had no rights, because the university was
religious and she was a chaplain, so gender
discrimination was their right.
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At this early stage in the case, in this
column, I will not delve into the niceties of
the legal doctrine that will be debated at the
Court: Rather, I want to paint the big picture
for my readers so that they can understand
what is happening in this and other related
cases.
There are· two sides of this debate. First,
there are the religious groups, which have
been trying to construct a moat or a wall
around 'religious institutions that would
shield them from accountability for
discrimination against their employees.
They are fond of arguing for their
"autonomy" from the law. They trade on the
American inclination to trust and revere
religious institutions.
On the other side are the employees who
find themselves shocked by a religious
institution they intuitively trusted that fires
them in violation of our shared cultural
norm against many kinds ·of discrimination.
Cases have involved racial, gender, and
disability discrimination. They also have
involved sexual harassment. For example,
seminaries have argued that seminarians
may not bring a sexual harassment claim
after the seminarian was sexually
propositioned by superiors.
This is a clash of old-time First Amendment
thinking-which treats religious institutions
as benign institutions that should be left to
their own devices-and civil rights.
Americans have an instinct for fairness and
justice, and assume that if anyone, including
their religious employer, treats them

discriminatorily, they should have legal
recourse. But religious institutions and their
lawyers sink tremendous resources into
blocking such legal recourse. (Nevel'
forget-all those who hold power are likely
to abuse it in some way, and religious
institutions are run by humans, not gods.)
The church in this case is seeking the right
to exclude the courts from "interfering" with
their employment decisions.
If the church school wins this case, which it
should not, I think that Congress and the
state legislatures owe it to potential
employees of religious institutions to warn
them of their lack of protection from
invidious discrimination. Most come into
such institutions expecting that they will
. receive· better treatment than your average
corporation. Without such' a warning,
employees unwittingly place themselves in a
position of weakness and risk at work. All
religious institutions should be required to
include language in their employment
contracts that states the follOWing:
This is a religious institution, which treats
all of its employees as though they are
religious; You must understand that that
means that we will take the position if we
discriminate against you that the federal and
state anti-discrimination laws cannot apply.
Therefore, if this institution engages in
invidious racial, gender, or disability
discrimination against you, you may have no
legal recourse.
This is what is at stake in this case.
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Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
10-1293
Ruling Below: Fox ,Television Stations, Inc. v. F.c.c., 613 F.3d 317 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 2011 WL 1527312 (U.S. 2011).
In both 2002 and 2003, the F.C.C. found expletives uttered by award recipients during the Fox's
live broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards violated the F.C.C.'s indecency policy.
Additionally in 2003, several affiliates on the ABC-TV network were fined for airing an episode
of "NYPD Blue" found to be indecent by the F.C.C. The cases involve separate proceedings that
were combined in a sole petition to the Court. The F.C.C. indecency policy was originally held to
be arbitrary and capricious in the first appeal before the Second Circuit. As such, the network's
constitutional claims were not reached. The Court granted cert and reversed, holding the F.C.C.'s
indecency policy was not arbitrary and capricious, and remanded, the case for consideration of
the constitutional claims. In this latest appeal, the Second Circuit found the F.C.C. indecency
policy to be unconstitutionally vague, resulting in a chilling effect on speech in violation of the
First Amendment.
Question Presented: Whether the Federal Communications Commission's current indecencyenforcement regime violates the First 01' Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., CBS Broadcasting Inc.,WLS Television, KTRK
Television, Inc., KMBC Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., ABC Inc., Petitioners,

v.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, United States of America,
Respondents, NBC Universal, Inc., NBC Telemundo License Co., NBC Television
Affiliates, FBC Television Affiliates Association, CBS Television Network Affiliates, Center
for the Creative Community, Inc., Doing Business as Center for Creative Voices in Media,
Inc., ABC Television Affiliates Association, Intervenors.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second.Circuit
Filed July 13, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
POOLER, Circuit Judge:
This petition for review comes before us on
remand from the Supreme Court. Previously,
we held, with Judge Leval dissenting, that
the indecency policy of the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") was arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Fox

Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d
444, 462 (2d Cir.2007). The Supreme Court
reversed, upholding the policy under the
AP A and remanding for consideration of
petitioners' constitutional arguments. See
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., U.S. - , - , 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1819, 173
L.Ed.2d 738 (2009) (Scalia, l). We now
hold that the FCC's policy violates the First
Amendment because it is unconstitutionally
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vague, creating a chilling effect that goes far
beyond the fleeting expletives at issue here.
Thus, we grant the petition for review and
vacate the FCC's order and the indecency
policy underlying it.

BACKGROUND
Section 1464 of Title 18 of United States
Code provides that "[w]hoever utters any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both." In 1960, Congress
authorized the FCC to impose civil
forfeitures for violations of Section 1464. It
was not until 1975, however, that the FCC
first exercised its authority to regulate
speech it deemed indecent but not obscene.
The speech at issue was comedian George
Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue, a 12minute string of expletives broadcast on the
radio at 2:00 in the afternoon.
The FCC brought forfeiture proceedings
against the Pacifica Foundation, the
broadcaster that had aired the Carlin
monologue. In finding that Pacifica had
violated Section 1464, the Commission
defined "indecent" speech as "language that
describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory activities mid organs, at times
of the day when there is a reasonable risk
that children may be in the audience."
Pacifica petitioned for review to the D.C.
Circuit, which declared the FCC's indecency
regime invalid. In finding the FCC's order
both vague and overbroad, the court pointed
out that the Commission's definition of
indecent speech would prohibit "the
uncensored broadcast of many of the great
works of literature including Shakespearian
plays and contemporary plays which have
won critical acclaim, the works of renowned
classical and contemporary poets and

writers, and passages from the Bible." Such
a result, the court concluded, mnounted to
unconstitutional censorship.
In a plurality opinion authored by Justice
Stevens, the Supreme Court reversed. See
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 98
S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978). The
Court limited its review to the question of
whether the FCC could impose a civil
forfeiture for the. Carlin monologue and
declined to address Pacifica's argument that.
the regulation was overbroad and would
chill protected speech. In limiting its review,
the Court stressed the "specific' factual
context" of the Carlin monologue, focusing
in particular on Carlin's deliberate and
repetitive use of expletives to describe
sexual and excretory activities.
The Court then went on to hold that the FCC
could, at least in the situation before it,
restrict indecent speech in the broadcast
context that did not meet the legal definition
of obscenity. Resting on a nuisance
rationale, the Court first noted that "of all
forms of communication, it is broadcasting .
that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection" because of its
"uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of
all Americans." Moreover, the nature of
broadcast television~as opposed to printed
materials-made it "uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read." The
Court,
however,
"emphasize [d]
the
narrowness of [its] holding." "[N]uisance
may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard. We simply hold that when the
Commission finds that a pig has entered the
parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power
does not depend on proof that the pig is
obscene."
Justices Powell and Blackmun, who
concurred in a separate opinion, also made
clear that the FCC's regulatory authority
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was limited, stating that the Court's holding
did not give the FCC "an umestricted
license to decide what speech, protected in
other media, may be banned from the
airwaves in order to protect unwilling adults
from· momentary exposure to it in their
homes." Nor,· they explained, did the
holding "speak to cases involving the
isolated use of a potentially offensive word
in the course of a radio broadcast, as
distinguished from the· verbal shock
treatment administered by respondent here."
Finally, they took the FCC at its word that it
would "proceed cautiously," which they
reasoned would minimize any chilling effect
that might otherwise result.

In the years after Pacifica, the FCC did
indeed pursue a· restrained enforcement
policy, taking the position that its
enforcement powers were limited to the
seven specific words in the Carlin .
monologue; No enforcement actions were
brought between 1978 and 1987. Then, in
1987, the FCC abandoned its focus on
specific words, concluding that "although
enforcement was clearly easier under' the
standard, it could lead to anomalous results
that could not be justified." The FCC
reasoned that under the prior standard,
patently offensive material was permissible
as long as it avoided certain words. Th~s, the
Commission concluded, "made neither legal
nor policy sense." The Commission instead
decided to utilize the definition it had used
in Pacifica, adopting a contextual approach
to indecent speech.
Despite its move to a more flexible standard,
the FCC continued to exercise restraint. In
particular, it consistently held that a single,
non-literal use of an expletive was not
actionably indecent.
In 2001, in an attempt to "provide guidance
to the broadcast industry regarding ... [its]
enforcement policies with respect to

broadcast indecency," the FCC issued a
policy statement in which it set forth its
indecency standard in more detail. Industry
Guidance on the Commission's Case Law
Intelpreting J8·USC. § 1464,16 F.C.C.R.
7999, at ~ 1 (2001) ("Industry Guidance ").
In· Industry Guidance, the FCC explained
that an indecency finding involved the
following two determinations: (1) whether
the material "describe[s] or depict [s] sexual
or excretory organs or activities"; and (2)
whether the broadcast is "patently offensive
as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium." The
FCC further explained that it considered the
following three factors in determining
whether a broadcast is patently offensive:
(1) "the explicitness or graphic nature of the
description or depiction"; (2) "whether the
material dwells on or repeats at length" the
description or depiction; and (3) "whether
the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the materials appears to
have been presented for its shock value."
The Industry Guidance reiterated that under
the second prong of the patently offensive
test, "fleeting and isolated" expletives were
not actionably indecent.
In 2004, however, the FCC's policy on
indecency changed. During the 2003 Golden
.Globe Awards, U2 band member Bono
exclaimed, upon receiving an award, "this is
really, really, fucking brilliant. Really,
really, great." In re Complaints Against
Various Broadcast Licenses Regarding the
Airing of the "Golden Globe Awards"
Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, at ~ 3 n. 4
(2004) ("Golden Globes Order "). In
response to complaints filed after the
incident, the FCC declared, for the first time,
that a single, nonliteral use of an expletive (a
so-called "fleeting expletive") could be
actionably indecent. Finding that "the 'FWord' is one of the most vulgar, graphic,
and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in
the English language," and therefore
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"inherently has a sexual connotation," the
FCC concluded that the fleeting and isolated
use of the word was irrelevant and overruled
all prior decisions in which fleeting use of
an expletive was held per se not indecent.
The FCC also found that the broadcast was
"profane" within the meaning of Section
1464, abandoning its previous interpretation
of the term to mean blasphemy.
At the same time that the FCC expanded its
enforcement efforts to include even fleeting
expletives, the FCC also began issuing
record fines for indecency violations. While
the Commission had previously interpreted
the maximum fines in the statute as applying
on a per-program basis, it began treating
each licensee's. broadcast of the same
program as a separate violation, thereby
multiplying the maximum fine the FCC
could order for each instance of indecent
speech. In addition, Congress amended
Section 503(b)(2)(c)(ii) to increase the
maximum fine permitted by a factor of 10from $32,500 to $325,000-meaning that
the fine for a single expletive uttered during
a broadcast could easily. run into· the tens of
millions of dollars.
NBC Universal, Inc. ("NBC"), along with
numerous other patties, filed petitions for
reconsideration of the Golden Globes. Order
before the FCC, raising statutory and
constitutional challenges to the new policy.
While the petitions for reconsideration were
pending, the FCC applied the Golden
Globes
Order
policy in IN RE
COMPLAINTS REGARDING VARIOUS
TELEVISION BROADCASTS BETWEEN
FEBRUARY 2, 2002 AND MARCH 8, 2005,
21 F.C.C. Red. 2664 (2006) ("Omnibus
Order "), which the Commission stated was

intended to "provide substantial guidance. to
broadcasters and the public" about· what· was
considered indecent under the new policy. In
. the Omnibus Order (which dealt with many
more programs than are at issue in the·

present case), the Commission found four
programs-the 2002 Billboard Music
Awards, the 2003 Billboard Music Awards,
various episodes of ABC's NYPD Blue, and
CBS's The Early Show-indecent and
profane under the Golden Globes standard.
All four programs involved· what could be
characterized as fleeting expletives. For
instance, during the 2002 Billboard Music
Awards, Cher, in an unscripted moment
from her acceptance speech, stated: "People
have been telling me I'm on the way out
every year, right? So fuck 'em." Similarly,
during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards,
Nicole Ritchie-on stage to present an
award with Paris Hilton-made the
following unscripted remark: "Have you
ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada
purse? It's not so fucking simple." Episodes
of NYPD Blue were found indecent based
on several instances of the word "bullshit,"
while the CBS's The Early Show was found
indecent on the basis ofa guest's use of the
word "bullshitter" to describe a fellow
contestant on the reality TV show, Survivor:
Vanuatu.
In finding these programs indecent and
profane, the FCC reaffirmed its decision in
the Golden Globes Order that any use of the
word "fuck" was presumptively indecent
and profane, further concluding that any use
of the word "shit" was also presumptively
indecent and profane. It also held that the
four broadcasts in question were "patently
offensive" because the material was explicit,
shocking, and gratuitous, notwithstanding
the fact that the expletives were fleeting and
isolated.
Fox Television Stations, Inc. ("Fox"), CBS
Broadcasting Inc. ("CBS"), and ABC Inc.
("ABC"), as well as several network
affiliates, filed petitions for review of the
Omnibus Order. The FCC moved for a
voluntary remand, which we granted, so that
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it could have the 0ppoliunity to address
petitioners' arguments and could ensure that
all licensees had a full opportunity to .be
heard before the FCC issued a final decision..
After soliciting public comments, the FCC
issued a second order on November 6, 2006.
See IN RE COMPLAINTS REGARDING
VARIOUS TELEVISION BROADCASTS
BETWEEN FEBRUARY 2, 2002 AND
MARCH 8,2005,21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006)
("Remand Order"). In the Remand Order,
the FCC reaffinned its finding that the 2002
and 2003 Billboard Music Awards were
indecent and profane. However, the FCC
reversed its finding with respect to The
Early Show and dismissed the complaint
against NYPD Blue on procedural grounds.

making a variety of administrative,
statutory, and constitutional arguments. In a
2-1 decision (with Judge Leval in dissent),
we held that the FCC's indecency policy
was arbitrary and capricious under the AP A.
Fox, 489 F.3d at 447. We reached this
decision because we believed that the FCC
had failed to adequately explain why it had
changed itsnearly-30-year policy on
fleeting expletives. Moreover, we noted that
the FCC's justification for the policy-that
children could be harmed by hearing even
one fleeting expletive (the so-called "first
blow" theory)-bore "no rational connection
to the Commission's actual policy," because
the FCC had not instituted a blanket ban on
expletives.

In the Remand Order, the FCC rejected the
petitioners' argument that. non-literal uses of
expletives were not indecent, reasoning that
"any strict dichotomy between expletives
and descriptions or depictions of sexual or
excretory functions is artificial and does not
make sense. in light of the fact that an
expletive's power to offend derives from its
sexual or excretory meaning." However, the
Commission did "not take the position that
any occurrence of an expletive is indecent or
profane under its. rules,"allowing that
expletives that were "integral" to an artistic
work or occurring during a "bonafide news
interview" might not run afoul of the
indecency standard. As such, it reversed its
previous decision concerning the CBS's The
Early Show because the utterance of the
word "bullshitter" took place during a bona
fide news interview. The Commission made
clear, however, that "there is no outright
news exemption from our indecency rules."

Because we .struck down the indecency
policy on AP A . grounds, we declined to
reach the constitutional issues in the case.
We noted, however, that we were "skeptical
that the Commission [could] provide a
reasoned explanation for its 'fleeting
expletive' regime that would pass
constitutional . muster." We expressed
sympathy for "the Networks' contention that
the FCC's indecency test [wa]s unclefined,
indiscernible,
inconsistent,
and
consequently, unconstitutionally vague." We
were also troubled that the FCC's policy
appeared to permit it to "sanction speech
based on its subj ective view of the merit of
that speech." However, because it was
unnecessary for us to reach them, we left
those issues for another day. The FCC
subsequently filed a writ of certiorari, which
the Supreme Court granted.

and
intervenors,
which
Petitioners
collectively represented all the major
broadcast networks as well as local affiliates
affected by the FCC's indecency policy
(hereinafter, the "Networks"), returned to
this Court for review of the Remand Order,

In a 5--4 decision, the Supreme Court
reversed our AP A ruling, holding that the
FCC's "fleeting expletive" policy was not
arbitrary and capricious because "[t]he
Commission could reasonably conclude that
the pervasiveness of foul language, and the
. coarsening of public entertainment in other
media such as cable, justifY more stringent
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regulation of broadcast programs so as to
give conscientious parents a relatively safe
haven for their children." 129 S.Ct. at 1819.
However, the Court declined to address the
Networks'
constitutional
arguments,
"see[ing] no reason to abandon our usual
procedures in a rush to judgment without a
lower court opinion," and remanded for us
to consider them in the first instance. Thus,
after further briefing by the parties,
intervenors, and amici, we now turn to the
question that we deferred in our previous
decision-whether the FCC's indecency
policy violates the First Amendment.
DISCUSSION
1.
1 It is well-established that indecent speech
is fully protected by the First Amendment.
In most contexts, the Supreme Court has
considered restrictions on indecent speech to
be content-based restrictions subject to strict
scrutiny....
... Broadcast radio and television, however,
have always occupied a unique position
when' it comes to First Amendment
of
protection.
The
categorization
broadcasting as different from all other
forms of communication pre-dates Pacifica.
And the Supreme Court has continuously
reaffirmed
the
distinction
between
broadcasting and other forms of media since
Pacifica. However, it was in Pacifica that
the Supreme Court gave its fullest
explanation for why restrictions on
broadcast speech were subject to a lower
level of scrutiny, relying on the twin pillars
of pervasiveness and accessibility to
children. While Pacifica did not specify
what level of scrutiny applies to restrictions
on broadcast speech, subsequent cases have
applied something akin to intermediate
scrutiny.

The Networks argue that the world has
changed since Pacifica and the reasons
underlying the decision are no longer valid.
Indeed, we face a media landscape that
would have been almost unrecognizable in
1978.
[Describing the proliferation of cable
networks and internet media.]
Moreover, technological changes have given
parents the ability to decide which programs
they will pe1mit their children to watch.
Every television, 13 inches or larger, sold in
the United States since January 2000
contains a V -chip, which allows parents to
block programs based on a standardized
rating system. Moreover, since June 11,
2009, when the United States made the
transition to digital television, anyone using
a digital converter box also has access to a
V -chip. In short, there now exists a way to
block programs that contain indecent speech
in a way that was not possible in 1978. In
fact, the existence of technology that
allowed
for
household-by-household
blocking of "unwanted" cable channels was
one of the principle distinctions between
cable television and broadcast media drawn
by the Supreme Court in Playboy. The Court
explained:
The option to block reduces the
likelihood, so concerning to the
Court in Pacifica, that traditional
First Amendment scrutiny would
deprive the Government of all
authority to address this sort of
problem. The corollary, of course, is
that targeted blocking enables the
Government to support parental
authority without affecting the First
Amendment interests of speakers and
willing
listeners-listeners
for
whom, if the speech is unpopular or
indecent, ,the privacy of their own
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homes may be the optimal place of
receipt.
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 815, 120 S.Ct. 1878
(internal citation omitted).

We can think of no reason why this rationale
for applying strict scrutiny in the case of
cable television would n~t apply with equal
force to broadcast television in light of the
V-chip teclmology that is now available.
Neveliheless, as we stated in our previous
. decision, we are bound by Supreme Court
precedent, regardless of whether it reflects
today's realities. The Supreme Court may
decide in due course to overrule Pacifica
and subject speech restrictions in the
broadcast context to strict scrutiny: This
Court, however,. is "not at liberty to depart
from binding Supreme Court precedent
'unless and until [the] Court reinterpret [s]'
that precedent." The Networks, although
they may wish it otherwise, seem to concede
that we must evaluate the FCC's indecency
policy under the framework established by
the Supreme Court in Pacifica.
There is considerable disagreement among
the parties, however, as to what framework
. Pacifica established. The FCC interprets
Pacifica as permitting it to exercise broad
regulatory authority to sanction indecent
speech. In its view, the Carlin monologue
was only the most extreme example of a
hn'ge category of indecent speech that the
FCC can· constitutionally prohibit. The
Networks, on the other hand, view Pacifica
as establishing the li!llit of the FCC's
authority. In other words, they believe that
only when indecent speech rises to the level
of "verbal shock treatment," exemplified by
the Carlin monologue, can the FCC impose
a civil forfeiture. Because Pacifica was an
intentionally narrow opinion, it does not
provide us with a clear answer to this
question. Fortunately, we do not need to

wade into the brambles in an attempt to
answer it ourselves. For we conclude that,
regardless of where the outer limit of the
FCC's authority lies, the FCC's indecency
policy is unconstitutional because it is
impermissibly vague. It is to this issue that
we now turn.
II.
It is a basic principle that a law or regulation
"'is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are.
not clearly defined. '" A law or regulation is
impermissibly vague if it does not "give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited."
The First Amendment places a special
burden on the government to ensure that
restrictions on speech are not impermissibly
vague. However, "'perfect clarity and
precise guidance have never been required
even of regulations that restrict expressive
activity. '"

The vagueness doctrine serves several
important objectives in the First Amendment
context. First, the doctrine is based on the
principle of fair notice. '" [W]e assume that
man is free to steer between lawful and
unlawful conduct and we give him notice of
what is prohibited so that he may act
accordingly. '" Notice is particularly
impOliant with respect to content-based
speech restrictions "because of [their]
obvious chilling effect on free speech."
Vague regulations "'inevitably lead citizens
to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than
if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were
clearly marked.'" Second, the vagueness
doctrine is based "on the need to eliminate
the impermissible risk of discriminatory
enforcement." "A vague law impermissibly
delegates
basic policy matters to
[government officials] for resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis .... " Specificity,
on the other hand, guards against
subjectivity and discriminatory enforcement.
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A.

The. Networks argue that the· FCC's
indecency test is unconstitutionally vague
because it provides no clear guidelines as to
what is covered and thus forces broadcasters
to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone,"
rather than risk massive fines. In support of
their position, the Networks rely on the
Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU.
Section 223 (a) of the Communications
("CDA")
prohibited
Decency
Act
transmitting "indecent" material to minors
over the Intemet while section 223 (d)
prohibited material that "in context, depicts
or describes, in terms patently offensive as
. measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs." In addition to finding that the
statute was not narrowly tailored, the Court
found the statute unconstitutionally vague
because· "the many ambiguities conceming
the scope of its coverage render [ed] it.
problematic for purposes of the First
Amendment." The Court found that the
statute's use of the "general, undefined
terms 'indecent' and 'patently offensive'
cover [ed] large amounts of nonpomographic
material with serious educational or other
value." Because of the "vague contours" of
the regulation, the Court held that "it
unquestionably silence [d] some speakers
whose messages would be entitled to
constitutional pf(~tection." The Networks
argue that since Reno found this indecency
regulation unconstitutionally vague, the
FCC'sidentically-worded indecency test for
broadcasting must fall as well.
FCC argues the opposite-that Reno
forecloses a vagueness challenge to the
FCC's policy. In Reno, the govemment
argued that the· CDA was "plainly
constitutional" under the Pacifica decision.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
distinguishing Pacifica on the grounds that
(1) the FCC is an expert agency that had

been regulating the radio for decades; (2) the
CDA was a categorical ban on speech while
the FCC's indecency regulation designated
"when-rather than whether-it would be
permissible to air such a program"; (3) the
order at issue in Pacifica was not punitive;
and (4) the broadcast medium had
traditionally received the most limited First
Amendment protection. According to the
FCC, because the Court refused to find
Pacifica controlling of the constitutional
challenges to the CDA, we must find Reno
equally inapplicable here.
As an initial matter, we reject the FCC's
argument that Reno forecloses the
Networks' vagueness challenge. When the
Supreme Court distinguished Pacifica in
Reno, it did so with respect to "the level of
First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to this medium," not to its analysis
of whether the statute was unconstitutionally
vague. Broadcasters are entitled to the same
degree of clarity as other speakers, even if
restrictions on their speech are subject to a
lower level of scrutiny. It is the language of
the rule, not the medium in which it is
applied, that determines whether a law or
regulation is impermissibly vague.
We also reject the Networks' argument that
Reno requires us to find the FCC's policy
vague. To be sure, the CDA's definition of
indecency was almost identical to the
Commission'S, . and language that is
unconstitutionally vague in one context
cannot suddenly become the model of clarity
in another. However, unlike in Reno, the
FCC has further elaborated on the definition
of indecency in the broadcast context. For
example, the FCC has outlined three factors
that it purportedly uses to detennine whether
a broadcast is patently offensive, and has
declared "fuck" and "shit" presumptively
indecent. This additional guidance may not
be sufficient to survive a vagueness
challenge, but it certainly distinguishes the
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FCC policy from the one struck down in
Reno.
Finally, we reject the FCC's argument that
the Networks' vagueness challenge is
foreclosed by Pacifica itself. Pacifica,
which did not reach the question of whether
the FCC's policy was unconstitutionally
vague, was an intentionally narrow opinion
predIcated on the FCC's "restrained"
enforcement policy. The FCC's policy has
now changed and we would be hard pressed
to characterize it as "restrained." Thus, the
questions left unresolved by Pacifica are
now squarely before us, as the Supreme
Court itself indicated in its opinion above.
B.

Having concluded that neither Pacifica nor
Reno resolves the question, we must now
decide whether the FCC's indecency policy
provides a discernible standard by which
broadcasters can accurately predict what
speech is prohibited. The FCC set forth its
indecency policy in its 2001 Industry
Guidance, in which the FCC explained that
an indecency finding involved the following
two determinations: (1) whether the material
"describe[s] or depict [s] sexual or excretory
organs or activities"; and (2) whether the
broadcast is "patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium." Under the policy,
whether a broadcast is patently. offensive
depends on the following three factors: (1)
"the explicitness or graphic nature of the
description or depiction"; (2) "whether the
material dwells on or repeats at length" the
description or depiction; and (3) "whether
the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the materials appears to
have been presented for its shock value."
Since 2001, the FCC has interpreted its
indecency policy in a number of decisions,
including Golden Globes Order and the
orders on review here.

The FCC argues that the indecency policy in
its Industry Guidance, together with its
subsequent decisions, give the broadcasters
sufficient notice as to what will be
considered indecent. The Networks argue
that the policy is impermissibly vague and
that the FCC's decisions interpreting. the
policy only add to the confusion of what will
be considered indecent.
We agree with the Networks that the
indecency policy is impermissibly vague.
The first problem arises in the FCC's
determination as to which words or
expressions are patently offensive. For
instance, while the FCC concluded that
"bullshit" in a "NYPD Blue" episode was
patently offensive, it concluded that "dick"
and "dickhead" were not. Other expletives
such as "pissed off," "up yours," "kiss my
ass," and "wiping his ass" were also not
found to be patently offensive. The
Commission argues that its three-factor
"patently offensive" test gives broadcasters
fair notice of what it will find indecent.
However, in each of these cases, the
Commission's . reasoning consisted of
repetition of one or more of the factors
without any discussion of how it applied
them. Thus, the word "bullshit" is indecent
because it is "vulgar, graphic and explicit"
while the words "dickhead" was not
indecent because it was "not sufficiently
vulgar, explicit, or graphic." This hardly
gives broadcasters notice of how the
Commission will apply the factors in the
future.
The English language is· rife with creative
. ways of depicting sexual or excretory organs
or activities, and even if the FCC were able
to provide a complete list of all such
expressions, new offensive and indecent
words are invented every day. For many
years after Pacifica, the FCC decided to
focus its enforcement efforts solely on the
seven "dirty" words III the Carlin
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monologue.
This
strategy had its
limitations-it meant that some indecent
speech that did not employ these seven
words slipped through the cracks. However,
it had the advantage of providing
broadcasters with a clear list of words that
were prohibited. Not surprisingly, in the
nine years between Pacifica and the FCC's
abandonment of this policy, not a single
enforcement action was brought. This could
be because we lived in a simpler time before
such foul language was common. Or, it
could be that the FCC's policy was
sufficiently clear that broadcasters knew
what was prohibited.
The FCC argues that a flexible standard is
necessary precisely because the list was not
effective-broadcasters
simply
found
offensive ways· of depicting sexual or
excretory organs or activities without using
any of the seven words. In other words,
.because the FCC cannot anticipate how
broadcasters will attempt to circumvent the
prohibition on indecent speech, the FCC
needs the maximum amount of flexibility to
be able to decide what is indecent. The
observation that people will always find a
way to subvert censorship laws may expose
a certain futility in the FCC's crusade
against indecent speech, but it does not
provide a justification for implementing a
vague, indiscernible standard. If the FCC
cannot anticipate what will be considered
indecent under its policy, then it can hardly
expect broadcasters to do so. And while the
FCC characterizes all broadcasters as
consciously trying to push the envelope on
what is permitted, much like a petulant
teenager angling for a later curfew, the
Networks have expressed a good faith desire
to comply with the FCC's indecency regime.
They simply want to know with some
degree of certainty what the policy is so that
they can comply with it. The First
Amendment requires nothing less.

The same vagueness problems plague the
FCC's presumptive prohibition on the words
"fuck" and "shit" and the exceptions thereto.
Under the FCC's current policy, all variants
of these two words are indecent unless one
of two exceptions apply. The first is the
"bona fide news" exception, which the FCC
has failed to explain except to say that it is
not absolute. The second is the artistic
necessity exception, in which fleeting
expletives are permissible if they are
"demonstrably essential to the nature of an
miistic or educational work or essential to
informing viewers on a matter of public
importance." In deciding whether this
exception applies, the FCC "consider[s]
whether the material has any social,
scientific or artistic value."

** *
There is little rhyme or reason to these
decisions and broadcasters m'e left to guess
whether an expletive will be deemed
"integral" to a program or whether the FCC
will·consider a particular broadcast a "bona
fide news interview."
The FCC created these exceptions because it
recognized that an outright ban on certain
words would raise grave First Amendment
concerns. In the Omnibus Order, the FCC
"recognize[d] the need for caution with
respect to complaints implicating the
editorial judgment of broadcast licensees in
presenting news and public affairs
programming, as these matters are at the
core of the First Amendment's free press
guarantee." .Likewise, in applying the
"mtistic necessity" exception, the FCC noted
that it was obligated to "proceed with due
respect for the high value our Constitution
places on freedom and choice in what the
people say and hear," particularly with
respect to speech that has "social, scientific
or artistic value." It is these same concerns
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that informed the
FCC's original
"restrained" enforcement policy, which had
the advantage of prohibiting the most
egregious instances of indecent speech while
minimizing the burden on protected speech.
The FCC's current indecency policy
undoubtedly gives the FCC more flexibility,
but this flexibility comes at a price. The
"artistic necessity" and "bona fide news"
exceptions allow the FCC to decide, in each
case, whether the First Amendment is
implicated. The policy may maximize the
amount of speech that the FCC can prohibit,
but it results in a standard that even the FCC
cannot articulate or apply consistently. Thus,
it found the use of the word "bullshitter" on
CBS's The Early Show to be "shocking and
gratuitous" because it occurred "during a
morning television interview," before
reversing itself because the broadcast was a
"bona fide news interview." In other words,
the FCC reached diametrically opposite
conclusions at different stages of the
proceedings for precisely the same reasonthat the word "bullshitter" was uttered
during a news program. And when Judge
Leval asked during oral argument if a
program about the dangers of pre-marital
sex designed for teenagers would be
permitted, the most that the FCC's lawyer
could say was "I suspect it would." With
millions of .dollars and core First
Amendment values at stake, "I suspect" is
simply not good enough.
With the FCC's indiscernible standards
come the risk that such standards will be
enforced in a discriminatory inanner. The
vagueness doctrine is intended, in part, to
avoid that risk. If government officials are
permitted to make decisions on an "ad hoc"
basis, there is a risk that those decisions will
reflect the officials' subjective biases. Thus,
in the licensing context, the Supreme' Court
has consistently rejected regulations that
gIve government officials too much

. discretion because "such discretion has the
potential for becoming a means of
suppressing a particular point of view."
We have no reason to suspect that the FCC
is using its indecency policy as a means of
suppressing particular points of view. But
even the risk of such SUbjective, contentbased decision-making raises grave concerns
under the First Amendment. Take, for
example, the disparate treatment of "Saving
Private Ryan" and the documentary, "The
Blues." The FCC decided that the words
"fuck" and ·"shit" were· integral to the
"realism and immediacy of the film
experience for viewers" in "Saving Private
Ryan," but not in "The Blues." Fox, 489
F.3d at 463. We query how fleeting
expletives could be more essential to the
"realism" of a fictional movie than to the
"realism" of interviews with real people
about real life events, and it is hard not to
speculate that the FCC was simply more
comfortable with the themes in "Saving
Private Ryan," a mainstream movie with a
familiar cultural milieu, than it was with
"The Blues," which largely profiled an
outsider genre of musical experience. But
even if there were a perfectly benign way of
explaining these particular outcomes,
nothing would prevent the FCC from
applying its indecency. policy in a
discriminatory manner in the future. As the
Supreme Court explained in Forsyth:
It is not merely thesporlldic abuse of
power by the censor but the
pervasive threat inherent in its very
existence that constitutes the danger
to
freedom
of
discussion.
Accordingly, the success of a facial
challenge on the grounds that an
ordinance delegates overly broad
discretion to the decisionmaker rests
not on whether the administrator has
exercised his discretion in a contentbased manner, but whether there is
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anything in the ordinance preventing
him from doing so.
505 U.S. at 133 n. 10, 112 S.Ct. 2395
(internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
The FCC argues that its context-based
approach is consistent with, indeed even
required by, Pacifica. While Pacifica
emphasized the importance of context in
regulating indecent broadcasts, it did so in
order to emphasize the limited scope of its
holding, finding that the particular "context"
of the Carlin monologue justified an
intrusion on broadcasters rights under the
First Amendment. It does not follow that the
FCC can justify any decision to. sanction
indecent speech by citing "context." Of
course, context is always relevant, and we
do not mean to suggest otherwise in this
opinion. But the FCC. still must have
discernible standards by which individual
contexts are judged.
The FCC assures us that it will "bend over
backwards" to protect editorial jUdgment, at
least in the news context, but such
assurances are not sufficient given the
record before us. Instead, the FCC should
bend over backwards to create a standard
that gives broadcasters the notice that is
required by the First Amendment.
III.

Under the current policy, broadcasters must
choose between not airing or censoring
controversial programs and risking massive
fines or possibly even loss of their licenses,
and it is not surprising which option they
choose. Indeed, there is ample evidence in
the record that the FCC's indecency policy
has chilled protected speech.
For instance, several CBS affiliates declined
to air the Peabody Award-winning "9/11~'

documentary, which contains real audio
.footage-including occasional expletivesof firefighters in the World Trade Center on
September 11 tho Although the documentary
had previously aired twice without
complaint, fohowing the Golden Globes
Order affiliates could no longer be sure
whether the expletives contained in the
documentary could be found indecent. In yet
another example, a radio station cancelled a
planned reading of Tom Wolfe's novel 1 Am
Charlotte Simmons, based on a single
complaint it received about the "adult"
language in the book, because the station
feared FCC action. When the program was
reinstated .two weeks later, the station
decided that it could only safely. air the
program during the "safe harbor" period.
The FCC's application of its policy to live
broadcasts creates an even more profound
chilling effect. In the case of the 2003
Billboard· Music Awards broadcasts, Fox
had an audio delay system in place to bleep
fleeting expletives. It also pre-cleared the
scripts of the presenters. Ritchie, however,
departed from her script and used three
expletives in rapid sequence. While the
person . employed to monitor and bleep
expletives was bleeping the first, the
following two slipped through. Even
elaborate precautions will not protect a
broadcaster against such occurrences. The
FCC argues that Fox should simply
implement a more effeCtive screening
system, but, short of giving up live
broadcasting altogether, no system will ever
be one. hundred percent effective. Instead,
Fox may decide not to ask individuals with a
history of using profanity to present at its
awards shows. But, of course, this will not
prevent someone who wins an award-such
as Cher or Bono-from using fleeting·
expletives. In fact, the only way that Fox can
be sure that it won't be sanctioned by the
FCC is by refusing to air the broadcast live.
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This chilling effect extends to news and
public affairs programming as. well.
Broadcasters may well decide not to invite
controversial guests on totheir programs for
fear that an unexpected fleeting expletive
will result in fines. The FCC points to its
"bona fide news" exception to show that
such fears would be unfounded. But the
FCC has made clear that it considers the
decision to apply this exception a matter
within its .discretion. Otherwise, why not
simply make an outright news exception?
During the previous proceedings before this
Couti, amicus curiae gave the example of a
local station in Vermont that refused to ail' a
political debate because one of the local
politicians involved had previously used
expletives on air. The record contains other
examples of local stations that have forgone
live programming in order to avoid fines.
For instance, Phoenix TV stations dropped
live coverage of a memorial service for Pat
Tillman, the former football star killed in
Afghanistan, because of language used by
Tilliman's family members to express their
grief. A station in Moosic, Pennsylvania
submitted an affidavit stating that in the
wake of the FCC's new policy, it had
decided to no longer provide live, direct-toair coverage of news events "unless they
affect matters of public safety or
convenience." If the FCC's policy is
allowed t6 remain in place, there will
undoubtedly be countless other situations
where broadcasters will exercise their
editorial judgment and decline to pursue
contentious people or subjects, 01' will
eschew live programming altogether, in
order to avoid the FCC's fines. This chill
reaches speech at the heart of the First
Amendment.
The chill of protected speech has even
extended to programs that contain no
expletives, but which contain reference to or
discussion of sex, sexual organs, or

excretion. For instance, Fox decided not to
re-broadcast an episode of "That 70s Show"
that dealt with masturbation, even though it
neither depicted the act or discussed it in
specific terms. The episode subsequently
won an award from the Kaiser Family
Foundation for its honest and accurate
depiction of a sexual health issue. Similarly,
an episode of "House" was re-written after
concerns that one of the character's
struggles with psychiatric issues related to
his sexuality would be considered indecent
by the FCC.
As these examples illustrate, the absence of
reliable guidance in the FCC's standards
chills a vast amount of protected speech
dealing with some of the most important and
universal themes in art and literature. Sex
and the magnetic power of sexual attraction
are surely among the most predominant
themes in the study of humanity since the
Trojan War. The digestive system and
excretion. are also important areas of human
attention. .By prohibiting all "patently
offensive" references to sex, sexual organs,
and excretion without giving adequate
guidance as to what "patently offensive"
means, the FCC effectively chills speech,
because broadcasters have no way of
knowing what the FCC will find offensive.
To place any discussion of these vast topics
at the broadcaster's peril has the effect of
promoting wide self-censorship of valuable
material which should be completely
protected under the First Amendment.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we strike down·
the FCC's indecency policy. We do not
suggest that the FCC could not create a
constitutional policy. We hold only that the
FCC's current policy fails constitutional
scrutiny. The petition for review is hereby
GRANTED.
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"FCC's Rules Against Nudity, Profanity Will Be
Reviewed"
Wall Street Journal

June 28, 2011
Brent Kendall & Amy Schatz
The constitutionality of federal rules that
effectively bar the broadcast of nudity and
profanity when children are likely to be
tuned in will be taken up by the Supreme
Court in its next term, the justices said
Monday.

10 p.m., when children are more likely to be
in the audience. Although stations can air all
of the racy content they want in the late
evening and early morning hours, they
generally don't out of concern they might
offend advertisers and viewers.

The case, brought by broadcasters seeking to
overtum the Federal Communications
Commission's curbs on indecent broadcast
speech, sets up an oppoliunity for the
Robelis Court to break new ground on freespeech rights.

One case before the court involves Fox
Television broadcasts of the 2002 and 2003
Billboard Music Awards in which Cher and
Nicole Richie uttered expletives. Another
case involves ABC's airing of a 2003
episode of "NYPD Blue" that depicted a
woman's naked buttocks. The Supreme
Couli will consider one appeal that
consolidates the two cases.

The Supreme Couli hasn't directly
addressed the First Amendment issues raised
by the FCC's longstanding rules against
broadcast indecency since a 1978 decision
that allowed the agency to fine a radio
station for broadcasting a monologue on
diliy words by the late comedian George
Carlin.
A divided couli ruled for the FCC on narrow
grounds in 2009, finding the agency's
stepped-up efforts to combat indecency were
a legally permissible exercise of the
agency's administrative powers. Now the
court has indicated it would hear
broadcasters' arguments that the FCC's
rules are unconstitutional and no longer
necessary as cable and broadband have
broken the hold federally licensed
broadcasters once had over what Americans
listen to on the radio and watch on
television.
FCC rules prohibit station owners from
airing indecent content, including images
and words, between the hours of 6 a.m. and

The FCC found Fox was III violation of
indecency prohibitions but didn't sanction
the network. In the "NYPD Blue" case, the
agency fined 45 ABC network-owned or
affiliated stations that aired the episode.
Fox is a division of News Corp., which also
owns The Wall Street Journal. "We look
forward to the Supreme Court's review of
the significant constitutional issues in the
case. Weare hopeful that the court will
ultimately agree that the FCC's indecency
enforcement practices trample on the First
Amendment rights of broadcasters," a Fox
spokesman said Monday.
An FCC spokesman said the agency "is
.. hopeful that the Court will affirm the
commission's exercise of its statutory
responsibility to protect children and
families
from
indecent
broadcast
programming." ...

328

"Justices Agree to Consider F.C.C.
Rules on Indecency"
New York Times

June 27,2011
Edward Wyatt
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
decide whether the Federal Communications
Commission's policies banning nudity,
expletives and other indecent content on
broadcast television and radio violated the
Constitution.
The granting of a hearing in the case, F. C. C.
v. Fox Television Stations, No. 10-1293,
puts into question whether the court will
overturn its landmark 1978 ruling on
indecency, F. C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation.
The Pacifica decision, which upheld the
commission's finding that George Carlin's
classic "seven dirty words" radio monologue
was indecent, cemented the F.C.C.'s ability
to police the public airwaves.
But in the subsequent 33 years, the media
landscape has markedly changed, causing
several justices to question in recent
decisions whether those standards were still
relevant in a world of unfiltered cable
television, Internet, film and radio.
The case is an appeal by the F.C.C. of a
ruling in 2010 by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit that said the
commission's policy against "fleeting
expletives" and other indecency, which it
measures on a case-by-case basis, was
"unconstitutionally vague."
The Supreme Court reframed the case
slightly, saying it would hear arguments
only on whether the F.C.C.'s "indecency
enforcement regime" violated the free
speech or due process clauses of the.
Constitution.

At issue are two live broadcasts on the Fox
network of the Billboard Music Awards. In
the first, in 2002, Cher used an obscenity
while accepting an award. In 2003, Nicole
Richie, while presenting an award, used two
vulgarities in explaining how hard it was to
remove cow manure from a purse.
The Supreme .Court will also consider
whether the appeals court was warranted in
overturning a fine against ABC stations for
the 2003 broadcast of an episode of the thenpopular ABC series "NYPD Blue" that
included a naked woman.
The Fox case has previously come before
the court. In 2009, the Supreme Court ruled
in a 5-4 .decision that the commission had
followed proper administrative procedures
when it invoked the ban on expletives
during certain hours against broadcasters.
But several justices, including at least one
on each side of the decision, expressed
skepticism that the ban on expletives was
constitutional.
The Obama administration and the F.C.C.
asked the Supreme· Court to overturn the
recent· appeals court decision, saying it
would keep the agency from effectively
policing the airwaves.
"We are pleased the Supreme Court will
review the lower court rulings that blocked
the F.C.C.'s broadcast indecency policy," a
spokesman for the F.C.C. said in a
statement. "We are hopeful that the court
will affirm the commission's exercise of its
statutory responsibility to protect children
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and families from
programming."

indecent

broadcast

Fox said in a statement that it was "hopeful
that the court will ultimately· agree that the
F.C;C.'s indecency enforcement practices
trample on the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters." ABC also said it believed that
the Second Circuit was correct and that the
Supreme Court should affirm that decision.
The appeals court ruled that the F.C.C.'s
policy was inconsistent, in part because the
. commission ruled that Fox stations violated
its policy with the language on the awards
shows while it allowed the use of the same
language in a broadcast of the film "Saving
Private Ryan."

authority to regulate indecent speech like the
Carlin monologue, which made deliberate
and repetitive use of vulgarities, it left
uncertain whether the use of an occasional
expletive could be punished. The F.C.C.
later said it could, and it has generally ruled
that broadcasters could not allow indecent
material from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. All of the
incidents at issue occurred within those
protected hours.
The F.C.C. case was one of 11 that the court
accepted on Monday for its next term .
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who was a judge
on the Second Circuit before being
appointed to the Supreme Court, recused
. herself from consideration of the F.C.C.
case.

While the Pacifica case gave the F.C.C. the
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"F.C.C. Indecency Policy Rejected on Appeal"
New York Times

July 13, 2010
Edward Wyatt
A federal appeals court struck down a
Federal
Communications
Commission
policy on indecency Tuesday, saying that
regulations barring the use of "fleeting
expletives" on radio and television violated
the First Amendment because they were
vague and could inhibit free speech.
The decision, which many constitutional
scholars expect to be appealed to the
Supreme Court, stems from a challenge by
Fox, CBS and other broadcasters to the
F.C.C.'s decision in 2004 to begin enforcing
a stricter standard of what kind of language
is allowed on free, over-the-air television.
The stricter policy followed several
incidents that drew widespread public
complaint, including Janet Jackson's breastbaring episode at the 2004 Super Bowl and
repeated instances of profanity by
celebrities, including Cher, Paris Hilton and
Bono, during the live broadcasts of awards
programs. The Janet Jackson incident did
not involve speech but it drew wide public
outrage that spurred a crackdown by the
F.C.C.
In a unanimous three-judge decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
New York said that the F.C.C.'s current
policy created "a chilling effect that goes far
beyond the fleeting expletives at issue here"
because it left broadcasters without a
reliable guide to what the commission would
find offensive.
The appeals court emphasized that it was not
precluding federal regulation of broadcast
standards. "We do not suggest that the
F.C.C. could not create a constitutional

policy," the court said. "We hold only that
the
F.C.C.'s
current
policy
fails
constitutional scrutiny."
But if the commission decides to appeal the
ruling-the latest in a string of court
decisions questioning its ability to regulate
media-it almost certainly lUllS the risk that
the .Supreme Court could reverse
longstanding precedents· that subject
broadcast content to indecency standards
that are not allowed for any other media.
Julius Genachowski, the chairman of the
F.C.C., said in a statement that the
commlSSlOn was "reviewing the court's
decision in light of our commitment to
protect children, empower parents, and
uphold the First Amendment."
In a statement, Fox said it was extremely
pleased by Tuesday's decision. "We have
always felt that ·the government's position
on fleeting expletives was unconstitutional,"
said the company, a unit of the News
Corporation. "While we will continue to
strive to eliminate expletives from live
broadcasts,
the
inherent
challenges
broadcasters face with live television,
coupled with the human element required
for monitoring, must allow for the
unfortunate isolated instances where
inappropriate language slips through."
The case, known as Fox Television Stations
Y. F.c.c., has already been to the
Supreme Court on a technical matter that did
not involve its constitutionality. In 2009, the
justices ruled that the F.C.C.'s indecency
standard was not "arbitrary and capricious"
and therefore was allowable.

Inc.
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Rodney A. Smolla, a First Amendment
scholar who is president of Furman
University in Greenville, S.C., said that the
Supreme Court had .been clear in ruling that
when the government created rules about
what a person could and could not say, "you
have to be very specific about what is in
bounds and what is out of bounds."
"This decision demands of the F.C.C. that it
regulate with precision and not use general
terms like 'indecency,'" Mr. Smolla said.
Before 2004, the F.C.C. consistently held
that occasional, spontaneous use of certain
words that were otherwise prohibited did not
violate its indecency standards. But as
complaints multiplied over the celebrity
obscenities and the Janet Jackson episode,
the F.C.C., under Michael K. Powell, then
its chairman, tightened its standard and
Congress increased the potential fine for
indecency violations tenfold, to up to
$325,000 per episode.
Tuesday's decision takes the F.C.C. back to
.. the Supreme Court;s ruling in 1978 in
F. C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation, which
upheld the commission's finding that
George Carlin's classic "seven dirty words"
radio monologue, with its deliberate and
repetitive use of vulgarities over 12 minutes,
was indecent. At that time, the court left
open the question of whether the use of "an
occasional expletive" could be punished.

rejected the appeals court's ruling, justices,
including Clarence Thomas, who was in the
majority of the 5-4 decision, and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who dissented, indicated that they
had questions about the First Amendment
issues in the F.C.C. indecency policy and
whether existing standards were still
. relevant.
The appeals court picked up on that theme in
Tuesday's decision, noting that the media .
landscape was much different in 2010 than it
was in 1978.
"Technological changes have given parents
the ability to decide which programs they
will permit their children to watch," the
appeals court said. Noting that it was bound
by the Supreme Court's Pacifica decision,
the court said that it nevertheless wondered
why broadcasters were still subject to
restrictions that, in the case of cable
television, would be found to violate the
First Amendment.
Ted Lempert, president of Children Now,
said that while the court's decision was
troubling, it also emphasized the need for
clarity about broadcast standards. "It's of
concern because the F.C.C. has been a
critical protector of children's interests when
. it comes to media,". he said, adding that he
expects that the commission will try to
construct a more targeted approach to
keeping indecency off the airwaves at times
when children are likely to be watching.

In 2009, when the Supreme Court first
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'''Fleeting Expletive' Ban Lifted"
SCOTUSblog
July 13, 2010
Lyle Denniston

Reacting to a Supreme Court order to take a
new look at "indecency" on radio and TV,
the Second Circuit Court suggested on
Tuesday that constitutional law on free
speech may need to be updated for the
Digital Age, especially now that "new
offensive and indecent words are invented
every day." Ev~n so, applying First
Amendment doctrine as it now exists, the
three~judge panel struck down the Federal
Communications Commission's ban on the
day and evening broadcast of even single
"fleeting expletives." If the Obama
Administration plans to continue defending
the ban, the case could be on its way back to
the Supreme Court.
In a 32-page opinion that makes liberal use
of the actual four-letter versions of the "FWord" and "S-Word" and variations of
them, the Circuit Court said the FCC's sixyear-old ban' is unconstitutionally vague,
because it is littered with exceptions that
make it unclear to broadcasters what is
allowed and what is not. The case is Fox
. Television Stations, et al., v. FCC (lead
Circuit Court docket is 06-1760). With
"massive fines" and free speech rights
vitally at stake, the Court said, the broadcast
industry is taking the option of censoring
itself-including its news programs-to
avoid violating the policy.
The Circuit Court looked back, quite
skeptically, at the Supreme Court's 1978
Supreme Court ruling that first upheld FCC
authority to regulate "indecent" radio or TV
broadcasts (FCC v. Pacifica Foundation),
and noted that broadcasters and the FCC are
still in dispute about just how much
authority the Commission has under that

ruling. But the Circuit Court said it need not
resolve that dispute, since it found that the
current policy adopted in 2005 simply fails a
traditional . First Amendment test for
vagueness.
The panel, in an opinion written by Circuit
Judge Rosemary S. Pooler and joined by
Circuit Judge Peter W. Hall and Senior
Circuit Judge Pierre N. Leval, readily
accepted the broadcast networks' argument
that "the world has changed" since the
Pacifica decision. It commented:
"We face a media landscape that would have
been almost unrecognizable in 1978. Cable
television was still in its infancy. The
Internet was a project run out of the
Department of Defense with several hundred
users. Not only did Youtube, Facebook, and
Twitter not exist, but their founders were
either still in diapers or not yet conceived. In
this environment, broadcast television
'l..miquely
undoubtedly possessed as
. pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans. '
"The same cannot be said today. The past
thirty years has seen an explosion of media
sources, and broadcast television has
become only one voice in the chorus. Cable
television is almost as pervasive as
broadcast-almost 87 percent of households
subscribe to a cable or satellite service-and
most viewers can alternate between
broadcast and non-broadcast channels with a
click of their remote control.. .. The internet,
too, has become omnipresent, ofering access
to everything from viral videos to feature
films and, yes, even broadcast television
programs."
333

It went on to note that technological change
has given parents clear control over what
their children can see and hear on television.

Noting that the Supreme Court had
considered such changing circumstances in
deciding to give cable TV full, rather than
qualified, First Amendment protection from
government regulation, the Circuit Court
said it could "think of no reason why this
rationale for applying strict scrutiny in the
case of cable television would not apply
with equal force to broadcast television" in
light of the parental control technology now
available.
Still, it conceded that, as a lower federal
court, it was bound by Supreme Court
precedent, "regardless of whether it reflects
today's realities. The Supreme Court may
decide, in due course, to overrule Pacifica
and subj ect speech restrictions in the
broadcast context to strict scrutiny." But it
has not done so yet, so, the panel said, it was
bound not to anticipate such a change.

But, rather than sort out just what Pacifica
means in the present communications
environment, the panel simply resOlted to
vagueness doctrine, and found that the
Commission had been unable to show, with
any clarity, just what is now banned, and'
what is now allowed, on radio and TV in
either entertainment or news progra!.111.lling.
.It thus nullified the policy outright.
The Circuit Court had the case retumed to it
by the Supreme Court in April last year in a
5-4 decision. The majority ruled then that
the FCC's ban on "fleeting expletives" did
not violate the federal statutes under which
the FCC operates. But that ruling· did not
resolve
the
broadcast
industry's
constitutional challenges to the ban, leaving
that to the Second Circuit in the first
instance, leading to Tuesday's ruling.
. The FCC now has the option of seeking en
banc review by the full Second Circuit, or of
taking the case on to the Supreme Court, if it
wishes to try to resurrect the ban.
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"Supreme Court Rulesthat Government Can
Fine for 'Fleeting Expletives'"
Washington Post

April 29, 2009
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court said yesterday that the
Federal Communications Commission may
penalize even the occasional use of certain
expletives on the airwaves but left for
another day the question of whether such a
policy is constitutional.
The court's narrow ruling said the FCCprompted by Cher's use of the F-word
during a 2002 live broadcast and similar
remarks by what Justice Antonin Scalia
called "foul-mouthed glitteratae from
Hollywood"-was justified in changing its
policy in 2004 to fine broadcasters up to
$325,000 every time certain words are
allowed on the air.
"The commission could reasonably conclude
that the pervasiveness of foul language, and
the coarsening of public entertainment in
other media such as cable, justify more
stringent regulation of broadcast programs
so as to give conscientious parents a
relatively safe haven for their children,"
Scalia wrote for the five-member
conservative majority.
Fox Television Stations and other networks
had challenged FCC's actions under the
Administrative Procedure Act. They said the
agency did not adequately explain why it
changed its policy, which previously held
that one-time utterances of expletives did
not constitute a violation of FCC rules.
The networks also challenged the rule under
the First Amendment,' but, like the U.S.
C<?urt of Appeals for the Second Circuit in

New York, the Supreme Court did not rule
on the question of constitutionality.
"Whether [the policy] is unconstitutional
will be determined soon enough, perhaps in
this very case," Scalia wrote in sending the
case back to the appeals court. In the
meantime, any suppressed "references to
excretory and sexual material surely lie at
the periphery of First Amendment concern."
The Parents Television Council, which had
. strenuously lobbied the commission to adopt
the tougher stance, called the ruling "an
incredible victory for families." It called on
the FCC to "use today's opinion to . . . rule
on the merits of the tens of thousands of
indecency complaints currently awaiting
review at the Commission."
Fox said it was disappointed but "optimistic
that we will ultimately prevail when the
First Amendment issues are fully aired
before the courts."
. Jqstices Clarence Thomas, who aligned with
the majority, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who
dissented, expressed constitutional concerns.
Thomas said he was "open" to reviewing the
court's decisions that gave the FCC
constitutional authority to police the
airwaves, and Ginsburg said there is "no
way to hide the long shadow the First
Amendment casts over what the commission
has done."
The lingering constitutional question and
instability at the FCC make it unclear how
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the· commission will react to the decision.
Two seats on the five-member agency are
empty, and Julius Genachowski, President
Obama's nominee to head the FCC, has not
been confirmed by the Senate. Genachowski
seems not to take as high· an interest in
violations of indecency rules as the previous
chairman, Kevin Martin, who made the
crackdown a priority.

Billboard Music Awards by saying, to use
Scalia's alternative, "So F 'em." Celebrity
Nicole Richie complained on air that getting
the S-word out of a Prada purse was not so
"F-ing simple," Scalia recalled.
Those and other incidents-such as Janet
Jackson's exposed breast during the 2004
Super Bowl halftime show, not an issue in
this case-outraged the public.

But Jessica Zufolo, an analyst at the research
firm Medley Global Advisors, said
Genachowski will hear from members of
Congress who strongly support rules on
broadcast indecency.

But the appeals couli struck the agency's
toughened rules, saying it had failed to
"articulate a reasoned basis" for the policy
change.

"Congress is very buillish on upholding the
FCC's indecency rules, so we expect a
tremendous amount of pressure on the FCC
in the aftermath of this decision," Zufolo
said.

Scalia and the majority disagreed, saying the
commission was fulfilling its mission from
Congress to patrol the airwaves for
descriptions or depictions of sexual or
excretory functions, whether used literally or
as expletives.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. joined
Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Samuel A.
Alito Jr., Thomas and Scalia in the majority
that upheld the FCC's action in the case,
FCC v. Fox Television Stations. Six of the
nine justices wrote separate, occasionally
biting opinions to explain their decisions and
criticize the others.
The court made it through an hour of oral
arguments in the fall and yesterday's
decision announcement without using the
offending words. But Scalia yesterday
recounted some of the events that led to the
FCC's change of policy by substituting what
he said "we will call the F-word and the Sword."
First, there was Cher, who responded to her
critics aftel.' winning an award at the 2002

"Programming replete with one-word
indecent expletives will tend to produce
children who 'use (at least) one-word
indecent expletives," Scalia wrote.
But Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the
agency does not have "the freedom to
change major policies on the basis of
nothing more than political considerations or
even personal whim." His dissent was joined
by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter and Ginsburg.

It has been 30 years since the court
considered the afternoon radio broadcast of
comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words"
monologue and decided that the government
can police the nation's airwaves without
violating the First Amendment.
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Knox v. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000
10-1121
Ruling Below: Knox v. California State Employees Ass'n, Local lOOO, Servo Employees Int'l
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, 628 FJd 1115 (9th Circ. 2010) cert. granted, 10-1121,2011 WL 863866
. (U.S. JlU1e 27, 2011).
Plaintiffs in this case represent two classes: those who objected to the lU1ion's 2005 Hudson
notice and those.that did not [unions must explain basis for assessment and the right to object].
. After issuing their 2005 Hudson notice, lU1ion officials voted to approve a special assessment to
fund a "Political Fight Back Fund" to combat against what the union perceived as potentially
unfavorable contemplated government action. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming the assessment and
the subsequent fee increase violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2007
the district court found for the plaintiffs, holding that an additional Hudson notice should have
been provided. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed. The cOUli applied a balancing test under
Hudson, balancing the union's interest in avoiding free rider issues against the employees'
interest in avoiding compelled subsidy of speech.
Questions Presented: (1) Maya State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
condition employment on the payment of a special lU1ion assessment intended solely for political
and ideological expenditures without first providing a notice that includes information about that
assessment and provides an opportunity to object to its exaction? (2) Maya State, consistent with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition continued public employment on the payment
of union agency fees for purposes of financing political expenditures for ballot measures?
Dianne KNOX; William L. Blaylock; Robert A. Conover; Edward L. Dobrowolslti, Jr.;
Karyn Gil; Thomas Jacob Hass;·Patrick Johnson; Jon Jumper, On Behalf of Themselves
and the Class They Seek to Represent, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.
CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000, SERVICE
EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL -CIO - CLC, Defendant-Appellant,
and
Steve Westly, Controller,State of California, Defendant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed December 10,2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citation omitted.]
THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question of whether
a union is required, pursuant to Chicago
Teachers Union V. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,

106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986), in
addition to an annual fee notice to
nonmembers, to send a second notice when
adopting a temporary, mid-term fee
increase. Under the circumstances presented
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by this case, we conclude that a. second
notice is not required, and we reverse the
judgment of the district court.

objectors be given sufficient information to
gauge the propriety of the union's fee."
B

I

A

Congress has long recognized the
. "important contribution of the union shop to
the system of labor relations." The Supreme
Court has underscored this Congressional
policy by enforcing the right ofa union, as
the
exclusive
collective
bargaining
representative of its employees, to require
nonunion employees to pay a fair share of
the union's costs. However, the Supreme
Court has also recognized the First
Amendment limitation on collection of fees
from dissenting employees for the suppOli of
ideological causes not germane to the
union's duties as collective-bargaining
agent.
In Hudson, the Supreme Court established
certain procedural safeguards to balance
these interests by requiring "an adequate
explanation of the basis for the fee, a
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge
the amount of the fee before an impartial
decisionmaker, and an escrow for the
amounts reasonably in dispute while such
challenges are pending." Notices issued
pursuant to this language have become
known as "Hudson notice[s]."
After receiving a Hudson notice, "the
nonunion employee has the burden of
raising an objection, but '" the union retains
the burden of proof' as to the appropriate
proportion of fair share fees. It is the
policies underlying Hudson. that inform the
determination of whether a Hudson notice is
adequate: "Basic considerations of faimess,
as well as concem for the First Amendment
rights at stake, . . . dictate that the potential

This appeal involves the adequacy of a
Hudson notice given by SEIU Local 1000
(the "Union"), the exclusive bargaining
agent for Califomia state employees. The
Union and the State of Califomia have
entered into a series of Memoranda of
Understanding controlling the terms and
conditions .of employment for employees,
including a provision requiring that all State
employees in these bargaining units join the
Union as formal Union members, or if
opting not to join, pay an "agency" or "fair
share" fee to the Union for its
representational efforts on their behalf. The
agency fee is calculated as a percentage of
the Union dues paid by members of the
Union.
The Union issues a Hudson notice to all
nonmembers
every
June.
The
constitutionally required notice is meant to
provide nonmembers with an adequate
explanation of the basis of the agency fee.
The notice contains information regarding
the Union's expenditures from the most
recently audited prior year, broken down by
maj or category of expense and then, within
each
category,
allocated
between
"chargeable"
and
"non-chargeable"
classifications. "Chargeable" expenses are
those that are "germane" to the union's
representational functions, and can be
charged to all nonmembers of the union.
"Non-chargeable"
expenses are those
unrelated to the union's representational
functions, such as partisan political
expenditures or purely ideological issues.
The union may charge nonmembers for nonchargeable expenses, but the nonmember
has the option to object, and only be charged
a reduced agency fee based upon the percent
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of the union's total expenditures that can be
classified as "chargeable." In addition, the
nonmember is not charged for certain unionsponsored benefits, such as a credit union
credit card, that are not available to
nonmembers.
The financial information in the notice
forms the basis for calculating the fee to be
paid by nonmembers during the ensuing fee
year. The notice also provides that for thirty
days after the notice is issued, nonunion
employees can object to the collection ofthe
full agency fee, and elect instead to only pay
a reduced rate during the upcoming fee year
based on the percentage ratio of chargeable
expenditures to total expenditures. During
that thirty day period, nonmembers can
challenge the Union's calculation of its
chargeable and non-chargeable expenses, to
be resolved by an impartial decision maker.
A given agency fee is in effect from July 1

through June 30 of the following year (the
"fee year"), at which point the agency fee
set forth in the Union's next Hudson notice
goes into effect. The 2005 Hudson notice set
the agency fee to be paid by nonunion
employees as 99.1% of the Union dues. The
reduced agency fee of 56.35% of Union
dues would be charged to nonmembers who
objected to paying the full agency fee, and
who requested a· reduction pursuant to the
procedures and deadlines outlined in the
notice. The notice explicitly stated dues and
fees were subject to change without further
notice to fee payers.
During the summer of 2005, the legislative
bodies within the Union debated and
approved a temporary assessment (also
referred to as a dues and fees increase) equal
to .0025, or .25% of Union members' gross
wages. The increase took effect at the end of
September 2005 and terminated at the end of
December 2006, and was expected to raise

$12 million for the Union.
Specifically, on July 30, 2005 the Union's
Budget Committee proposed an emergency
temporary assessment to create what· was
termed in the agenda item introducing it as a
"Political Fight Back Fund." This agenda
item stated the Fund "will be used for a
broad range of political expenses" in
"anti-union"
response
to
several
propositions on the November 2005 special
election ballot in California, and that the
fund "will not be used for regular costs of
the union-such as office rent, staff salaries
or routine equipment replacement." On
August 27, 2005 Union delegates voted to
implement the temporary dues increase. On
August 31, 2005, the Union sent a letter to
all members and agency fee payers stating
that they were subject to the new increase,
and that the fund would be used. "to defeat
Propositions 76 and 75," other future attacks
on the Union pension plan, and other
activities.
The Union material indicated that the fund
would be used for political activities. Yet, in
response to inquiries, the Union specifically
stated it intended to split the increase
"between political actions and collective
bargaining actions." Further, not all of the
political activities fell into the "nonchargeable" category. The assessment itself
included no spending limitations, and the
money was actually used for a range of
activities, both political and not, and both
chargeable and not. Pursuant to the increase,
the Controller began collecting additional
fees from Plaintiffs at the end of September
2005.
Plaintiffs represent two classes of nonunion
employees, those who objected. to the
Union's 2005 Hudson notice ("objectors")
and those who did not ("nonobjectors")
(collectively "Plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs initiated
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this action in November 2005, alleging the
assessment violated their First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs filed for summary
judgment, and the Union filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment. The
district court granted Plaintiffs' motion in its
entirety, and partially granted and partially
denied the Union's motion. This timely
appeal followed.
We review de novo a district cOUli's grant of
summary judgment on the sufficiency of the
Hudson notice. On review, we must
determine, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving patiy,
whether there at'e any genuine issues of
material fact and whether the district court
correctly applied the relevant substantive
law.

First, Hudson itself articulated the legal
standard to be applied, and we are not free to
rej ect the balancing test mandated by the
Supreme Court.
Second, we articulated the test in Grunwald
v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist.,
994 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.l993). We noted in
that case that in challenges to the First
Amendment procedure used by unions, the
union need not employ procedures that
"would minimize fmiher the burden on
agency fee payers." "The test, after all, is
not whether the union and the [employer]
have come up with the system that imposes
the least burden on agency fee payers,
regardless of cost (a test no system could
possibly satisfy); rather we inquire whether
the system reasonably accommodates the
legitimate interests of the union, the [public
employer] and nonmember employees."

II
A
In reviewing the adequacy of the Hudson
notice, we employ our usual standard of
review, as dictated by Hudson. In that case,
the . Supreme COUli articulated the legal
standard to be applied in this analysis as a
balancing test, stating that "[t]he objective
must be to devise a way of preventing
compulsory subsidization of ideological
activity by employees who object thereto
without restricting the Union's ability to
require every employee to contribute to the
cost of collective-bargaining activities."
The Plaintiffs argue we should abandon the
balancing test established in Hudson, in
favor of strict scrutiny review. They argue
that this case involves compelling their
speech on political issues, and that therefore
the government-mandated speech cases, and
their application of strict scrutiny should
apply .... We disagree.

Therefore, we will apply the normal Hudson
balancing and reasonable accommodation
test we have used in the past when deciding
challenges to Hudson notice procedures ..
B
Applying the balancing test, we conclude
that the Union did not violate the Hudson
requirements. The Supreme COUli in Hudson
recognized the impossibility of determining
the chargeability of a union's anticipated
expenditures at the outset of the fee year,
and specifically approved calculating the
present year's objector fee based on the
prior year's total expenditures. The Supreme
Court explained, "We continue to recognize
that there are practical reasons why absolute
. precision in the calculation of the charge to
nonmembers cannot be expected or required.
Thus, for instance, the Union cannot be
faulted for calculating its fee on the basis of
its expenses during the preceding year."
Hudson thus struck a balance between the
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rights and burdens III this context,
acknowledging that a union is not
constitutionally required to take any and all
steps demanded by fee payers to insure that
its annual fee notice accurately predicts its
actual spending in the upcoming year.

inevitably be incorrect as to the union's
actual expenditures. The Hudson notice is
not, and cannot be expected to be, p!ore than
that.

Use of the prior year method is a practical
necessity because, for large public sector
unions, the Hudson notice must be based on
audited financial statements, with the
union's chargeable percentage calculation
verified by an independent auditor, and the
union must send its fee payers the
independent auditor's report with its Hudson
notice. The audit requirement renders.
impossible any method of determining the
charge ability of the upcoming fee year's
expenditures other than basing it on the prior
year's actual expenditures, because one
cannot audit anticipated future expenditures.
Until the money has been spent, the auditor
cannot determine whether the expenditures
which the union claims it made for celiain
expenses were actually made for those
expenses.

The district court faulted the Union for·
failing to make an accurate prediction in its
June 2005 Hudson notice of its actual.
expenditures in the remainder of that fee
year due to the subsequent enactment of the
temporary increase. Yet, under the normal
Hudson procedure, any payments over and
above the Union's actual chargeable
expenditures in the 2005 fee year would be
incorporated into the rate for the next fee
year. The Supreme Comi has determined
that this is sufficiently accurate to comply
with the constitutional restrictions. There is
no principled distinction to be drawn
between the paradigmatic Hudson procedure
and the one employed here.

The inevitable effect of the Hudson "prior
year" method is a lag of at least one year
between the time when a union incurs
expenditures and when the audited ratio of
its chargeable expenditures· to total
expenditures is applied to calculate the
objectors' fee for the next year. Fluctuation
is inherent in such a method: in each year,
objectors may be "underpaying" or
"overpaying" fees when compared to the
chargeable percentage of the union's actual
expenditures in that year because under
Hudson's "prior year" method the fee is
based upon the chargeable percentage of the
prior year's actual expenses, but the
inevitable effect of the Hudson method is
that these over-and undercharges even out
over time. The Hudson notice can never be
more than a prediction, which will

C

Indeed, in the usual Hudson notice situation,
the actual chargeable percentage of a
union's actual spending in any given year, as
well as the precise dollar amount of dues
and fees, will likely vary from the prior
year's figures set forth in the applicable
Hudson notice. The Plaintiffs allege the
Union did not provide a procedure that
would avoid the risk that nonmembers'
funds from the special assessment would be
used, even temporarily, to finance
nonchargeable activities, but merely offered
dissenters the possibility of a rebate.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs reason, the
procedure
is
unconstitutional.
This
construction takes the central Hudson
concepts completely out of context and
applies them in a way that would not only
invalidate the fee increase, but would
invalidate the very procedural system
decreed by the Supreme Court in Hudson.
Plaintiffs appear to argue that because the
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assessment was to be used for "purely"
political reasons, it could not be
constitutionally collected from nonmembers
in the first place, and that any collection and
then later incorporation of the nonchargeable amount into a future agency fee
objector rate would be tantamount to an
impermissible rebate of the earlier fee. Yet,
the Union had already reduced the fee for
objecting
nonmembers,
and
has
demonstl;ated that the assessment was not
purely non-chargeable, nor intended to be
so. Fmiher, the record belies the asseliion
that the charges were used "purely" for nonchargeable expenses.
The section of Hudson discussing rebates
did not condemn the advance reduction
procedure the Union used here, but rather a
"pure rebate" system where the union
collects a fee that is equal or nearly equal to
full dues, and then pi'ovides a rebate of the
non-chargeable portion to objectors only at
the end of the fee year. Here the Union
charged objectors only 56.35% of the
temporary
increase,
the
chargeable
percentage set forth in the June 2005 notice,
rather than 100% of the increase followed
by a later rebate.
Additionally, the district court's direction
that a union must issue a second Hudson
notice when it intends "to depart drastically
from its typical spending regime and to
focus on activities that [are] political or
ideological in nature," is practically
unworkable. Union spending may vary
substantially from year to year-in one year
there may be a new collective bargaining
agreement negotiated, resulting in a high
chargeable percentage for objectors that is
followed by an election year that results in a
low chargeable percentage for objectors. In
fact, for example, the chargeable percentage
for 2006, the· year incorporating the fee
increase spending, was higher than that for

the 2005 Hudson notice ..
Hudson's prior year method assumes and
accepts that .a union has no "typical.
spending regime," and that even though
spending might vary dramatically, a single
annual notice based upon the prior year's
is
constitutionally
audited
finances
sufficient. Otherwise, a union's Hudson
notice for an upcoming pmiisan political
election year, following a negotiating year,
could not be based upon the union's actual
total expenditures in the previous year
because the union would intend in the
coming fee year to "depmi drastically from
its previous spending regime and to focus on
activities that are political or ideological in
nature. " Yet, this is the system set out by
Hudson, and no following case has
questioned its continuing vitality. The fact
that a projection of expenditures may differ
from actual expenditures should surprise no
one. The key analytic point for Hudson
purposes is that proper notice is given and
subsequent adjustments made.

The district court's conclusion was also at
odds with our precedent. The district court
required the Union to come up with a system
that imposes the least burden on agency fee
payers. However,the legal requirement for
unions in this situation is to establish a
"reasonably
system
that
merely
accommodates the legitimate interests of the
union, the
[public employer]
and
nonmember employees[.]" . . . The 2005
notice satisfied the standards established by
Hudson.
The Supreme Court's decision in Davenport
v. Washington Education Ass 'n, 551 U.S.
177, 127 S.Ct. 2372, 168 L.Ed.2d 71 (2007),
does not lead us to a contrary conclusion. In
Davenport, the Supreme Court held the
.Hudson requirements outline a minimum set
of procedures by which a public sector
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union in an agency shop relationship could
meet its constitutional requirements, and that
state legislatures may place limitations on a
union's entitlement to fees above those laid
out in Hudson. Davenport· arose in the
context of the state of Washington enacting
legislation requiring unions to give all
nonmembers the objector fee rate unless
they affirmatively agreed to be charged for
non-chargeable activities (in contrast to the
California rule where silence equals consent,
rather than dissent). Davenport held that
while the "silence equals consent rule" is
constitutional, it is also constitutional for a
state to make a "silence equals dissent" rule.
Under Davenport, it is state legislatures,
rather than courts, that have the power to
implement higher standards. This holding
does not alter our conclusion in this case that
the 2005 notice was adequate to cover the
subsequent dues increase, as Davenport does
not speak to such a situation.
III

The Union's notice in this case complied
with the Hudson procedural requirements.
Therefore, we reverSe the district court, and
remand with instructions to deny the
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
We also reverse the denial of defendant's
motion for partial summary judgment
regarding the consent of nonobjectorsunder
California law, and remand with instructions
to grant the motion. We reverse the award of
nominal damages to Plaintiffs.'
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
.WALLACE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
dissent from the majority's opinion
because it is not faithful to the principles
guiding the Court's decision in Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,
106 S.Ct: 1066,89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986). The

majority begins from an inaccurate account
of the interests at stake, and applies the
procedures set forth in Hudson without due
attention to the distinguishing facts of this
case. The result is contrary to wellestablished First Amendment principles.
1.

I begin with the legal authorization for the
. agency shop system because it provides the
framework for my evaluation of the issues in
this case, and because I am of the view that
the majority's opmlOn presents an
incomplete account of the relevant legal
principles.

A.
The National Labor Relations Act allows the
states to regulate their labor relationships
with public sector employees. Many states,
including California, allow public-sector
unions and government employers to enter
"agency-shop"
arrangements.
into
Defendant SEIU Local 1000 (Union) is the
designated bargaining representative for
California state employees, pursuant to such
an agency-shop arrangement. The Union is
legally obligated to represent equally all
employees in the bargaining unit. The Union
levies a fee on every employee whom it
represents in collective bargaining, even if
the employee refuses to join the Union. The
fees paid by bargaining unit employees who
are not members ofthe Union are commonly
known as "agency fees" or "fair share fees."
Plaintiffs in this case are eight nonmembers
of the Union, . representing a class of
approximately 28,000 public employees,
who are required to pay an agency fee.

I

Agency-shop arrangements present First
Amendment concerns. These concerns are
particularly sharp in the public sector:
"agency-shop arrangements in the public
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sector raise First Amendment concerns
because they force individuals to contribute
money to unions as a condition of
government employment." The Court
explained in Davenport that "[r]egardless of
one's views as to the desirability of agencyshop agreements, . . . it is undeniably
unusual for a government agency to give a
private entity the power, in essence, to tax
government employees."
Despite the infringement of First
Amendment rights engendered by the
agency-shop arrangement, the Supreme
Court has deemed such arrangements to be
constitutionally permissible in principle. The
Court has determined that agency-shop
arrangements are "justified by the
government's interest in promoting labor
peace and avoiding the 'free-rider' problem
that would otherwise accompany union
reco gnition. "
Importantly, however, a union "[may] not,
consistently with the Constitution, collect
from dissenting employees any sums for the
suppOli of ideological causes not germane to
its duties as collective-bargaining agent."
Instead, nonmembers may only be
compelled to contribute a fair share of costs
germane to collective bargaining. As a
corollary; nonmembers have a constitutional
right to "prevent the Union's spending a pmi
of their required service fees to contribute to
political candidates and to express political
views unrelated to its duties as exclusive
bargaining representative." "The amount at
stake for each individual dissenter does not
.diminish this concern. For, whatever the
amount, the quality of respondents' interest
in not being compelled to subsidize the
propagation of political 01' ideological views·
that they oppose is clear."
B.

In

addition, procedural protections are

constitutionally required in connection with
a union's assessment and collection of an
agency fee. In Hudson, the Court considered
whether a union's procedure for the
collection of agency fees adequately
protected the distinction between germane
collective
bargaining
costs
and
nonchargeable political expenditures. The
Court explained that procedural protections
were constitutionally required in this context
for two reasons:
First, although the government
interest in labor peace is strong
enough to support an "agency shop"
notwithstanding
its
limited
infringement
on
nonunion
employees' constitutional rights, the
fact that those rights are protected by
the First Amendment requires that
the procedure be carefully tailored to
minimize the infringement. Second,
the
nonunion
employee-the
. individual whose First Amendment
rights are being affected-must have
a fair opportunity to identify the
impact of the governmental action on
his interests and to assert a
meritorious First Amendment claim.
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 302-03, 106 S.Ct. 1066.

The Court held that, "[s]ince the agency
shop itself is 'a significant impingement on
First Amendment rights,' ... the government
and union have a responsibility to provide
procedures that minimize that impingement
and that facilitate a nonunion employee's
ability to protect his rights."
In Hudson, the defendant, a teacher's union,
had implemented a fair share fee calculated
as the proportion of chargeable expenditures
in the preceding fiscal year, that is, those
expenses related to collective bargaining and
contract administration. The union also
established a procedure for .the consideration
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of nonmembers' objections. The union
failed, however, to provide nonmembers
with any explanation of how the fair share
fee was calculated or explanation of the
union's procedures. The Court held that the
union's procedure was inadequate for three
reasons: "because it failed to minimize the
risk that nonunion employees' contributions
might be used for impermissible purposes,
because it failed to provide adequate
justification for· the advance reduction of·
dues, and because it faIled to offer a
reasonably prompt decision by an impartial
decisionmaker. "
First, the procedure at issue in Hudson was
constitutionally deficient because it merely
offered dissenters the possibility of a rebate;
it failed to minimize the possibility that
dissenters' funds would be used for an
improper purpose in the first place. The
Court stressed that the union should not be
permitted to exact an agency fee from
dissenters "without first establishing a
procedure which will avoid the risk that
their funds will be used, even temporarily, to
finance ideological activities unrelated to
collective bargaining."
Second, the union's procedures were held
constitutionally deficient because employees
had not been provided with sufficient
information about the basis of the
proportionate share: "[b]asic considerations
of fairness, as well as concern for the First
Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that
the potential objectors be given sufficient
information to gauge the propriety of the
union's fee." In Abood, the Court had stated
that it was a union's duty to provide "the
facts and records from which the proportion
of political to total union expenditures can
reasonably be calculated." The Court went
further in Hudson, holding that the union
was required to provide this information
without awaiting an objection.

Third, Hudson held that there must be a
dispute resolution procedure. The Court
stated that a union must provide both "a
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge
the amount of the fee" as well as "a
reasonably prompt decision by an impartial
decisionmaker." The procedure at issue in
Hudson was inadequate· because it was
controlled by the union and did not provide
for an impartial decisionmaker. The Court
further held that a union must provide an
"escrow for the' amounts reasonably in
dispute while such challenges are pending."
Drawing on these considerations, Hudson
outlined three requirements for a union's
collection of an agency fee: (1) "an adequate
explanation of the basis for the fee," (2) a
"reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge
the amount of the fee before an impartial
decisionmaker," and (3) "an escrow for the.
amounts reasonably in dispute while such
challenges are pending."
C.

Surprisingly, in the case before us the
majority characterizes the Hudson "test" as a
"balancing
test"
or
"reasonable
accommodation test." The majority chooses,
moreover, to highlight the Union's interests,
stating that Congress has recognized the
"important contribution of the union shop to
the system of labor relations," and that·
"[t]he Supreme Court has underscored this
Congressional policy by enforcing the right
of a union, as the exclusive collectivebargaining representative of its employees,
to require nonunion employees to pay a fair
share of the union's costs."
The majority puts its finger on the wrong
side of the scale. A union has no "right" to
the collection of agency fees, and Hudson
does not call for merely a "reasonable
accommodation"
of
employees'
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constitutional rights. From the framework
described above, I view the Union's
procedures much differently than the
majority. I fear that the majority's account
of the interests at stake, compounded by its
view of the operative legal test, invites
confusion. Indeed, it tampers with vitally
important First Amendment principles.
1.
I cannot begin from the proposition that we
are required to balance the "rights" of the
Union against the rights of the employees it
represents. While the majority insists that
the only way "to faithfully characterize the
procedures set out in Hudson ". is to
"balance" the Union's "right" to collect
agency fees against the first amendment
rights of non-union employees,it is the
majority that is unfaithful to Hudson and her
progeny. The Union's collection of fees
from nonmembers is authorized by an act of
legislative grace, not by any inherent "right"
of the Union to the possession of
nonmembers' funds. This should be clear to
all. In Davenport, the Court explained that
its agency-fee cases "were not balancing
constitutional rights in the manner [the
union] suggests, for the simple reason that
unions have no constitutional entitleinent to
the fees of nonmember-employees." Along
similar lines, the Second Circuit ha$ held
that it is error to approach the agency-fee
issue "with a balancing test in which the cost
to the union and the practicality of the
procedures were to be weighed against the
dissenters' First Amendment interests."
Davenport considered a Washington state
law prohibiting labor unions from using the
agency-shop fees of nonmembers for
election-related purposes
unless
the
nonmember affirmatively. consented. The
Comi considered whether this restriction on
a union's spending of agency fees, as

applied to public-sector labor unions,
violated the First Amendment. The Court
emphatically determined that the restriction
did not: "[t]he notion that this modest
limitation upon an extraordinary benefit
violates the First Amendment is, to say the
least, counterintuitive." The union had no
right to the funds; instead, "[w]hat matters is
that public-sector agency fees are in the
union's
possession
only
because
Washington and its union-contracting
government agencies have compelled their
employees to pay those fees."
Viewed properly, the collection of agency
fees is authorized by legislative policy
considerations pertaining to labor relations.
There ate several justifications foran agency
shop, but only one is implicated in this case:
to prevent free-riding by nonmembers who
benefit from the union's collective
bargaining
activities.
Political
and
ideological expenditures fall outside "the
reasons advanced by the unions and
accepted by Congress why authority to make
union-shop agreements was justified."
Thus, the majority is mistaken. The Union's
interest in this case is not a "right" to
nonmembers' funds. The Union's interest
lies in receiving a fair contribution to its
collective bargaining expenses. The Union
has no legitimate interest, however, in
collecting agency fees from nonmembers to
fill its political war-chest.

2.
The majority describes Hudson as a
"reasonable accommodation test." The
majority points to the following statement
·from Hudson: "[t]he objective must be to
devise a way of preventing compulsory
subsidization of ideological activity by
employees who object thereto without
restricting the Union's ability to require
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every employee to contribute to the cost of
collective-bargaining
activities."
The
majority also states that a union need not
take "any and all steps demanded by fee.
payers." The majority looks to our decision
in Grunwald v. San Bernardino City Unified
School District, which stated: "[t]he test ...
is not whether the union and the [employer]
have come up with the system that imposes
the least burden on agency fee payers,
regardless of cost." 994 F.2d 1370, 1376 n. 7
(9th Cir.1993).
But there is a wide gap between taking "any
and all steps demanded by fee payers"-that
is, a least-restrictive means test-and what
the majority endorses. While Hudson does
not require a union to adopt procedures that
impose the least intrusive burden on fee
payers possible, the majority affords the
union undue leniency. The majority ignores
Hudson's
instruction
that,
because
employees' First Amendment interests ·are
implicated by the collection of an agency
fee, "the procedure [must] be carefully
tailored to minimize the infringement." To
eliminate any doubt, in the footnote
appended to this statement, the Court cites
several cases· holding that when First
Amendment rights are implicated, the
government must avoid burdening those
rights.
Hudson
emphasized, moreover, that
"procedural safeguards often have a special
bite in the First Amendment context." In the
agency fee context, Hudson described the
goal . of procedural protections as to
"minimize the risk that nonunion
employees' contributions might be used for
impelmissible purposes" even temporarily,
and to "facilitate a nonunion employee's
. ability to protect his rights[.]" I therefore
conclude that the majority's "reasonable
accommodation test" is misguided and is
inconsistent with case law· that we are
required to follow.

II.
The Union's procedures in this case should
be evaluated in light of the principles set
forth in Hudson and the legitimate interests
at stake. As the majority has already set
forth the facts of this case in some detail, I
recite them only where partiCUlarly relevant
to my views or where additional detail is
warranted. I also seek to draw more
attention to the well-reasoned decision of the
district court.
A.

***
In the Summer of 2005, shortly after the
expiration of the period for objection to the
June 2005 Hudson notice, the Union's
legislative bodies began discussing a
temporary dues increase. The proposal was
described as an "Emergency Temporary
Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back
Fund." The agenda for a July 30, 2005
Council Meeting described the purpose of
the assessment as follows: "[t]he funds from
this emergency temporary assessment will
be used specifically in the political arenas of
California to defend and advance the
"
interests of members of Local 1000.
The agenda continued to describe:

These
temporary
emergency
assessments are made necessary by
. political attacks on state employees
and other public workers launched
by Governor Schwarzenegger and
his allies which threaten the wages,
benefits and working conditions of
Local 1000 members, and undermine
the services they provide to the
people of California.
The Union contemplated that the "Political
Fight~Back Fund" would not be used for the
"regular costs of the union ... such as office
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rent, staff salaries or routine equipment
replacement." Instead, the Fund would be
used "for a broad .range of political
expenses."
The Union approved the temporary
assessment at the end of August 2005. The
Union's yearly Hudson notice had been
issued in June 2005, and that notice did not
mention the possibility of the later-enacted
temporary assessment. After passage of the
temporary assessment, the Union sent a
letter to members and nonmembers, dated
August 31, 2005, informing them that
"Local
1000
delegates
voted
overwhelmingly for a temporary dues
increase to create a Political Fight-Back
Fund." The letter stated that the funds
collected from the dues increase would be
used for several political purposes: (1) to
defeat two propositions appearing on the
November 2005 ballot (Propositions 75 and
76); (2) to "defeat another attack on [the]
pension plan" in June 2006; and (3) "[i]n
November 2006 ... to elect a governor and
legislature who support public employees
and the services [they] provide." The letter
explained that the $45 per month cap on
dues would not apply to the temporary
assessment. For sake of clarity, I point out
that this letter did not constitute "notice" as
contemplated in Hudson. The letter did not
provide an explanation for the basis of the
additional fees being imposed, and it did not
provide nonmembers with an opportunity to
object to the additional fees.
After receiving the Union's letter, some
nonmembers attempted to object to the
temporary assessment.
For example,
plaintiff Dobrowolski contacted the Union
to lodge his objectiontothe "Political FightBack Fund." He was told, in effect, that
there was nothing he could do about it; he
. was not allowed to object. The Union
thereafter sent a letter to nonmembers, like

plaintiff Dobrowolsld, who attempted to
object to the increase in fees. That letter,
dated October 27, 2005, stated in part:
The Union. has received your
objection to the dues increase. We
understand that you are a political
objector and a fee payer in the Union
and that you have raised an objection
to paying this increase because you
believe the money will be directed
solely to political activities by the
Union.
We
understand
your
frustration about paying a little more
to the Union when you have not seen
a new contract with a pay increase.
However, we hope that by explaining
the Union's position concerning this
dues and fees increase, you will
better understand our position ....
When we have a· campaign that is
split between political actions and
colle~tive bargaining actions the
Union is required by law to annually
audit the expenditures for those
activities; the Union will fully
comply with this requirement.
However, the Supreme Court has
stated that this audit must occur at
the end of the fiscal year in which
the activities take place, because next
year's objecting fee-payer rate must
be based on that audit.
This campaign will entail much
workplace organizing divided over
two fiscal years. At the end of each
year, the Union's expenses for these
activities will be audited, and the
amount of expense which is not
germane to collective bargaining will
be used to set the objecting fee-payer
rate for the next year. Presently you
are an objecting fee-payer who pays
the audited rate for this year. Next
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year, you will be able to exercise
your objection again and pay the
audited rate set for that year, based
on the Union's expenditures this
year. That rate will fully account for
any political actions of the nature to
which you have objected.
The temporary assessment took effect at the
end of September 2005. At that time, the
Controller of the . State of California,
defendant Steve Westly, began deducting
. the additional fees automatically from all
nonmember
employees'
paychecks.
Although the assessment was "temporary,"
it was certainly not of short duration, lasting
from September 2005 until the end of
December 2006.

B.

***
There are several important features of the
district court's [grant of] summary judgment
[in plaintiffs' favor]. First, the district court
addressed the burden imposed by the
temporary special assessment. The Union
argued that nonmembers who had objected
to the June 2005 Hudson notice were
assessed only a 14.09% increase in the
deduction from the objector's salary. The
district court opined that the figure was
"somewhat misleading" because it ignored
the fee increase imposed on nonunion
employees who had not objected to the
Union's June 2005 Hudson notice. The
district court indicated that the Union's
quantification of the temporary assessment
was misleading in other respects as well, and
that the actual increase in fair share fee for
nonmembers ranged, on average, from 25%
to 33%. The district court deemed this "a
material change in the amount of funds
nonunion employees were required to
contribute to Union expenditures." The

district couli concluded, "the fair share fees
paid by both objectors and nonobjectors
actually increased by a much greater margin
than Defendants would like to suggest."
Second, the district court discussed the
characterization of the temporary special
assessment. Plaintiffs asserted that the fund
was intended solely for political and
ideological
purposes.
The
Union
characterized the assessment as "an ordinary
dues and fees increase" because, in
retrospect, some of the expenses funded
through the temporary assessment were
to
eventually . deemed
chargeable
nonmembers. The district court thought the
Union's position "def [ied] logic." The
Union had described the proposed
assessment as a political fund, and
specifically stated that the fund was not to
be used for regular costs.
Third, taking all of the above together, the
district court concluded that the June 2005
notice did not provide potential objectors
with sufficient information to gauge the
propriety of the Union's fee, in light of the
temporary special assessment. The June
2005 Hudson notice could not provide
adequate notice as to the temporary
assessment because it relied on categories
that were not relevant to the temporary
assessment. According to the Union's
statements,
the
temporary' special
assessment was intended for a specific
purpose and would not be used for regular
expenses. The district court pointed out that,
"after implementing the increase, the Union
took the position that nonunion employees
had already been given an opportunity to
make an informed decision as to the
Assessment by means of the 2005 Hudson
notice. The Union now turns a blind eye to
the inconsistency inherent in asking nonunion employees to compare apples, in the
form of the prior year's financials, to
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oranges, in the form of a new Assessment."
Finally, the district court concluded that the
appropriate remedy was a second Hudson
notice, relying on Wagner v. Professional
Engineers in California Government, 354
F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir.2004). This
remedy had to be made available to
nonmembers regardless of whether they had
objected to the June 2005 Hudson notice,
because: "[i]n order for any nonunion
employees' failure to object to have any
legal significance, the 2005 Hudson Notice
must have been valid and sufficient to cover
the Assessment." The district court held that
objectors to the second Hudson notice would
be entitled to a refund, with interest, of any
withheld amounts.

III.
In this case, the Union failed to protect .
adequately the First Amendment rights of
nonmembers from whom it collected an
agency fee. In collecting agency fees from
nonmembers,the Union is subject to
constraints that are both procedural and
substantive in nature. Procedurally, the
Union did not provide nonmembers with
sufficient information to gauge the propriety
of the agency fee. The Union's June 2005
Hudson notice was insufficient in light of
the temporary assessment. Notably, the
Union adopted no other procedures to
protect nonmembers' First Amendment
rights upon imposition of the temporary
assessment. Nonmembers were provided no .
additional notice, opportunity to object,
dispute resolution procedure, and so forth.
Compounding these procedural failures,
there is a substantive problem. The
temporary assessment is suspect, because it
was instituted shortly after the June general
Hudson notice and was explicitly and
exclusively intended to fund the Union's
political
activities.
The
temporary

assessment was a special purpose fund that
would not be used for regular Union costs
and therefore represented a departure from
the Union's typical spending regime. I do
not believe the Union sufficiently minimized
the risk that nonmembers' funds would be
used to subsidize political and ideological
activities in light of these circumstances.

A.
I first consider the adequacy of the Union's
June 2005. Hudson notice in light of the
temporary assessment. ...

***
The Union submits that the Supreme Court
has approved the retrospective method by
which it calculates the yearly agency fee: a
"look-back" procedure, by which the Union
sets the agency fee for the upcoming year
according to the proportion of chargeable
versus nonchargeable expenditures' in the
prior year. However, the Union's June 2005
Hudson notice was not adequate to provide
an explanation of the basis for the agency
fee extracted from nonmembers' paychecks
for the temporary assessment. To reiterate
the obvious, the June 2005 Hudson notice
provided no information regarding the
temporary assessment, as it was enacted
subsequently, in August 2005. The Union
would respond that the notice was adequate
to cover such future contingencies. How
could that be? The temporary special
assessment resulted in approximately a 25%
increase in fair share fees-a fairly
substantial increase. Because the temporary
. assessment was exempted from the dues
cap, higher-earning employees might
experience an effective Qr actual increase
that was even greater. Moreover, while the
assessment was "temporary," it was in effect
for the bulk of the 2005 fee year, from the
end of September 2005 until commencement
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of the next fee year in July 2006.
The district court further held that the fee
increase was material, and I agree. The
temporary
special
assessment might
therefore have affected a fee payer's
decision to object pursuant to the June 2005
Hudson notice. Indeed, because the Union
refused to give nonmember employees· an
opportunity to object when information
about the temporary assessment was
disclosed,
these
nonmembers
were
essentially left in the "dark" about the nature
of the agency fee during the time period in
which they were required to file objections.
In other words, even though the special
assessment
significantly
altered
the
magnitude and intended use of the agency
fee, the Union and the majority believe that
nonmember employees were required to
object before the material information was
revealed. Such an approach simply cannot
be reconciled with the procedures set forth
in Hudson.

adequacy of a Hudson notice. From the
standpoint of a potential objector, the
magnitude of the increase in fees imposed
by the temporary assessment could very well
be material. This increase, as an absolute
amount, could affect a· nonmember's
decision to object or not to object even if the
percentage fee remained static. And these
nonmembers are the ones whose First
Amendment rights are in jeopardy-not the
Union's.
Moreover,
the
temporary
assessment was exempted from the cap on
dues. Thus, even though the fair share fee
remained constant as a basic percentage
under the temporary assessment, because the
assessment was exempted from the $45 per
month cap on dues, some employees would
in fact experience a proportionately greater
share in monthly fee deductions. This is
inconsistent with a static-percentage
justification for the Union's failure to
provide additional notice regarding the
temporary assessment.

The Union would respond, I venture, by
asserting that the temporary assessment did
not alter the agency fee as a percentage of
total union dues. The June 2005 Hudson
notice disclosed that the agency fee was
99.1 % of membership dues, and that the
objectors' agency fee was 56.35% of
membership
dues.
The
temporary
assessment did not affect these percentages.
But such an argument rests on the faulty
premise that, if nonmembers' fees remain
constant as a percentage of members' dues
through a given fee year, any absolute
increase in fees is protected from scrutiny by
the yearly Hudson notice, that is, that the
proportionate share is what matters, and
because this was not altered there can be no
constitutional violation.

Furthermore, by exempting the temporary
assessment from the cap, the Union acted
contrary to the June 2005 Hudson notice.
The June 2005 Hudson notice, stated:
"currently 1.0% of monthly gross salary and
are presently capped at a maximum of $45
per month." Exceptions from the cap, or the
elimination of it, was not contemplated in
the June 2005 Hudson notice. The Union's
June 2005 Hudson notice also stated:
"[d]ues are subject to change without further
notice to fee payers." I cannot put much
weight in this sweeping reservation of
assumed authority; in any event, the notice
did not disclose that the cap could be
eliminated. For these additional reasons, I
conclude that the temporary. assessment
might be a material factor in a nonmembers'
decision to object.

I am not convinced that the proportionate
share is all that matters in evaluating the

I conclude that the Union's June 2005 notice
did not fulfill its obligations under Hudson.
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The purpose of a Hudson notice is to enable
informed consent or objection. The Union's
.June 2005 Hudson notice was inadequate to .
provide fee payers with a basis on which to
adjudge the propriety of the Union's agency
fee, and to decide whether or not to object.
Because the Union's June 2005 Hudson
notice was inadequate, an employee's failure
to object to it does not constitute an effective
waiver, an abandonment of a known right.
Until Hudson's requirements are satisfied,
employees must be afforded subsequent
opportunities to object.
The June 2005 Hudson notice was not
adequate to provide notice as to the
temporary assessment for an additional
reason, which walTants separate attention.
The temporary assessment was a special
purpose fund. The Union envisioned the
temporary assessment as a political
fundraising vehicle, to build a "Political
Fight-Back Fund." The Union contemplated
that the temporary assessment would
provide a distinct source of capital for
political activities and that it would not be
used for the regular expenses of the union.
Recognizing the unique character of the
temporary assessment has two implications.
First, the June 2005 Hudson notice could not
be adequate to enable nonmembers'
informed objection to the agency fee. The
June 2005 Hudson notice contemplated
ordinary expenditures; the temporary special
assessment stood apart from that. As the
district court stated, the union asked
nonmembers to compare "apples, in the
form of the prior year's financials, to
oranges, in the form of a new [a]ssessment,
an [a]ssessment which was not to be utilized
for Union operations but was instead
earmarked for discrete political purposes."
Even if agency fees remained constant as a
percentage of total member dues,

nonmembers might well object to paying
increased fees for purely political purposes;
for example, they might object in light bfthe
depmiure from the Union's normal spending
regime.
Second, as a substantive matter, the Court
has repeatedly stressed that a union m~y
extract from nonmembers "only those fees
and dues necessary to performing the duties
of an exdusive· representative of the
employees in dealing with the employer on
labor~management issues." In Lehnert, the
Court outlined a framework for evaluating
whether an activity was germane to a
union's role as exclusive bargaining agent:
"chargeable activities must (1) be 'germane'
to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be
justified by the government's vital policy
interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free
riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the
burdening of free speech that is inherent in
the allowance of an agency or union shop."
To protect the distinction between
chargeable and non-chargeable activities, a
union is required to adopt procedures that
minimize the risk that nonmembers will be
compelled to subsidize political or·
ideological activities with which they do not
agree. In Hudson, the Court explained,
"[t]he Union should not be permitted to
exact a service fee from nonmembers
without first establishing a procedure which
will avoid the risk that their funds will be
used, even temporarily, . to finance
ideological activities unrelated to collective
b<,!rgaining. "
The
temporary
assessment
was
contemplated as a political fundraising
vehicle; it therefore cannot be justified by
the interest in preventing nonmembers from
free-riding on the Union's collective
bargaining
efforts.
The
temporary
assessment clearly burdened the speech of
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nonmembers. But the Union undertook no
efforts, in connection with the imposition of
the temporary assessment, to minimize the
impact on nonmembers' First Amendment
rights. Taking these considerations together,
I conclude that, in connection with the
imposition and collection of the temporary
assessment, the Union did not fulfill its
obligation to be mindful of nonmembers'
First Amendment rights.

with an opportunity to object to the
temporary assessment. The Union did not
provide a procedure for resolving disputes
and did not place disputed amounts in
escrow.
Indeed,
when nonmembers
attempted to object to the temporary
assessment, they were refused a forum for
their dispute and were never provided with
the opportunity to obtain the decision of a
neutral hearing officer.

The Union and the majority seek to evade
the fact that the temporary assessment was·
enacted to fund pciliticalactiviiies by
arguing that the fund was ultimately used for
some expenses that were chargeable to
nonmembers. I agree with the district court's
assessment of the Union's post hoc
rationalization: "[fJollowing the union's
logic it should be required only to show that
some small fraction of this fund was used
for chargeable purposes in order to justify
subverting its Hudson responsibilities." The
district court further reasoned that, even if
the temporary assessment was not intended
solely for politiqal purposes, it was indeed
intended predominantly for political
purposes. As such, the district court
continued, "it is clear that the Union's intent
was to depart drastically from its typical
spending regime and to focus [the temporary
special assessment funds] on activities that
were political or ideological in nature."

IV.

In sum, the Union's procedures were not
adequate under the circumstances. The June
2005 Hudson notice was inadequate to
provide nonmembers with sufficient
information . from which to evaluate the
propriety of the Union's agency fee. After
enacting the temporary special assessment,
the Union made no effort whatsoever to
minimize the infringement of nonmembers'
rights. The Union dId not provide notice
regarding the temporary assessment; the
Union also did not provide nonmembers

This brings me to the crux of the Union's
arguinent: that Hudson approved· calculating
an agency fee as the proportion of
chargeable to nonchargeable expenses in the
prior fiscal year. The Union asserts that the
prior-year method is virtually required here,
as it is a large public sector union and must
calculate its agency fee on the basis of
audited financial reports. Because of the
audit requirement, moreover, the Union
asserts that it could not prospectively
apportion the temporary assessment between
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses.
The majority agrees that the Union complied
with its obligations. The majority recites that
"absolute" precision cannot be expected or
required in the calculation of an agency fee,
and that the Union cannot be "faulted" for
calculating its agency fee on the basis of the
prior fiscal year's expenditures. Further, the
majority states that the Union could not
deviate from the prior-year method of
calculating the agency fee with respect to
the special assessment. The majority
explains that the prior-year method makes
lag inherent; in any given year, an objector
might be "underpaying or overpaying," but
"the inevitable effect of the Hudson method
is that these over- and undercharges even
out over time."
This strikes me as a strange argument when
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dealing with a First Amendment challenge.
First, the Hudson notice procedure is not per
se adequate to protect the rights of
nonmembers in all situations. Instead,
where, as here, there is a substantial
deviation from the normal Hudson process,
adaptation is required. Second, the prioryear calculation method does not establish
the adequacy of the June 2005 Hudson
notice nor does it demonstrate that the
Union's procedures were adequate when
viewed as a whole.

A.
We should not measure the Union's conduct
by the discrete Hudson procedures alone.
Hudson establishes a floor. In Davenport,
the Court stressed, "we have described
Hudson as 'outlin[ing] a minimum set of
procedures by which a [public-sector] umon
in an agency-shop relationship could meet
its requirement under Abood. '"
Here, the temporary assessment was not like
the Union's ordinary dues and not like the
facts presented in Hudson. Several features
of the special assessment distinguish this
case. The temporary assessment was
imposed mid-year and not in the normal
course of the Hudson process. The
temporary assessment imposed a material
increase in agency fees over those
contemplated in the Hudson notice, and was
exempt from the dues cap (which was
inconsistent with· the Hudson notice).
Hudson did not consider a fee increase
outside of a normal periodic notice process.
Likewise, Hudson' did not contemplate a
special-purpose assessment, as here. Even
assuming the Union did here what was done
in Hudson, it could not be sufficient to
satisfy its duties in light of the unique
circumstances of this case.
I cannot agree with the proposition that the
Union's June 2005 Hudson notice satisfied

the Union's obligations to nonmembers until
issuance of the next yearly Hudson notice.
The Union's mid-year conduct cannot be
insulated from scrutiny. Rather, there must
be some limitation on a union's imposition
of fee increases between Hudson annual
notices.
B.

The Union contends that it complied with
the procedures set forth in Hudson, because
the .Court approved the calculation of an
agency fee based on the proportion of the .
prior year's chargeable to nonchargeable
expenditures. Indeed, in a footnote, the
Court stated that a union "cannot be faulted
for calculating its fee on the basis of its
expenses during the preceding year." The
Union represents, furthermore, that its hands
were tied with regard to the temporary
assessment, because it is required to base its
agency fee calculation on audited financial
statements.
The prior-year calculation method used here
does not satisfy all of the Union's
obligations,
however.
The
Union's
allocation of expenses as chargeable or
nonchargeable presents a distinct issue in the
adequacy of its Hudson notice. Thus, even if
the Union "cannot be faulted" for relying on
prior-year expenditures in calculating the
agency fee, it is not relieved from its other
Hudson obligations. The Union must still
provide adequate . notice to enable an
informed decision, an opportunity to lodge
objections, a prompt hearing on objections
by a neutral decisionmaker, and escrow of
any amounts in dispute. Even if we look
only to compliance with Hudson, therefore,
the Union still falls short of the mark.
I recognize that the Union, in relying on
prior-year expenditures as the basis for its
agency fee, is subject to an audit
requirement. In my view, application of the
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audit requirement relates to the appropriate
remedy in this case, a question we do not
reach. A district court, with a proper record,
could evaluate the audit requirement in light
of the temporary assessment. Indeed, the
purpose of an audit is to verify that a union
.hactually spent the amount of money. it
claims; the audit is not intended to verify the
union's allocation as a "legal, not an.
accounting,
decision
regarding
the
appropriateness of the allocation of expenses
to the chargeable and non-chargeable
categories." In any event, the audit
requirement does not relate to the other
Hudson protections impli.cated by this case,
and is ultimately of limited help to the
Union. Even a temporary violation of the
First Amendment is a significant violation.

v.
The majority construes the issue in this
appeal as "whether a union is required ... to

send a second notice when adopting a
temporary, mid-term fee increase." By
framing narrowly the issue in this case, the
majority shifts attention to the remedy
adopted by the district court. But the district
court's remedy is only one consideration in
this case-one we do not even reach-and
should not be set up as a strawrnan for
attack.
In this case, the Union's provision of an
annual Hudson notice was insufficient to
enable nonmembers to protect their First
Amendment rights upon imposition of the
temporary
assessment.
The
Union,
furthermore, made no effort to minimize the
of nonmember's
First
infringement
Amendment rights despite substantially
increasing the fees extracted from their
paychecks. I believe that the majority's
opinion does not carry out the principles of
Hudson. I therefore dissent.
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"U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Constitutionality of
Special Union Fees"
Lawyers Weekly USA

June 28, 2011
Pat Murphy
The u.s. Supreme Court will decide
whether a state may constitutionally
condition employment on the payment of a·
special union "political action" assessment
without first providing notice and the
opportunity to object.
In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson (475
U.S. 292), the Court recognized certain
procedural safeguards for the First
Amendment rights of nonunion employees
who are required to bear a fair share of
union costs. The procedural safeguards
include so-called Hudson notices, by which
unions must explain the basis for a particular
assessment and the right to object.
This case addresses a special assessment
made by Service Employees International
Union, Local 1000, which is the exclusive
bargaining agent for. California state
employees. Under an agreement between the
state and the union, all employees within the
covered bargaining units must pay a fair
share of the cost of representation, including
nonmembers.
In August 2005, the union approved a
special assessment to pay political expenses
for the defeat of celiain anti-union ballot
propositions.
A class of nonumon employees

alleging that the special assessment violated
their First Amendment rights because it was
made without the required Hudson notices.
But the 9th Circuit decided that Hudson
notices sent in June 2005 in conjunction
with the union's assessment of annual dues
satisfied constitutional requirements.
"The district court faulted the union for
failing to make an accurate prediction in its
June 2005 Hudson notice of its actual
expenditures in the remainder of that fee
year due to the subsequent enactment of the
temporary increase ....
"Yet, under the normal Hudson procedure,
any payments over and above the union's
actual chargeable expenditures in the 2005
fee year would be incorporated into the rate
for the next fee year. The Supreme COUli
has determined that this is sufficiently
accurate to comply with the constitutional
restrictions," the cOUli said.
A decision from the Supreme Court
expected next term.

IS

Knox v. Service Employees International
Unioll, Local 1000, No. 10-1121.Certiorari
granted: June 27, 2011. Ruling below: 628
F. 3d. 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).

sued,
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"U.S. SC Will Hear Case Involving Union Fees"
Legal Newsline

June 28, 2011
Jessica M. Karmasek
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
review an appeals court's ruling that a union
is not required, in addition to an annual fee
notice to members, to send a second notice
when adopting a temporary, mid-term fee
Increase.
In its Dec. 10 decision, the Ninth Circuit
COUli of Appeals reversed the judgment of a
district court in Knox v. California State
Employees Association, Local 1000,
Service Employees International Union.
. The appeals court argued that the district
court's direction that a union must issue a
second notice when it intends "to depart
drastically from its typical spending. regime
and to focus on activities that (are) political
or ideological in nature" is "practically
unworkable. "
"Union spending may vary substantially
from year to year-in one year there may be
a new collective bargaining agreement
negotiated, resulting in a high chargeable
percentage for objectors that is followed by
. an election· year that results in a low
chargeable percentage for objectors," the
court wrote.
The National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation, who represented Dianne Knox
and the class of plaintiffs in the case, argues
that the appeals court's ruling "effectively
forces nonunion California state employees
to fund union political activism."
The foundation, based in Springfield, Va., is
a nonprofit organization that provides free
legal aid to employees whose human or civil
rights have been violated by "compulsory

unionism abuses," according to its website.
Pointing to a separate Supreme COUli
decision, the foundation argues that public
employees forced to pay union dues as a
condition of employment must be notified of
how much their dues' are spent on union
activities
unrelated
to
collective
bargaining-such as members-only events
and political activism-and given a chance
to opt out of paying for the activities~
However, CSEA union officials issued a
"special assessment" in 2005 to raise money
from all state employees for a union political
fund, regardless of their membership status.
Nonunion employees were not given a
chance to opt out, the foundation says.
In 2007, the district court ruled that the
CSEA had to provide a notice to nonunion
employees about the assessment, allow them
to opt out of paying into the fund, provide a
refund of monies spent on union boss
politics and pay interest from dates of the
deduction to nonmembers who chose to opt
out. The Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling.
Subsequently, in March, attorneys with the
legal foundation filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari for the plaintiffs with the nation's
high court.
On Monday, the Court included the case on
its list of certiorari granted.
Mark Mix, president of the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation, said he
was happy the Court decided to review the
case.
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"Allowing the Ninth Circuit's ruling to stand
would further undermine state employees'
First Amendment rights and encourage
union bosses to extract more forced dues
from nonunion workers as a condition of
employment," he said in a statement.

union assessment intended solely for
political and ideological expenditures
without first providing a notice that includes
information about that assessment and,
provides an opportunity to object to its
exaction?

The foundation has posed two questions ,to
the Comi:

• Also, maya State, consistent with the First
and Fourteenth ,Amendments, condition
continued public employment on the
payment of union agency fees for purposes
of financing political expenditures for ballot
measures?

• Maya State, consistent with the First and
Fourteenth
Amendments,
condition
employment on the payment of a special

,

,
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"Unions and Forced Political Speech"
National Review Online
June 1,2011
Frank Miniter

The Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) is being dragged to the Supreme
Court for alleged First Amendment
infringements. In Knox v. SEIU, Local
1000, the Court will decide· whether the
union forced non-members to pay for
political speech and failed to give proper
notice.
This court fight began .in 2005. Before
Arnold Schwarzenegger became another
fallen star left blushing on the society pages,
he took on the unions; he scared them so
much, in fact, that SEIU, Local 1000
decided to garnish the wages of California's
public employees-including 28,000 public
workers who were not union members-as
an "Emergency Temporary Assessment to
Build a Political Fight-Back Fund." This
political war chest paid for political ads and
other efforts to defeat Proposition 75, a
measure that would have restricted the use
of union dues for political purposes, and
Proposition 76, which would have imposed
a cap on state spending.
If you're wondering how a union can take
money .from people who are not union
members, then you need an introduction to
modern union rules in states without strong
right-to-work laws-that is, laws that allow
workers to refuse to pay union dues or join
unions (though even then they are still
covered by the union contract). Like 25
others, California is not a right-to-work
state. As a result, those who have the
privilege to work in unionized shops, or for
the state of California itself, have to fund
whatever union is recognized as their
"monopoly bargaining representative." So
though the 28,000 state employees

represented in the class-action suit were not
members of SEIU, Local 1000, they had to
pay SEIU 99.1 percent of full union dues.
The other 0.9 percent was knocked off
because that's what the union spends on
members-only benefits. In addition, nonmembers could pay a reduced fee of 56.35
percent-funding only the union expenses
that are "chargeable" to non-members
against their will under Supreme Court
precedent-if they formally objected.
According to the Court, non-members
cannot be forced to fund political
'activities-and under Chicago Teachers
Local No.1 v. Hudson, unions cannot collect
money from non-members unless they first
provide a breakdown of the fees and offer a
chance to object. This is called a "Hudson
notice," and unions typically provide them
annually.
So when SEIU, Local 1000-after sending
out its Hudson notice for the year-decided
to take an additional portion of all
employees' paychecks for political ads, it
was standing on dubious ground. Even those
who objected had to pay 56.35 percent of
the new fees-a number calculated based on
the previous year's budget, not on where
these new funds would actually be spent.
And though the union did send out a letter
explaining the new charge, it did not provide
a new Hudson notice. Eight plaintiffs filed a
class-action suit.
U.S. District Court Judge Monison C.
England Jr. quickly issued a temporary
restraining order that prevented the state
controller from further garnishing the
employee's salaries to fund the political ads, .
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but then the judge lifted the order and
refused to issue a permanent injunction.

political activities fell into the
chargeable' category."

After Governor Schwarzenegger lost the
votes on his referenda-partly because of
ads paid for in this way-.the plaintiffs
appealed their case with the help of the
National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation. They won a lower"court
decision, but the SEIU appealed the cas~ to
the Ninth Circuit.

He also noted that the practice of calculating
. the rate for objectors based on the previous
year's expenditures is allowed by Supreme
Court precedent-ignoring the special
circumstance that this money was collected
specifically for the purpose of political
activity.

The lawsuit went before a three"judge panel
at the Ninth Circuit, which voted 2" 1 in
favor of the .8EIU. How did the Ninth
Circuit justify permitting a Union to garnish
non"members' wages to fund ideological
ads?
SEIU, Local 1000, claimed its "Political
Fight"Back Fund"-the fund it had
originally said, in the summer of 2005, was
designated "for a broad range· of political
expenses, including television and radio
advertising, direct mail, voter registration,
voter education, and get out the vote
activities"-was actually used for a variety
of expenditures, not just political speech.
The two"judge majority at the Ninth Circuit
overlooked SEIU's Orwellian rewriting of
fact.
Judge Sidney R. Thomas wrote for the
majority at the Ninth Circuit that the
"Supreme Court has underscored .
Congressional policy by enforcing the right
of a union, as the exclusive collective"
bargaining representative of its employees,
to require nonunion employees to pay a fair
share of the union's costs." He found that
"the Union material indicated that the fund
would be used for political activities. Yet, in
response to inquiries, the Union specifically
stated it intended to split the increase
'between political actions and collective
bargaining actions.' Further, not all of the

'non"

. James Young, the staff attorney for the
National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation who litigated the case before the
Ninth Circuit and will likely argue the case
before the U.S. Supreme COUli, said, "The
First Amendment protects free speech and
the freedom of association. In Knox, the
union forced public employees to pay an
'emergency fee' that their own materials
said was for political ads· and other
expenditures. This is unconstitutional, as it
is forced speech. The Ninth Circuit got it
wrong."
To prove his point, Young points to the
aforementioned case Chicago Teachers
Local No. 1 v. Hudson, which held that "the
constitutional requirements for the Union's
collection of agency fees include an
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee,
a reasonably prompt opportunity to
challenge the amount of the fee before an
impartial decision maker, and an escrow for
the amounts reasonably in dispute while
such challenges are pending."
In his dissent, the third judge on the Ninth
Circuit panel, J. Clifford Wallace, wrote, "I
dissent from the majority's opinion because
it is not faithful to the principles guiding the
[U.S. Supreme] Court's decision in Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson." Wallace quoted
another Supreme Court case, Davenport v.
Wash. Education Association, which held
that "regardless of one's views as to the
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desirability of agency-shop agreements ... it
is undeniably unusual for a government
agency to give a private entity the power, in
essence, to tax government employees."
Finally, Wallace pointed out the obvious
constitutional infringement when he wrote,
"The Union's interest lies in receiving a fair
contribution to its collective bargaining
expenses. The. Union has no legitimate
interest, however, in collecting agency fees
from nonmembers to fill its political warchest."
No kidding.
Seen from a broader perspective, if unions in
non-right-to-work states are allowed by the
Supreme Court to tap the salaries of nonmembers for political advocacy, then those
members have lost not only their right to

free speech, but also their Fifth Amendment
right to property.
So as the Left has been wildly claiming that
Wisconsin's Scott Walker, New Jersey's
Chris Christie, and Ohio's John Kasich are
attacking public employees' rights, SEIU
has been actually guilty of this charge. After
all, there is no constitutional right to
collectively bargain, but there are individual
. rights to free speech and association.
The Supreme Court must rule in favor of the
plaintiffs in Knox and force SEIU, Local
1000, to return the monies it garnished from
their· wages. It wouldn't be the first time
they've overruled the Ninth Circuit.
Hopefully, the U.S. Supreme COUli will
to
return First Amendment rights
California's public employees.
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Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper
10-1024

Ruling Below: Cooper v. F.A.A., 596 F.3d 538 opinion amended and superseded on denial of
reh'g, 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 10-1024, 2011 WL 516398 (U.S. June 20,
2011).

Plaintiff Stanmore Cooper applied for and received FAA medical certification to fly 5 times
between 1994 and 2004. Each time plaintiff Cooper did not disclose he had been diagnosed with
HIV and was on antiretroviral medications. In 1995 Cooper qualified for Social Security longterm disability benefits after disclosing his HIV status to the SSA. Cooper received benefits
through August 1996. From 2002 to 2005 Cooper was investigated in connection with Operation
Safe Pilot culminating in 3 indictments for making false statements to a government agency. In
.2006 Cooper pled guilty to one count of making and delivering a false official writing. Cooper
filed suit in 2007 claiming the interagency exchange of his medical records violated the Privacy
Act and caused him to suffer embarrassment and emotional distress. The district cOUli ruled for
the government. The court found no issue of triable fact as to whether the government had failed
in its record keeping duties but also found that the term "actual damages" in the Privacy Act was.
ambiguous. The court applied the canon of sovereign immunity finding that due to the
ambiguity, the government did not clearly consent to be sued for the kind of damages put forth
by Cooper. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the only plausible reading of the
term "actual damages" included Cooper's damages and thus the sovereign immunity canon was
inapposite.
Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff who alleges only mental and emotional injuries can
establish "actual damages" within the meaning of the civil remedies provision of the Privacy
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A).
Stanmore Cawthon COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; Social Security Administration; VRW
United States Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed February 22,2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:
The Privacy Act of 1974,5 U.S.C. § 552a et
seq. (the Act), prohibits federal agencies
from disclosing "any record which is
contained in a system of records by any
means of communication to any person, or

to another agency" without the consent of
"the individual to whom the record
pertains," unless the disclosure falls within
one or more enumerated exceptions to the
Act. The Act also creates a private cause of
action against an agency for its wilful or
intentional violation of the Act that has "an
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adverse effect on an individual," and allows
for the recovery of "actual damages"
sustained as a result of such a violation.
Plaintiff Stanmore Cawthon Cooper claims
to have sustained actual damages as the
result of an interagency exchange of
information performed as part of a joint
criminal investigation by Defendants
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Social Security Administration (SSA), and
Department of Transportation (DOT)
(collectively, the Government). Cooper
seeks actual damages for nonpecuniary
InJUrIes, such as humiliation, mental
anguish, and emotional distress, as a result
of the unauthorized interagency disclosure
of his medical information; he does not
claim any pecuniary or out-of-pocket losses.
Because Cooper seeks damages only for
nonpecuniary injuries, the district court .
granted summary judgment to the
Government,' after holding that the Act
allows recovery only for pecuniary damages.
We hold that actual damages under the Act
enco,mpasses
both
pecuniary
and
nonpecuniary damages. We reverse and
remand to the district court.

1. FACTUAL AND
BACKGROUND

PROCEDURAL

A. Medical Celiificates and Disability.
Benefits
Cooper first obtained a private pilot
celiificate in 1964 and has been flying
airplanes intermittently ever since. To
operate an aircraft lawfully, one must be
issued a pilot certificate and a valid airman
medical certificate. The FAA requires that a
pilot periodically renew his or her medical
celiificate to ensure that the pilot satisfies
current FAA medical requirements. The
medical certificate renewal application

requires an applicant to disclose any
illnesses, disabilities, or surgeries the
applicant has had during his or her lifetime,
and to identify any medications being taken
at the time of application.
Cooper was' diagnosed with HIV in 1985.
He knew he would not qualify for a renewal
of his medical certificate if he disclosed his
medical condition because, at that time, the
FAA did not issue medical celiificates to
individuals with HIV who were taking
antiretroviral medications. Accordingly,
Cooper grounded himself and chose not to
renew his medical certificate.
In 1994, however, Cooper applied for and
received a medical certificate from the FAA,
but without disclosing that he had HIV or
was taking antiretroviral medication; Cooper
renewed his medical certificate again in
1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004, each time
knowingly withholding required information
about his medical condition. Cooper
explains that he chose to withhold that
information because of the "social stigma"
associated with HIV and his sexual
orientation. Cooper feared that lmowledge of
his status as a gay man with HIV would
result in discrimination against him in
employment,
housing,
and
public
accommodation. As a result, he disclosed his
sexual orientation and medical condition
only to close friends and family.
In August 1995, after his symptoms
worsened, Cooper applied to the SSA for
long-term disability benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et
seq. Cooper disclosed his HIV status to the
SSA, comfOliable in his understanding that,
the medical information disclosed in his
application would be held confidential and
would only be used by the SSA for its
determination of Cooper's eligibility for
disability benefits. Cooper qualified for the
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benefits, which he received from August
1995 to August 1996.

examined the spreadsheets to identify entries
suggesting fraud.

B. Operation Safe Pilot

C. The Investigation and Prosecution of
Cooper·

In 2002, the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG) for the DOT and the OIG for the
SSA, who are charged with investigating
crimes related to their respective agencies,
collaborated to investigate a California pilot
who had consulted two different sets of
doctors in a scheme to obtain simultaneously
medical certifications to fly from the FAA
and disability benefits from the SSA. From
this investigation grew "Operation Safe
Pilot," a joint criminal investigation
conducted by the DOT-OIG and SSA-OIG
that sought to uncover efforts by medically
to
obtain
FAA
unfit
individuals
certifications to fly. Operation Safe Pilot
was initially proposed as a nationwide
endeavor, but was ultimately approved as a
regional project, limited to Northern
California.
In July 2002, the FAA, which is part of the
DOT, provided the DOT-OIG with the
names and other identifying information for
active. celiified pilots. In November 2003,
the DOT-OIG sent the
SSA-OIG
information relating to approximately
45,000 pilots in Northern California,
consisting of the pilots' names, dates of
birth, social security numbers, and genders.
The SSA-OIG cross-checked the DOTOIG's information· against the information
in the SSA-OIG's databases, and in March
or April 2004, the SSA-OIG provided the
DOT-OIG with three separate spreadsheets
summarizing its analysis: (1) a spreadsheet
listing the names and social security
numbers for the 45,000 pilots; (2) a
spreadsheet listing pilots who had received
Title II benefits; and (3) a spreadsheet listing
pilots who had received Title XVI benefits.
SSA-OIG and DOT-OIG agents then

Upon review of the spreadsheets, the agents
identified Cooper as a person of interest
because the agencies' compiled data
revealed that· Cooper was certified to fly by
the FAA, yet had received disability benefits
from the SSA. Acting on that information,
the agents acquired Cooper's medical file
from the FAA, which revealed that Cooper
had never disclosed his HIV to the FAA,
and his disability file from the SSA, which
contained information relating to Cooper's
HIV.
In January 2005, the agents conduCted a
series of meetings with FAA Flight
Surgeons to obtain their views as to whether
the pilots identified by the investigation,
including Cooper, had falsified their medical
certificate applications and if so, whether .
that falsified information was material to the
FAA's decision to certify the pilots. After
reviewing Cooper's FAA medical file and
SSA disability file, the FAA Flight Surgeons .
concluded that the FAA would not have
issued Cooper an unrestricted medical
celiificate had it known of his HIV.
At that point,· the agents arranged an
interview with Cooper to ask him about his
medical certificate applications. In March
2005, the agents met with Cooper, at which
time he confessed to having intentionally
withheld his medical condition from the
FAA. That same month, the FAA issued an
emergency order revoking Cooper's pilot
certificate due to his misrepresentations to
the FAA.
In August 2005, Cooper was indicted on
three counts of making false statements to a
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government agency under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
In 2006, he pleaded guilty to one count of
making and delivering a false official
writing, a misdemeanor under 18 U.S.C. §
1018. He was sentenced to two years of
probation and fined $1,000.

summary judgment de novo. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to
Cooper, we determine "whether there are
any genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court correctly applied
the substantive law."

D. The District Court's Decision

III. DISCUSSION

In March 2007, Cooper filed a lawsuit in the
Northern District of California against the
Government. Cooper alleged that the FAA,
DOT, and SSA willfully or intentionally
violated the Act by conducting their
interagency exchange of his records. He
claims that this unlawful disclosure caused
him "to suffer humiliation, embarrassment,
mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and
other severe emotional distress."

The Act forbids federal agencies from
disclosing an individual's records without
that individual's written consent, unless the
disclosure falls within one of the Act's
narrow exceptions. Congress passed the Act
'''to protect. the privacy of individuals
identified in information systems maintained
by Federal agencies'" by regulating "'the
collection,
maintenance,
use,
and
dissemination of information by such
agencies.'" To that end, the Act furnishes
federal agencies with "detailed instructions
for managing their records and provides for
various sorts of civil relief to individuals
aggrieved by failures on the Government's
part to
comply with the
[Act;s]
requirements. "

In spring 2008, both parties moved for
summary judgment. The district court
concluded there was no genuine issue of
material fact that the Government had failed
to uphold its record-keeping obligations
under the Act, but that there was a triable
issue of fact as to whether the Government's
violation was intentional or willful.
However, because the district· court found·
the term "actual damages" to be ambiguous,
. and construed the waiver of sovereign
immunity strictly in favor of the
Government, . it ruled against Cooper,
. holding that due to the strictly nonpecuniary
nature of his damages, there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to his having
suffered actual damages under the Act. The
district court never reached the issue of
whether the Government's failure to comply
with the Act proximately caused an adverse
effect on Cooper.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We review a district court's grant of

If a federal agency fails to comply with the
Act's record-keeping requirements, an
individual may file a civil action against the
agency in district court if the unauthorized
disclosure has "an adverse effect" on the
individual. If the individual demonstrates
. "that the agency. acted in a manner which
was intentional or willful," the individual
can recover "actual damages sustained by
the individual as a result of the" agency's
violation of the Act, "but in no case shall a
person entitled to recovery receive less than
the sum of $1,000." Thus, to prevail on a
claim under the Act, a plaintiff must prove
that: (1) the government agency failed to
uphold its record-keeping obligation; (2) the
agency acted intentionally or willfully in
failing to execute its responsibility; (3) the
failure proximately caused an adverse effect
on the· plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff
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sustained actual damages.

contemporary, common meaning."

In light of the ruling of the district court, the
sole issue before us on appeal is the meaning
of "actual damages" as used in the Act. The
Supreme Court has not expressly addressed
the issue. In Doe v. Chao, the' Court held
that the Act requires proof of "some actual
damages" to recover the Act's minimum
statutory damages of $1,000. 540 U.S. at
627, 124 S.Ct. 1204. But the Court did not
address "the precise definition of actual
damages," though it recognized the disparate
views of Courts of Appeals on the question.

Unfortunately, there is no ordinary or plain
meaning of the term actual damages because
it is a legal term of art. As a result, ordinary
dictionaries are of no assistance in clarifying
the plain meaning of the term. Neither the
American Heritage Dictionary of English
Language nor Webster's Third New
International Dictionary contains an entry
for actual damages.

In Fitzpatrick v. IRS, the Eleventh Circuit
held that actual damages "permits recovery
only for proven pecuniary losses and not for
generalized mental lllJunes, loss of
reputation, embarrassment or other nonquantifiable injuries." In Johnson v. IRS, the'
Fifth Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion, holding that "the term 'actual
damages' under the Act does indeed include
damages for physical and mental injury for
which there is competent evidence in the
record."
Unlike the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits, we have not previously decided the
meaning of actual damages under the Act.

A. Intrinsic Sources
Declaring the meaning of actual damages is
a matter of statutory interpretation. "The
purpose of statutory construction is to
discern the intent of Congress in enacting a
. particular statute."
Our search for Congress's intent begins with
. "the plain meaning of the language in
. question." If the relevant language is plain
and unambiguous, our task is complete. To
discern the text's plain meaning, "words will
be interpreted as taking their ordinary,

Black's Law Dictionary defines "actual
damages" as "[a]n amount awarded to a
complainant to compensate for a proven
injury or loss; damages that repay actual
losses." Unfortunately, that definition sheds
little light on the type of injury or loss
Congress intended plaintiffs to be able to
prove under the Act. Simply because a
statute authorizes the recovery of damages
to compensate for injuries does not mean
that the statute authorizes the recovery of
damages for any type ofloss.
The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits, III
Fitzpatrick and Johnson, agreed that the
meaning of the term actual damages is
ambiguous. In Fitzpatrick, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded there is "no consistent
legal interpretation" of actual damages, and
observed that "courts have used 'actual
damages' in a variety of circumstances, with
the interpretation varying with the context of
use." In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that "the term 'actual damages' has no plain
meaning or consistent legal interpretation."
Similarly, we have recognized the shifting
sense we have attributed to the term. The
term is "chameleon," as its meaning changes
with the specific statute in which it is found.
Since there is no plain meaning to the term
actual damages, as used in the Act, we next
consult the term in its statutory context,
looking to the language of the entire statute,
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its stmcture, and purpose.
Congress articulated a clear purpose behind
the Act, stating that "the right to privacy is a
personal and fundamental right protected by
the Constitution of the United States." To
protect that right, Congress passed the Act
"to provide certain safeguards for an
individual against an invasion of personal
privacy by requiring federal agencies ... to .
. . be subject to civil suit for any damages
which occur as a result of willful or
intentional action which violates any
individual's rights under this Act."
Congress's intent that the Act offer relief in
the form of "any damages" resulting from a
violation of one's right of privacy begs the
question of what types of injuries typically
result from the violation of such a right. The
Supreme Court has observed that "[i]n the
'right of privacy' cases the primary damage
is the mental distress from having been
exposed to public view." The related
common-law t011 of def~mation also
provides monetary relief for nonpecuniary
harms. In defamation cases, the Supreme
Court has stated that "the more customary
types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory
falsehood include impairment. of reputation
and standing in· the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering." Accordingly, in her dissent in
Doe v. Chao, Justice Ginsburg, commenting
on the Act's purpose of providing relief for
"any damages," stated "Act violations
commonly cause fear, anxiety, or other
emotional distress-in the Act's parlance,
'adverse effects [,] ", and that in such cases,
"emotional distress is generally the only
harm the claimant suffers." One can readily
envision circumstances in which these types
of injuries might flow from the disclosure of
one's confidential medical records, which
often contain some of the most sensitive and
intimate information about one's physical,

mental, and emotional well-being, and
sexual orientation. Given the nature of the
injuries that most frequently flow from
privacy violations, it is difficult to see how
Congress's stated goal of subjecting federal
agencies to civil suit for any damages
resulting from a willful or intentional
violation of the Act could be fully realized
unless the Act encompasses both pecuniary
and nonpecuniary injuries .
Congress signaled its intent, tlu'oughout the
Act, to extend monetmy recovery beyond
pure economic loss. The Act obligates
agencies to maintain a records system that
"shall
establish appropriate
administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards to insure the security and
confidentiality of records and to protect
against any anticipated threats or hazards to
their security. or integrity which could result
In
substantial harm, . embarrassment,
inconvenience, or unfairness to any
individual on whom information is
m~intained." Further, the Act provides a
civil remedy for an agency's failure "to
maintain any record concerning any
individual with such accuracy, relevance,
timeliness, and completeness as is necessary
to· assure fairness in any determination
relating to the . . . character . . . of . . . the
individual that :may be made on the basis of
such record." Congress's use of language to
ensure that a federal agency's recordkeeping practices do not result in
embarrassment or harm to one's character
bolsters a construction of actual damages
that reaches nonpecuniary damages.
Further, a contrary reading of the Act seems
unreasonable in light of how we and other
courts have constmed the term "adverse
effect." The Act provides actual damages for
intentional or wilful violations that have an
adverse effect on an individual. Our circuit
and at least seven others have recognized
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that a nonpecuniary harm, such as emotional
distress, may constitute an adverse effect
under the Act. Even the Eleventh Circuit
Fitzpatrick
that
aclmowledged
in
humiliation or an emotional injury can
qualify as an adverse effect. To recognize
that the Act entitles one to actual damages
for an adverse effect related to one's mental
or emotional well-being, or one's character,
as we and other circuits have previously
done, while holding that one injured under
the Act cannot recovel~ actual damages for
nonpecumary injuries, would be an
unreasonable construction of the Act.
Indeed, such a reading would essentially
render the provision of actual damages
meaningless in cases where the plaintiff s
injury relates to his or her character, or
mental or emotional health, even though
such cases are common under the Act.
c

B. Extrinsic Sources

The parties in this case have argued at length
about how the Act's legislative history
. supports their respective positions on the
meaning of actual damages.
The statutory text itself is the "authoritative
statement" of a statute's meaning. However,
courts can and do consult extrinsic
materials, such as legislative history, for·
guidance in construing an ambiguous
statute. But courts resort to extrinsic
materials "only to the extent they shed a
reliable light on the enacting Legislature's
understanding of otherwise ambiguous
terms."
In this case, the Act's legislative history is
not a reliable source for the meaning of
actual damages because both sides of the
argument can readily. find support for their
respective positions in that history.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that in
Fitzpatrick and Johnson, the Eleventh and

Fifth Circuits conducted their own thorough
reviews of the legislative history of the Act,
only to arrive at diametrically opposing
constructions of the same term. For these
reasons, we decline to wade through the
"murky, ambiguous, and contradictory"
legislative history of the Act in the vain
hope of finding clear guidance concerning
the meaning of the term "actual damages."
Moreover, legislative history is of no help to
us in construing the scope of the
of
sovereign
Government's
waiver
immunity at issue in this case, because "the
'unequivocal expression' of elimination of
sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an
expression in statutory text. If clarity does
not exist there, it cannot be supplied by a
committee repoli. "
However, one extrinsic source that does
shed some reliable light on the meaning of
the term actual damages in the Act is the
. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15
U.S.C: § 1681 et seq. In 1970, only four
years before Congress passed the Act,
Congress enacted the· FCRA with the
express purpose of requiring
consumer reporting agencies [to]
adopt reasonable procedures for
meeting the needs of commerce for
consumer
credit,
personnel,
insurance, and other information in a
manner which is fair and equitable to
the consumer, with regard to the
confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy,
and proper utilization of such
information in accordance with the
requirements of this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
In enacting the FCRA, Congress recognized
that this country's banking system has
produced a complex system of credit
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reporting, involving consumer reporting
agencies gathering and evaluating a wide
range of personal and sensitive information,
such as "credit worthiness, credit standing,
credit capacity, character, and general
. reputation of consumers." Congress passed
the FCRA to ensure that "consumer
reporting agencies exer~ise their grave
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality,
and a respect for the consumer's right to
priwlcy." To that end, the FCRA prohibits
credit reporting agencies from releasing
consumer credit repOlis except as provided
under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a).
Thus, not only did Congress enact the Act
and the FCRA within a few years of each
other,. but they were passed to address an
identical concern growing out of closely
analogous circumstances. In· both cases,
Congress acknowledged that vast databases
of personal information are being gathered
by agencies-in one case, federal agencies,
and in the other, credit reporting agenciesand sought to circumscribe these agencies in
the manner they gather, maintain, and use
that sensitive information. Ultimately,
Congress passed both laws with the purpose
of protecting an individual's right of privacy
from being violated by the disclosure of
private information.
Further, the Act and the FCRA provide
similar remedies. The FCRA creates a
private right of action for injured consumers
to recover any "actual damages" caused by
an agency's negligent or willful violation of
the FCRA. Most importantly, we have held
that actual damages under the FCRA
encompass damages for emotional distress.
Other courts have held similarly.
"[W]hen Congress uses the same language
in two statutes having similar purposes,
particularly when one is enacted shortly
after the other, it is appropriate to presume

that Congress intended that text to have the
same meaning in both statutes." The
presumption is appropriate in this case.
Therefore, our construction of the identical
language in the FCRA, a statute closely
analogous in purpose and time as the Act, is
a reliable extrinsic source that buttresses a
construction of the Act to mean that actual
damages encompass both pecuniary and
.
nonpecuniary damages.
Having reviewed the text, purpose, and
structure of the Act, as well as how actual
damages has been construed in other closely·
analogous federal statutes, we hold that
Congress intended the term actual damages
in the Act to encompass both pecuniary and
nonpecuniary injuries.
C. Sovereign Immunity Canon
The district court held that the term actual
damages is ambiguous and, consequently,
applied the sovereign immunity canon in the
Government's favor, construing actual
damages narrowly to encompass only
pecuniary damages.. Our finding of clear
congressional intent in the statute itself-its
purpose, structure, and language-and
external suppOli in the language and
construction of the FCRA mandates reversal
of the district court's decision.
The sovereign immunity canon holds that
"[a] waiver of the Federal Government's
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally
expressed in statutory text." To the extent
there are any ambiguities in the statutory
text, those ambiguities must be strictly
construed in favor of the sovereign.
Therefore, "[t]o sustain a claim that the
Government
is
liable
for
awards
of[nonpecuniary] monetary damages, the
waiver of sovereign immunity must extend
unambiguously to such monetary claims."
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Cooper argues that the canon applies only
where the initial waiver of immunity is in
question. Because the Act expressly
authorizes a private cause of action against
the Government for damages, Cooper
contends that the canon is of no use in
construing the meaning of actual damages.
Cooper's position is not supported by
applicable case law. In United States v.
Nordic Village, Inc., the Court applied the
.sovereign immunity canon to hold that 11
U.S.C. § 106(c) does not waive the federal
government's sovereign immunity from an
action seeking monetary recovery in
bankruptcy. The Court acknowledged that §
. 106(c)'s companion provisions, § 106(a) and
§ 106(b), plainly waive immunity with
regard to monetary relief, and that § 106(c)
waives immunity as to some fOlID of relief
(e.g., declaratory relief). Despite the waiver,
the Court did not limit its application of the
sovereign immunity canon; it proceeded to
analyze the canon as to the scope of the
waiver. Because the language of § 106(c)
was "susceptible of at least two
interpretations that do not authorize
monetary relief," the Court applied the
canon to hold that § 106(c) "fails to establish
unambiguously that the waiver extends to
monetary claims," and ruled in the
government's favor. Thus, the sovereign
immunity canon remains relevant and
applicable beyond the initial waiver of
sovereign immunity for purposes of gauging
the scope of the waiver.
Applying the canon to this case, if actual
damages is susceptible of two plausible
interpretations, then the sovereign immunity
canon requires the court to construe the telID
narrowly in favor of the Government,
holding that nonpecuniary damages are not
covered. For the reasons explained above in
Part lILA-B, we conclude that when read in
connection with the text of the entire Act,

the Act's remedial scheme, and its
underlying purpose of providing relief for
"any damages" resulting from a violation of
the privacy interests protected by the Act,
the term actual damages is unambiguous.
Given Congress's clear intent to' furnish
monetary relief for some injuries that are
nonpecuniary in nature, and are proximately
caused by an agency's wilful or intentional
violation of the Act, we do not deem a
construction that limits recovery to
pecuniary loss plausible.
The district court erred by failing to consider
the full panoply of sources available to it for
evaluating the scope of the Government's
waiver of sovereign immunity under the
Act. Rather, the district court relied on the
sovereign immunity canon: alone, to the
exclusion of the traditional tools of statutory
construction. "The sovereign immunity
canon is just that-a canon of construction. It
is a tool for interpreting the law, and. we
have never held that it displaces the other
traditional tools of statutory construction."
Moreover, the scope of a waiver of
sovereign immunity can be ascertained only
by reference to the congressional policy
underlying the statute.
Congress enacted the Act to secure a·
citizen's "right to privacy[, which] is a
personal and fundamental right protected by
the Constitution of the United States."
"Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not
exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to
protect persons from injuries to particular
interests, and their contours are shaped by
the interests they protect." In connection
with compensating constitutional injuries
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, another federal
statute that seeks to provide compensation
for injuries resulting from government
.misconduct, the Supreme Court has stated,
"to further the purpose of § 1983, the rules
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governing compensation for injuries caused
by the deprivation of constitutional rights
should be tailored to the interests protected
by the particular right in question[.]"
Similarly, to achieve the policy underlying
the Act, the privacy right should be tailored
to the particular interests implicated by the
Act. Those interests will, in most cases,
result in injuries that go beyond mere
financial loss (e.g., embarrassment, mental
anguish, emotional distress). In light of the
inherently noneconomic interests central to
the Act, we cannot plausibly construe actual
damages under the Act to exclude
nonpecuniary damages.

IV. CONCLUSION
Applying traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, we hold that in using the term
actual damages, Congress clearly intended
that when a federal agency intentionally or
willfully fails to uphold its record..:keeping
obligations under the Act, and that failure
proximately causes an adverse effect on the
plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary
injuries. As a result, we reverse and remand
to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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Stanmore Cawthon COOPER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; Social SecurityAdministration; United
States Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.

. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed February 22,2010; Amended September 16, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
ORDER
The opinion filed February 22, 2010, and
published at 596 F.3d 538, is hereby
amended by deleting footnote 2 (and
renumbering succeeding footnotes) on pages
2825-26 of the slip opinion (also found at
596 FJd 538,543-44).
With this amendment, the panel votes to
deny the petition for panel rehearing. Judge
M. Smith votes to deny the petition for .
rehearing en banc, and Judges Bright and
Hawkins so recommend.
The full court was advised of the petition for
rehearing en banco After a request for a vote
by an active judge, a vote was taken, and a
majority of the active judges of the court
failed to vote for a rehearing en banco
. The .petitions for panel rehearing and
rehearing en banc are DENIED. Further
petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc
shall not be entertained.
MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge,
concuning in the order denying rehearing en
banc:
I write to respond briefly to the dissent filed
with this order.
The Privacy Act (Act) unequivocally waives
sovereign immunity. Under the Act, if a
"court determines that [an] agency acted in a

manner which was intentional or willful, the
United States shall be liable to the
individual in an amount equal to the sum of.
. . actual damages . sustained by the
individual as a result of the refusal· or .
failure" to comply with the Privacy Act. In
light of that unconditional waiver, we
appropriately followed Justice Cardozo's·
admonition: '''The exemption of the
sovereign from suit involves hardship
enough, where consent has been withheld.
We are not to add to its rigor by refinement
of construction, where consent has been
announced. ",
Our dissenting colleague mistakenly asserts
that our opinion waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States. In fact,
Congress did so. Thus, the issue in this case
is not the existence of a waiver, but rather
the scope of that express waiver, as
contemplated in the Act. To that end, we
correctly construed the waiver to allow the
recovery of nonpecuniary damages, based
upon clear congressional intent.
I

The sovereign immunity canon requires that
of sovereign
governmental
waivers
immunity be "unequivocally expressed."
The canon has clearly been satisfied in this
case. The Act categorically waives the
federal government's immunity from suit
and indisputably authorizes the recovery of
"actual damages." The government's
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· surrender to liability for damages is in the
plain text of the Act itself, leaving us only to
construe the scope of that surrender.
To construe the scope of this waiver, the
panel followed controlling precedent
directing the panel to look to the policies or
objectives underlying the Act.
II
The dissent wrongly concludes that the
comi's observation that the term "actual
damages," standing alone, is ambiguous
necessarily means that the Act does not
waive sovereign immunity for nonpecuniary
damages. Our jurisprudence has clarified
that "[r]ather than focusing just on the word
or phrase at Issue, this court looks to the
entire statute to determine Congressional
intent." "Thus, the structure and purpose of
a statute may also provide guidance in
determining the plain meaning of its
provisions. "
Accordingly, we looked to several sources
manifesting the Act's overall objective. We
noted the Act's preambular statement of
purpose, wherein Congress stated that "[t]he
purpose of this act is to provide certain
safeguards for an individual against an
invasion of personal privacy by requiring
federal agencies ... to ... be subject to civil
suit for any damages which occur as a result
of willful or intentional action which
violates any individual's rights under this
Act." We highlighted the Act's requirement
that agencies maintain records "to protect
against any anticipated threats or hazards ...
which could result in . . .. embarrassment."
We also observed the Act provides a remedy
for an agency's violation that inhibits a fair
determination relating to one's "character."
Such sources provided helpful guidance in
discerning Congress's remedial aim in
enacting the Act.

Understanding that "statutory language
cannot be construed in a vacuum," the panel
construed the term "actual damages" in its
proper context, to conclude that it
unequivocally encompasses nonpecuniary
damages. When a statute is ambiguous, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is useful as
"a tool· for interpreting the law." When a
statute is not ambiguous, however, "[t]here
is no need for us to resort to the sovereign
immunity canon." Because "there [was] no
ambiguity left for us to construe," the
application of the sovereign immunity canon
was unnecessary in this case.
Further, "[t]he sovereign immunity canon is
just that-a canon of construction. It is a tool
for interpreting the law, and we have never
held that it displaces the other traditional
tools of statutory construction." Based upon
the clear congressional intent as to the scope
of "actual damages" under the Privacy Act,
this court properly concluded that the
government could not "carry the day by
invoking general maxims of judicial policy."
III

The dissent misconstrues the relationship
between the requirement of showing an
"adverse .effect" and that of "actual
damages." In Doe v. Chao, the Court held
that "an individual subjected to an adverse
effect has injury enough to open the
courthouse door." A majority of the circuits
in this country, including our own, has held
that mental distress 0'1' emotional harm IS
sufficient to constitute an adverse effect.
Under the dissent's view, a plaintiff is
entitled to establish standing for an injury
under the Act that results in a nonpecuniary
harm, but is not entitled to seek actual
damages for such a nonpecuniary injury.
Such a construction of the Act would clearly
frustrate the intent of Congress. In contrast,
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our opinion is tme to the overall objective of
the Act, allowing a plaintiff who
demonstrates a nonpecuniary adverse effect
to have the opportunity to recover
nonpecuniary damages, to the extent the
plaintiff can proffer the requisite degree of
competent evidence that there is a real and
tangible nonpecuniary injury. Our opinion is
also consistent with the familiar mle of
statutory
constmction that remedial
legislation should be constmed broadly to
effectuate its purposes.
IV

Controlling precedent in cases such as
Franchise Tax Board, Hopi Tribe, and Town
& Country, requires us to constme the scope

of the Act's unequivocal waiver of
sovereign immunity in light of the
underlying congressional policy, and with
the purpose of achieving the remedial goal
of that waiver. The multiple sources the
panel consulted reveal a clear and focused
intent on the part of Congress to grant
complete relief to those injured by willful
violations of the Act. Given that intent, .
Congress's provision that the federal
government be liable for "actual damages"
constitutes an unequivocal expression of the
federal government's waiver of its .own
sovereign immunity for nonpecuniary
injuries. The panel concluded there was no
other plausible explanation for this
unqualified language.
In conclusion, our dissenting colleague
reminds us that "[0Jnly Congress has the
keys to unlock our country's Treasury." But
Congress used its keys and opened that door
for plaintiffs injured by willful violations of
the Act when it expressly gave plaintiffs the
right to sue the government for actual
damages. A court must not act "as a selfconstituted guardian of the Treasury [toJ
import immunity back into a statute

designed to limit it."

V
The panel's decision is compelled by the
precedents of the Supreme Court and this
court for constming the scope of a waiver of
sovereign immunity, and the court properly
denied rehearing this case en banco
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting
from the order denying rehearing en banc,
joined by KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, and
GOULD,
TALLMAN,
BYBEE,
CALLAHAN, BEA, and N.R. SMITH,
Circuit Judges:
The Supreme Court has consistently held
that the sovereign immunity of the United
States may be waived only by an
unequivocal expression in statutory text.
Today, our court neglects this principle by
leaving in place a decision that the term
"actual damages" in the Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A), is sufficient to deem
sovereign
immunity
waived
for
nonpecuniary damages, even though the
opinion itself admits that the term is not
defined in the statute, has no plain meaning,
has no fixed legal meaning, and indeed, is a
"chameleon." Cooper V. FAA, 596 F.3d 538,
544-45 (9th Cir.2010). Even more troubling,
the opinion relies on· abstract legislative
intent and an interpretation of the Privacy
Act that the Supreme Court recently rejected
in Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct.
1204, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004). The effect
of today's order is to open wide the United
States Treasury to a whole new class of
claims without warrant. In so doing, we
exacerbate a circuit split that had been
healing under the strong medicine of recent
sovereign immunity jurispmdence. 1 Hence,
it is most unfortunate that we did not rehear
this case en banco
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I
'''A waiver of the Federal Government's
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally
expressed in statutory text, and will not be
implied. Moreover, a waiver of the
Government's sovereign immunity will be
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in
favor of the sovereign." "[T]he 'unequivocal
expression' of elimination of sovereign
immunity that we insist upon is an
expression in statutory text." "A statute's
legislative history cannot supply a waiver
that does not appear clearly in any statutory
text. ... "
A

Here, the court all but admits that the
statutory term "actual damages" does not
unequivocally express a waiver for
nonpecuniary damages. According to our
court's opinion, "there is no ordinary or
plain meaning of the term actual damages."
Cooper, 596 F.3d at 544 (emphasis added).
Indeed, definitional analysis "sheds little
light on the type of injury or loss Congress
intended plaintiffs to be able to prove." In
addition, the court concedes that two other
circuits "agree[ ] that the meaning of the
term actual damages is ambiguous." It also
states that "we have recognized the shifting
sense we have attributed to the term." The
term, the court concludes, is a '" chameleon, '
as its meaning changes with the specific
statute." Our court's own rationale,
therefore, indicates that the statute does not
waive sovereign immunity for nonpecuniary
damages.
B
Notwithstanding such textual infirmities, the
opinion resorts to the "clear purpose behind
the [Privacy] Act" purportedly embodied in
the Act's preamble, the way that Congress
"signaled its intent" in the Act's

recordkeeping
provision,
and
the
"presumption" that Congress intended the
Act to mirror the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
But the proper conclusion to draw from the
sources on which the court relies, if any can
be drawn at all, is precisely the opposite of
that drawn by the court. Assuming that
recourse to a preamble is appropriate in the
circumstances of this case, the Act's
preamble uses the term "any damages," not
the narrower term "actual damages." That
the preamble differs from the operative
provision indicates a difference in meaning,
not, as the court concludes, an equivalence
in meaning. In addition, the recordkeeping
provision requires . agencies to prevent
"embarrassment" but, notably, does not state
that such harm is compensable. Finally, the
court's intuiting of congressional intent from
our interpretation of the term "actual
damages" in the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
conflicts with the statement mere pages
earlier that the meaning of the term "actual
damages" varies from statute to statute.
Although my colleague's concurrence insists
that the majority opmlOn "correctly
construed the waiver to allow the recovery
of nonpecuniary damages," Concurrence at
1019, the opinion itself concedes that if the
term "actual damages is susceptible of two
plausible interpretations, then the sovereign
immunity canon requires the court to
construe the. term narrowly in favor of the
Government [and] hold[ ] that nonpecuniary
damages are not covered." The language
used in the preamble and. recordkeeping
provision, and the various ways the term is
used in other statutes, make evident that it is
indeed susceptible to an alternative plausible
interpretation. By its own logic, the court
should have construed the term narrowly.
C

. But it is the court's recourse to the Privacy
Act's standing provision that is the most
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troubling, because it conflicts with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the very
provision of the Privacy Act at issue in this
case. In Doe v. Chao, the Court
distinguished standing to sue under the
Privacy Act (which extends to all who suffer
an "adverse effect") from the right to
damages. The Court stated that the term
"adverse effect" has the "limited but specific
function" of "identifying a potential plaintiff
who satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation
requirements of Article III standing." "That
is, an individual subjected to an adverse
effect has injury enough to open the
courthouse door, but without more has no
cause of action for damages under the
Privacy Act." Here, the cOUli jumbles the'
two concepts, interpreting the term "actual
damages" broadly with respect to the type of
damages available simply because the term
"adverse effect" is interpreted broadly with
respect to standing. Not appropriate, said the
Supreme Court quite clearly in Doe.
II
It is apparent that this case involves an
. important question of federal law. "It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to
be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent." Sovereign immunity
allows
for
majoritarian
democracy,

preventing the discouragement by courts of
government action. We ignore at our peril
the well-established clear statement rule for
waivers of sovereign immunity, which. puts
Congress, not the courts, in charge.
Concern over the impact of a waiver of
sovereign
immunity
is
particularly
appropriate in this case. Even the dissent in
Doe, which sought to expand damages under
the Privacy Act, admitted that by its
enactment "Congress did not want to saddle
the Government with disproportionate
liability." Congress was prescient. Because
more and more government records are
accessible online through the Internet, they .
are easier to share. The proliferation of
electronic records raises the stakes of a
broader waiver of sovereign immunity,
increasing the fiscal exposure of the United
States to the tune of a $1000 minimum
statutory award per claim. Only Congress
has the keys to unlock our country's
Treasury. The role of the cOUlis is to ensure
that Congress has used them in each case.
III
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent
from the order denying rehearing en bane.

***
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"Supreme Court to Review Pilot's Privacy Suit"
San Francisco Chronicle

June 21, 2011
Bob Egelko
The U:.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
hear the Obama administration's request to
dismiss a lawsuit by a San Francisco pilot
against federal agencies that disclosed his
HIV -positive status during a fraud
investigation, a case that could determine
the scope of a post-Watergate privacy law.
At issue in Stan Cooper's case is whether
agencies that reveal an individual's medical
records or other private information can be
sued for causing emotional distress. The
Obama administration argued that the 1974
Privacy Act allows damages only for
financial losses, which C()oper did not claini
in his suit.
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
San Francisco ruled in February 2010 that
Cooper could seek damages for emotional
harm. The Supreme Court granted review of
the administration's appeal Monday and will
hear the case in the term that begins in
October. The issue of whether plaintiffs can
seek damages for emotional harm under the
Privacy Act has divided the nation's appeals
courts in other cases.
Cooper's lawyer, James Wood, said the case
would affect the continuing vitality of a law
that was passed in response to revelations of
break-ins and surveillance of private citizens
during
President
Richard
Nixon's
administration.

"More often than not, .embarrassment and
humiliation are the only damages," Wood
said. "Unless these are compensable, it's a
free license to the government" to break the
.
law.
Cooper, a small-plane pilot, started flying in
1964 but gave up his license after he was
diagnosed HIV-positive in 1985, when FAA
rules still denied licenses to anyone with the
AIDS virus.
Cooper reapplied for a license in 1994
without disclosing his condition. His health
briefly worsened in 1995 and he applied for
Social Security benefits, with the assurance
that his medical records would remain
confidential. Although the FAA repealed its
HIV ban several years later, the agency
revoked Cooper's license in 2005 after
obtaining his medical records from the
.Social Security Administration. The FAA's
investigation was part of "Operation Safe
Pilot," which examined records of 47,000
Northern California pilots to see if they had
committed fraud in obtaining Social
Security benefits or a pilot's license.
Cooper pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor
charge in 2006 and was fined $1,000. The
FAA restored his license later that year.
The Supreme Court case is FAA vs. Cooper,
10-1024.
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"Emotional Injury as Privacy Harm"
Harvard Law Blog: Info/Law
June 21,2011
William McGeveran

Perhaps lost in all the understandable
attention to yesterday's Supreme Court
decision in the Wal-Mart class action case,
the Court also granted cert. in a potentially
significant privacy law case, FAA v.
Cooper.
. . . The formal question presented in the
case IS:
Whether a plaintiff who alleges only
mental and emotional injuries can
establish "actual damages" within
the meaning of the civil remedies
provision of the Privacy Act, 5
U.S.C. 552a(g)(4)(A).
The Privacy Act concerns the federal
government's
handling
of
personal
information, and it includes restrictions on
the ability of one federal agency to provide
that information to other agencies. Cooper,
an airline pilot, had HIV and concealed it
when he renewed the medical certifications
required for his pilot's license. When his
condition deteriorated he applied for
disability from the Social Security
Administration, which later provided
information about Cooper's HIV status to
the FAA in an investigation. Cooper alleged
that action violated the Privacy Act, but he
did not claim damages related to the loss of
his license and his job, presumably because
his own concealment of his HIV status was a
federal crime (for which he was convicted
and put on probation).
An injured plaintiff can· recover "actual
damages" for "intentional or willful"
violations of the Privacy Act. But what are
"actual damages" in this context? Do they

include the emotional halm Cooper claims
he suffered? In this case, the Ninth Circuit
said it might. The Fifth Circuit has reached
the same conclusion previously, but the
Sixth and Eleventh. Circuits have made the
opposite determination. Now the Supreme
Court will sort it out.
This gets very complicated, not only
because of the· ephemeral nature of many
privacy hal'ms, but also because this case
involves hotly contested issues of sovereign
immunity. Under a well-established rule, the
government can be sued for damages only
when Congress clearly says so in a statute.
In essence, the Ninth Circuit decision in
Cooper said that the Privacy Act clearly
allows private lawsuits, and that the nature
of the damages available was a distinct
question. The government responds that
even the· Ninth Circuit found "actual
damages" a nebulous concept, so it could
hardly qualify as the type of "clear
statement" necessary to subject the
government to liability.
This dispute could yield a relatively nalTOW
and technical decision. On the other hand,
combined with the COU1i's earlier decision
limiting the availability of Privacy Act
damages awards in Doe v. Chao, it could
remove one of the last meaningful potential
penalties for violations of the Act. Or, if the
Court makes more expansive statements,
those could provide precedent for arguments
either supporting or opposing the award of
compensatory damages for the emotional
harm caused by privacy violations beyond
just the nalTOW confines of the Privacy Act.

***
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"Gay Pilot Wins New Hearing
on Privacy Act Damages"
Leonard Link (Blog)

February 23,2010
Professor Arthur S. Leonard
A unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled on
Feburary 22 that Stanmore Cawthon Cooper,
a gay pilot whose Social Security Disability
medical file was unlawfully shared by the
Social Secwity Administration with
investigators from the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Depatiment of
TranspOliation, was entitled to seek damages
for non-pecuniary injudes under the federal
Privacy Act. The ruling in Cooper v. FAA,
2010 Westlaw 597486, reverses a
determination by U.S. District Judge·
Vaughn Walker (N.D.Cal.) that the statute's
authorization of damages for ."actual
injuries" must be narrowly construed to be
limited only to pecuniary losses resulting
from a violation ofthe statute.
Cooper, who had a pilot's license beginning
in 1964, learned he was HIV+ in 1985, but
decided not to disclose this to the FAA,
because
he
was
worried
about
confidentiality concerning his sexual
orientation and HIV status. He actually
allowed his medical certification from the
FAA to lapse at one point, knowing that the
agency was grounding pilots· who were·
taking anti-retroviral medications. In 1994,
he reapplied for a medical certificate from
the FAA, but did not disclose his HIV status
or medication situation on the application,
and a new celiificate was issued. However,
his HIV-related symptoms worsened and in
1995 Cooper applied to the Social Security
Administration for disability benefits, which
were awarded to him from August 1995 to
August 1996. Cooper did not notify the FAA

about this development concerning his
health.
In July 2002, the FAA launched an
investigation into possible fraud by pilots
disclose adverse health
failing to
information to the agency. They launched a
data matching program in Northem
Califomia, where they sent a list of all
of
active
FAA
medical
holders
certifications, together with their social
security numbers, to the Social Security
Administration,. which then reported back to
them all of the pilots on the list who had
sought disability benefits from the agency.
Cooper's name was on the list. He was
subsequently confronted with this, and pled
guilty to a count of making and delivering a
false official writing, a misdemeanor for
which he was fined $1,000. Upset that the
Social
Security
Administration
had
disclosed medical information to the FAA
that was supposed to be confidential, Cooper
launched this lawsuit, and won a ruling from
the district court that the agencies had
violated the Privacy Act by failing to obtain
his authorization to disclose his Social
Security medical records. But Judge Walker,
as noted above, refused to award damages,
since Cooper's lllJurleS were entirely
psychological (emotional distress, etc.).
The court of appeals found that there is a
split of circuit authority on the question
whether
non-pecuniary
lllJunes
are
compensable under the ·Privacy Act, but that
it was a question of first impression for the
9th Circuit. The panel unanimously
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concluded that in light of the purpose and
function of the statute, it was clear that such
injuries should be compensable. Indeed,
elsewhere in the statute in relating the
legislative purposes, the law mentions
compensating "all injuries," and there is a
clear recognition in other federal privacy
statutes and in the Supreme Court's
constitutional privacy jurisprudence that.
frequently the main injury resulting from a
breach of privacy is embarrassment· or
emotional distress. Consequently, it would
be unreasonable to construe the statute to
deny compensation for such injuries. The

case was remanded to Judge Walker for a
determination whether the disclosure caused
any non-pecuniary injuries to Cooper that
should be compensated. If any qualifying
injury is shown, the statute authorizes
damages of at least $1,000.
Given the split of circuit authority, it is
possible that the government will seek en
banc review and/or an appeal to the
Supreme Court. Cooper is represented on
the appeal by Raymond A. Cardozo, Tiffany
Renee Thomas, James M. Wood and David
J. Bird from the firm of Reed Smith LLP.
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"The Nature of Privacy Harms: Financial and
Physical Harm vs. Emotional and Mental Harm"
Concurring Opinions
. January 15,2010
Daniel Solove
The 9th Circuit is hearing an interesting case
involving the Privacy Act-Cooper v.
Federal Aviation Administration, No. C
The
071383' VRW (N.D. Cal. 2008).
F ederal Aviation Administration (FAA)
shared information about pilot Stanmore
Cooper's HIV positive status with other
government agencies. The district court
found this information sharing to be
improper under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552a:
DOT-OIG . transmitted
Because
Cooper's records to another agency
without his prior consent and this use
does not fall within the routine use or
another exception to 5 USC §
552a(b), the DOTOIG's use of
Cooper's record was unlawful under
5 USC § 552a(b).
However, the fact that an agency violates the
Privacy Act does not mean that a plaintiff
can obtain redress. In a decision I find
wrongheaded-both as a matter of statutory
interpretation as well as normative policythe U.S. Supreme Court has held that the
Privacy Act requires that a plaintiff prove
actual damages before being able to get
monetary relief under the Act. See Doe v.
Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004). The Supreme
Court reached this conclusion even though
the Privacy Act has a liquidated damages
provision:
[T]he United States shall be liable to
the individual in an amount equal to
the sum of . . . actual damages
sustained by the individual as a result

of the refusal or failure, but in no
case shall a person entitled to
recovery receive less than the sum of.
$1,000.
5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4).
In order to receive the liquidated damages of
$1000, plaintiffs must first demonstrate they
are "entitled to recovery" and prove actual
damages.
.I believe the holding in Chao is misguided
because the very function of a liquidated
damages provision is to address difficulties
in proving harm. Privacy Act violations
often involve harms that are not akin to
traditional types of injuries. Privacy harms
caused by misuse or improper dissemination
of information are more abstract in nature
and often can't be directly linked to
financial losses or physical 1l1Jury.
Nevertheless, they are harms, and without a
way for plaintiffs to recover damages for
such . harms, there is not a sufficient
incentive for plaintiffs to bring Privacy Act
lawsuits and for' agencies to follow the
Privacy Act.
Unfortunately, until Congress amends the
Privacy Act to more clearly establish that
liquidated damages can be recovered
without proof of actual .damages, plaintiffs
must establish actual damages.
The issue in Cooper is what kind of
damages can constitute actual damages. Can
emotional/mental damages alone constitute
actual damages?
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There's a circuit split on the issue. As the
district court noted:
Two circuits that have addressed the
. definition of actual damages in the
context of the Privacy Act exaIl1ined
the statute's legislative history to
reach different conclusions. In
Fitzpatrick v. Internal Revenue
Service, the Eleventh Circuit focused
. on the evolution of the Privacy Act's
.damages provisions and noted that
while early versions of the
legislation included provisions for
punitive damages and general
damages, these damages provisions
were not included in the version that
became law. The court found support
in the legislative history for a narrow
reading of actual damages and held
that '''actual damages' as used in the
Privacy Act permits recovery only
for proven pecuniary losses and not
for generalized mental injuries, loss
of reputation, embarrassment or
other non-quantifiable injuries."
In Johnson v. Department of
Treasury, the Fifth Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion. The court.
noted that one of the Privacy Act's
stated purposes is requiring federal
agencies to "be subject to civil suit
for any damages which occur as a
result of willful or intentional"
violation." After a lengthy analysis
of the legislative history, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff
there could recover for proven
mental injuries.
The district court

III

Cooper sided with

Fitzpatrick, reasoning that the Act was
. ambiguous about what actual damages
constituted and such ambiguity should be
resolved in favor of the govemment.
I disagree. If Doe v. Chao is combined with
a rule that actual damages must involve
physical injury or financial loss, then it
becomes extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
recover under the Privacy Act. There will be
a large group of cases where plaintiffs suffer
Privacy Act violations butcan't get damages
because privacy hanns are often emotional
hanns. When they wrote their seminal
article, The Right to Privacy, inspiring a
significant development of privacy law,
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
recognized that privacy was an "injury to the
feelings" and that the law at the time (1890)
had evolved sufficiently to redress su.ch
harms that did not constitute physical
injuries or financial loss.
It would certainly be ironic if the Privacy
Act wouldn't recognize the nature of most
privacy harms. Agencies could violate the
. Privacy Act, improperly sharing and
disseminating information, and in a large
number of cases, then be able to argue that
there's no harm. Why should Congress have
bothered to pass the Privacy Act limiting
such practices and providing plaintiffs with
a remedy if in many of these cases there
would be no cognizable harm and plaintiffs
won't be able to recover any damages? It
seems like a wrongheaded interpretation to
me.

If we must live with Doe v. Chao, at the
very least, to avoid making a total mockery
of the Privacy Act, emotional/mental harm
must be sufficient to establish actual injury.
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